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Chapter 1 – Introduction  
 
I. Introduction 
Part of the bleak history of the ongoing failed attempts to resolve the Cyprus conflict is an 
encouraging success story: over the last few years, the Committee of Missing Persons, staffed 
by Greek Cypriot (GC) and Turkish Cypriot (TC) scientists, has made strides in discovering 
and identifying the bodies of individuals that had gone missing during the violence of the 1960s 
and 1970s.1 This became possible after decades of frustrating stalemate, when the plight of 
missing persons’ families was reconceptualised as a human rights problem affecting, and 
deserving a response from, both communities on the island.2 At the same time, the authorities’ 
failure to locate those who disappeared during the apartheid era in South Africa (SA), which 
was also understood and addressed as a human rights issue, has been described by the country’s 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) as ‘perhaps the most significant piece of 
unfinished business’ within its mandate.3 The juxtaposition between these two examples 
illustrates a tendency among decision makers from very different backgrounds, to rely on 
human rights in order to promote peace in post-violence societies. It also suggests that although 
the use of human rights as peacebuilding tools can have profound positive effects, this is not 
an absolute and universal truth.  
 
There is a paradox surrounding our expectations around the protection of human rights: on the 
one hand, we anticipate that they will provide stability and legitimise the legal and political 
system within which they operate, and on the other, we envisage that they will act as agents of 
change and be the bearers of necessary social reform.4 Yet, this paradox has not been translated 
in equally nuanced expectations about the way in which human rights can be utilised, and the 
effects they can have, in post-violence societies. Rather, human rights are seen as the 
‘universally recognised chic language’ of writing and implementing peace agreements5 and 
utterances that encourage measured expectations about what they can achieve are few and far 
between.6 This study challenges the orthodoxy by arguing that human rights can indeed make 
valuable contributions to peacebuilding efforts, so long as the necessary conditions that allow 
this are in place. Understanding the precise ways in which they can help build peace and 
identifying the factors that assist in this process, is important because it points to practical steps 
that decision makers can take to enhance their effectiveness in post-violence societies. Thus, 
clarifying the largely underexplored relationship between protecting human rights and building 
peace is not (only) an exercise of theoretical importance. Rather, if its conclusions are taken 
                                                 
1 For more information on the Committee of Missing Persons, see www.cmp-cyprus.org. 
2 Iosif Kovras, Grassroots Activism and the Evolution of Transitional Justice: The Families of the Disappeared 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2017) 154. 
3 TRC, Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Pretoria, TRC, 1998), Volume 6, Section 4, ch 1, 
[96] 
4 Aileen Kavanagh, ‘The Role of a Bill of Rights in Reconstructing Northern Ireland’ (2004) 26 Human Rights 
Quarterly 956. 
5 Christine Bell, Peace Agreements and Human Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000) 298. 
6 Emily Pia and Thomas Diez, ‘Human Rights Discourses and Conflict: Moving Towards Desecuritization’ in 
Raffaele Marchetti and Nathalie Tocci (eds), Civil Society, Conflicts and the Politicization of Human Rights 
(Tokyo, United Nations University Press, 2011). 
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seriously and adopted in good faith, they can give rise to a range of strategies that result in the 
betterment of people’s lives around the world.  
 
II. The Central Question 
References to the peacebuilding potential of human rights are abundantly scattered throughout 
the literature. The seminal UN report An Agenda for Peace confidently declared that ‘human 
rights monitors, electoral officials, refugee and humanitarian aid specialists’, in other words 
those professionals that are most directly concerned with the protection of human rights, play 
a ‘central role’ in peacebuilding operations.7 Similarly, the UN High-level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change expressed its support for the integration of human rights throughout 
the work of the Organisation and encouraged the development of strong domestic human rights 
institutions, especially in countries emerging from conflict.8 This faith in human rights was 
reiterated by UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, when he argued that ‘elements of good 
governance’, among them ‘monitoring [of] human rights’, have received much attention 
because they ‘can promote reconciliation and offer a path for consolidating peace’.9 This 
positive relationship has also been explicitly acknowledged by other UN organs, with the 
General Assembly noting that ‘the promotion of a culture of peace [is] based on […] respect 
for human rights’,10 and the Security Council stressing ‘the urgent need to promote peace and 
national reconciliation and to foster accountability and respect for human rights’, while 
highlighting ‘the key role’ that Human Rights Commissions can play in this respect.11  
 
Such peacebuilding expectations should be taken with a pinch of salt. Often, the absolute and 
overreaching, yet vague, language of UN instruments reflects compromises that took place 
during their drafting process, rather than accurate assessments of what human rights can 
deliver. For this reason, it is not always appropriate to use soundbites from lengthy UN reports 
and treat them as evidence of simplistic assumptions on behalf of policy makers that protecting 
human rights necessarily leads to peace. Even so, the history of peacebuilding operations 
confirms that such statements have, in fact, shaped practices on the ground. Since 1945, which 
marked the first modern attempts to build peace, and until today, peacebuilding operations have 
evolved and become much more sophisticated in their objectives and methods. Yet, at no point 
during this process, has the effectiveness of human rights as peacebuilding tools been seriously 
questioned. The emphasis that was placed on them during the early years is reflected in the 
establishment of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, which were intended to prosecute 
perpetrators of serious human rights violations.12 International peacebuilding went into 
hibernation during the Cold War, but the fall of communism at the end of the 20th century led 
                                                 
7 UN Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping: Report 
of the Secretary-General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 
January 1992, A/47/277 – S/24111 (New York, United Nations, 1992), [52]. 
8 UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our 
Shared Responsibility, A/59/565 (New York, United Nations, 2004), [284]. 
9 Kofi Annan, ‘The Quiet Revolution’ (1998) 4 Global Governance 123, 123. 
10 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 52/13 (15 January 1998), Art 2. 
11 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1270 (22 October 1999), Art 17. 
12 Robert Cryer et al, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (2nd edn, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2012) 109-119; Darryl Robinson, ‘The Identity Crisis of International Criminal Law’ 
(2008) 21 Leiden Journal of International Law 952, 958.  
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to the second stage of its development.13 Peacebuilding operations during this period – for 
example, in SA and Latin America – questioned a number of key assumptions, such as whether 
the use of criminal trials was the best way to promote peace, or Truth Commissions, coupled 
with amnesties, were more appropriate.14 Yet, paying attention to human rights, either by 
punishing or being open about their violations, remained among the cornerstones of 
peacebuilding efforts. The third, and current, stage places even more emphasis on human rights 
by making them a key tenet of liberal peacebuilding, which is being implemented, since the 
mid-1990s around the world.15 This peacebuilding strategy is based on the premise that the 
establishment of liberal institutions – among them, a democratic and free market, the rule of 
law and, importantly, the protection of human rights – is all that is needed for the 
transformation of post-violence societies.  
 
Thus, examples from such societies confirm that there is indeed an almost universal and 
extensive reliance on human rights as peacebuilding tools. For instance, the post-war 
Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) has made the country a member to 16 
international human rights agreements,16 while the SA Final Constitution contains one of the 
most robust Bills of Rights, with civil, political, economic, social, cultural and group 
protections.17 Northern Ireland’s (NI) Belfast Agreement often refers to human rights, precisely 
because any impasse during the negotiations was overcome by resorting to them18 and many 
of the peacebuilding initiatives that have been adopted in Cyprus are explicitly based on their 
protection.19 Moreover, confidence in the peacebuilding potential of human rights has been 
echoed by many academics, who are not restrained by the same limitations as diplomats and 
policy makers. Thus, Parlevliet notes that ‘the sustained protection of rights is essential for 
                                                 
13 Ruti Teitel, ‘Transitional Justice Genealogy’ (2003) 16 Harvard Human Rights Journal 69. 
14 For an excellent literature review of this debate, see Kieran McEvoy and Louise Mallinder, ‘Amnesties in 
Transition: Punishment, Restoration and the Governance of Mercy’ (2012) 39 Journal of Law and Society 410. 
15 Oliver Richmond, The Transformation of Peace (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). The literature 
addressing the limitations of liberal peacebuilding is vast and growing. See eg, Oliver Richmond, ‘A Post-Liberal 
Peace: Eirinism and the Everyday’ (2009) 35 Review of International Studies 557; Chandra Lekha Sriram, ‘Justice 
as Peace? Liberal Peacebuilding and Strategies of Transnational Justice’ (2007) 21 Global Society 579; Oliver 
Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall, Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, 
Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2016); Ronald Paris, ‘Wilson’s 
Ghost: The Faulty Assumptions of Postconflict Peacebuilding’ in Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamel 
Aall (eds), Turbulent Peace: Conflict Resolution Versus Democratic Governance: Divergent Paths to Peace? 
(Washington D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001); Roger Mac Ginty, ‘Indigenous Peace-Making 
Versus the Liberal Peace’ (2008) 43 Cooperation and Conflict 139; Charles Thiessen, ‘Emancipatory 
Peacebuilding: Critical Responses to (Neo)Liberal Trends’ in Thomas Matyok, Jessica Senehi and Sean Byrne 
(eds), Critical Issues in Peace and Conflict Studies: Theory, Practice and Pedagogy (Lanham, Lexington Books, 
2011). 
16 Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 4 of the General Framework Agreement, signed on 14 
December 1995, Annex I. 
17 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa [108 of 1996], Sections 7-39. 
18 The Northern Ireland Peace Agreement, Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations, signed on 10 
April 1998 (Belfast Agreement); Bell, Peace Agreements and Human Rights 173. 
19 Nikos Skoutaris, ‘Buidling Transitional Justice Mechanisms without a Peace Settlement: A Critical Appraisal 
of Recent Case Law of the Strasbourg Court on the Cyprus Issue’ (2010) 35 European Law Review 720. 
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dealing with conflict constructively’,20 while Barash and Webel,21 Little22 and Lederach23 
include human rights protections among their recommended peacebuilding tools. Finally, a 
literature review by Bonacker et al. points to widespread expectations that human rights can 
help desecuritize conflicts24 and even Brewer’s otherwise critical analysis of liberal 
peacebuilding, concludes that ‘[t]he human rights discourse […] is essentially a language of 
peace.’25 
 
Yet, despite such endorsements, relatively little attention has been paid to the specific ways in 
which human rights can help build peace and the conditions that must be in place for this to 
happen. Referring to the African context, Widner notes that ‘[b]ecause the language of the rule 
of law is now so much in vogue, observers too often tend to assume that courts can easily 
promote peace and democratic change in postconflict regimes, without looking closely at the 
grounds for such optimism.’26 This tendency is problematic, since it can result in significantly 
undertheorised expectations. We protect human rights in post-violence societies, without 
having settled on, or even properly discussed, what is the ultimate goal of the intervention, 
which actors are expected to deliver it, how we envisage this to materialise, whether there are 
any conditions that must be in place and what are the associated risks with the process.27 
Among the few academics that have adopted a more subtle analysis is Christine Bell, who notes 
on the one hand, that the strength of human rights protections and the success of the 
peacebuilding mission are integrally linked, but warns on the other, of the need to establish 
strong and effective institutions.28 Similarly, Marchetti and Tocci argue that whether the human 
right in question is an individual or a collective one, and the way it is used in each instance, 
affect its overall peacebuilding potential.29 The study joins these more critical voices by 
examining the adjudication, implementation and post-implementation challenges of human 
rights protection, and identifying the steps that should be taken, for these to be addressed. 
 
                                                 
20 Michelle Parlevliet, Bridging the Divide: Exploring the Relationship between Human Rights and Conflict 
Management, Track Two Occasional Paper (Cape Town, Centre for Conflict Resolution, March 2002), 20. 
21 David P. Barash and Charles P. Webel, Peace and Conflict Studies (2nd edn, California, SAGE Publications, 
2009). 
22 David Little, ‘Peace, Justice and Religion’ in Pierre Allan and Alexis Keller (eds), What Is Just Peace? (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2006). 
23 John Paul Lederach, ‘Beyond Violence: Building Sustainable Peace’ in Arthur Williamson (ed), Beyond 
Violence: The Role of Voluntary and Community Action in Building a Sustainable Peace in Northern Ireland 
(Belfast, Community Relations Council, 1995). 
24 Thorsten Bonacker et al, ‘Human Rights and the (De)Securitization of Conflict’ in Raffaele Marchetti and 
Nathalie Tocci (eds), Civil Society, Conflicts and the Politicization of Human Rights (Tokyo, United Nations 
University Press, 2001). For additional evidence of this, see Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler, ‘“We the 
Peoples”: Contending Discourses of Security in Human Rights Theory and Practice’ (2004) 18 International 
Relations 9.  
25 John D. Brewer, Peace Processes: A Sociological Approach (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2010) 48.  
26 Jennifer Widner, ‘Courts and Democracy in Postconflict Transitions: A Social Scientist’s Perspective on the 
African Case’ (2001) 95 American Journal of International Law 64, 64.  
27 Padraig McAuliffe, Transformative Transitional Justice and the Malleability of Post-Conflict States 
(Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2017) 65. 
28 Bell, Peace Agreements and Human Rights 294. 
29 Raffaele Marchetti and Nathalie Tocci, ‘Conflict Society and Human Rights: An Analytical Framework’ in 
Raffaele Marchetti and Nathalie Tocci (eds), Civil Society, Conflicts and the Politicization of Human Rights 
(Tokyo, United Nations University Press, 2011). 
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At the moment, the dominant perception is that any failures of human rights and other liberal 
tools to promote peace are mainly due to their non-implementation, or other exogenous factors, 
such as underfunding or lack of cooperation between peacebuilders.30 Disappointing results are 
never because human rights were used in an ill-suited way or under conditions that rendered 
them ineffective. Nevertheless, a belief that ‘a bit more human rights can never make things 
worse’ is dangerous because it necessarily ‘places blame for whatever goes wrong 
elsewhere’.31 As a result, the failures of human rights to build peace tend to be understood as 
encouragements to keep walking faster in the same direction, rather than question the 
correctness of the path that peacebuilding actors are on in the first place. This study proposes 
a different response: in short, entertain the possibility that what we ask of human rights in 
peacebuilding operations might simply be too much.   
 
Undertaking this exercise is essential because continuing to rely on current assumptions can 
result in several potentially dangerous and counterproductive misconceptions. First, a lack of 
clarity on how human rights can assist peacebuilding efforts might lead to the inaccurate 
conclusion that making any human rights policy part of the peacebuilding agenda can have 
equally positive effects. Second, this can prevent decision makers from assessing whether 
reliance on human rights is preferable to, or should be supplemented by, the adoption of other 
peacebuilding strategies. Finally, neglecting to pay close attention to the conditions that make 
human rights effective peacebuilding tools might lead to the misguided belief that their 
protection will always result in a positive outcome, irrespective of the context, which they are 
being implemented in. Consequently, this can result in the adoption of uniform strategies with 
little appreciation of how the peculiarities of each post-violence society should be taken into 
account. While these dangers might not be an unavoidable eventuality, they become more 
likely to materialise, if the nuanced relationship between human rights and peace is not in the 
forefront of decision makers’ minds.  
 
III. An Anatomy of the Relationship Between Human Rights and Peace 
The study clarifies the relationship between human rights and peace by relying both on the 
development of a theoretical framework and the assessment of hypotheses derived from it 
through the comparison of human rights-related peacebuilding practices in four post-violence 
societies. Chapter two starts building on the theory by proposing that peacebuilders should be 
working towards striking a balance between three inter-connected, but also potentially 
conflicting elements. The first, security, seeks to both objectively reduce the levels of violence, 
and promote a subjective sense among the population that their physical well-being is no longer 
                                                 
30 Roland Paris, ‘Understanding the “Coordination Problem” in Postwar Statebuilding’ in Roland Paris and 
Timothy D. Sisk (eds), The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace 
Operations (London, Routledge, 2009). This is further confirmed by statements from the UN Secretary-General, 
who identified the problem of peace operations as being an institutional one, with the creation of the Peacebuilding 
Commission providing the solution. (UN Secretary-General, Address by United Nations Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan to the Fifty-Sixth Session of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme (Geneva, 
United Nations, 6 October 2005).) 
31 David Kennedy, ‘The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?’ (2002) 15 Harvard Human 
Rights Journal 101, 124 and 122 respectively. 
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under threat. The second, justice, involves efforts to address the injustices of the past and ensure 
that further injustices will not be perpetrated in the future, while the third element, 
reconciliation, aims to build meaningful relationships of cooperation among previously 
warring parties. Like with security, efforts to promote justice and reconciliation should result 
in institutions that objectively improve people’s lives, the effects of which are also experienced 
and understood as such, by the target audience itself. Striking a balance between the three 
elements of peace, chapter three continues, does not require the elimination of conflicts among 
previously warring parties, but ensuring that these conflicts are resolved in a non-violent 
manner. Human rights can assist peacebuilding efforts by contributing to this conflict 
resolution process in two ways: on the one hand, they can be used during the adjudication of a 
conflict in the courtroom and provide guidance to the judge as to the best way to respond to it. 
On the other, they can be given a role during the political process, when activists and concerned 
citizens frame their arguments in human rights terms and lobby for the enactment and 
implementation of policies that will respond to a particular conflict. Through these strategies, 
human rights can give rise to both objective and subjective feelings of security, justice and 
reconciliation among the population. Their specific peacebuilding contributions depend on a 
series of factors, which are explored in detail in the three practical chapters that follow.  
 
Chapter four, which is concerned with the peacebuilding effects of human rights during the 
adjudication process, argues that they can provide meaningful guidance to judges when they 
respond to relatively minor, as opposed to fundamental, conflicts. Attempting to resolve 
fundamental disagreements in the courtroom can result either in a refusal of the judiciary to 
become involved in the dispute, or in the delivery of vague and contradictory judgments, that 
can undermine each of the elements of peace. At the same time, the judiciary’s conflict 
resolution potential also depends on the nature of the court hearing the dispute, and in 
particular, whether it is a domestic or an international forum. Finally in terms of adjudication, 
when the disagreement is litigated – specifically, whether a comprehensive peace settlement is 
in place and the amount of time that has passed since it came into operation – can affect the 
peacebuilding potential of human rights. Similarly, whether human rights-inspired laws can 
assist in the conflict resolution process depends on a series of factors and in particular, the 
extent to which they are successfully enforced. Thus, chapter five proposes that the 
implementation of human rights – and the consequent building of peace – are matters of degree 
and shaped by how much political willingness to induce change is present among 
policymakers. Additionally, the extent of the ability of such laws to influence the conflict 
resolution process depends on skilful legislative drafting and the presence of enforcement 
bodies that have the independence, powers, resources and expertise to fulfil their mandate 
successfully. 
 
Judicial guidance and lobbying for the protection of human rights are useful strategies because 
they can induce legal and institutional reforms that are necessary for the building of objective 
peace. If the beliefs of the people are also going to be challenged however, which will in turn 
contribute to a subjective sense of peace in the post-violence society, two additional conditions, 
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discussed in chapter six, must be present. The first is that the protection of human rights must 
impact on the lives of the people in the sense that they result in meaningful socio-economic 
and psychological changes among the population. Related is the second condition, which 
provides that these changes must not only resolve conflicts as a matter of fact, but should also 
be understood by their target audience as having this effect. The three sets of conditions, 
discussed in chapters four, five and six, are not exhaustive and cannot guarantee that, when 
present, the protection of human rights will necessarily result in successful conflict resolution. 
Paying attention to them however, can elucidate the connections between the two concepts and 
enhance the effectiveness of peacebuilding operations on the ground.    
  
IV. The Methodology 
This study explores the relationship between human rights and practice through a comparative 
analysis of four case studies: BiH, Cyprus, NI and SA. In doing so, it engages in a ‘practical 
reasoning’ methodological approach, which ‘seeks to derive general conclusions from 
particular instances and to appreciate a complex reality’.32 Like a pendulum, it does this by 
oscillating between theory and practice: it reaches theoretical conclusions through an analysis 
of specific human rights initiatives in the four case studies, while at the same time, it assesses 
these initiatives in light of the developing theoretical framework.  
 
A. Defining a Post-violence Society 
Post-violence societies are societies that have experienced communal violence, whose effects 
they are currently recovering from.33 The definition is concerned with violence emanating from 
intra-state, rather than inter-state, conflicts because these have been the most common and 
destructive types of conflicts since the end of the Cold War.34 Intra-state violence usually 
results in a higher number of civilian victims and, due to the very close proximity between the 
combating parties, causes the greatest levels of insecurity among the population.35 
Additionally, this type of violence is linked to a vicious cycle of mistrust that gives rise to 
unique peacebuilding challenges: the violent conflict intensifies the group divisions that are 
undermining peace on the one hand, and the securitization of group identities encourages the 
continuation or resumption of violence on the other. Of course, the distinction between intra-
state and inter-state violence is not always clear, with several societies having experienced a 
combination of the two.36 While, for instance, the eruption of violence in Cyprus in the 1960s 
had an intra-state character, in the 1970s this morphed into an inter-state conflict, following 
Turkey’s military invasion of the island.37 This proviso notwithstanding, the study focuses on 
                                                 
32 Tom Gerard Daly, The Alchemists: Questioning Our Faith in Courts as Democracy-Builders (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2017) 18. 
33 Brewer, Peace Processes. 
34 Between 1989-2003, there were only seven inter-state and 116 intra-state conflicts. (Mikael Eriksson and Peter 
Wallensteen, ‘Armed Conflict, 1989-2003’ (2004) 41 Journal of Peace Research 625.) 
35 Between 1945 and 1999, 20 million deaths took place as a result of intra-state conflicts and three million due 
to inter-state ones. (Sujit Choudhry, ‘After the Rights Revolution: Bills of Rights in the Post-Conflict State’ (2010) 
6 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 301, 308.)  
36 Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, Contemporary Conflict Resolution 313-315. 
37 Harry Anastasiou, Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and the Quest for Peace in Cyprus: Volume One: The Impasse 
of Ethnonationalism (Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 2008) 93-100. 
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examples where the eruption of communal violence has affected a single society that is 
currently implementing some form of a peacebuilding strategy as a response.  
 
Although violence is always directed at the individual, whether towards her person or property, 
communal violence is characterised by attacks that are motivated by the intended victim’s 
membership in a given group. In the four case studies examined here, the violence has been 
caused by largely unchanging group identities, such as those relating to race, ethnicity, 
language or religion, rather than, for example, political affiliation, which can more easily 
fluctuate throughout a person’s life. Racial, religious or ethnic groups in post-violence societies 
are politically organised and have certain demands, usually relating to non-discrimination or 
greater recognition of their differences. These groups deem such demands to be necessary 
because they perceive their identities to be distinct and, in many cases, diametrically opposed 
to each other.38 This is what Miller calls ‘rival nationalities’: especially during, or immediately 
before and after violence has erupted, the groups see themselves as having an antagonistic 
relationship, partly due to the fact that they define their identity as that which the other is not.39 
Of course, not every society manifests its group divisions violently; examples from 
UK/Scotland and Canada/Quebec testify to this. However, where violence does break out, the 
defining group characteristic becomes the most dominant aspect of a member’s identity, groups 
tend to act cohesively on almost all political issues and, as a result, the conflicts that arise 
between them are usually zero-sum in nature. Finally, since political threats are not easily 
distinguished from personal ones, group membership in post-violence societies determines not 
only who people vote for, but also who they socialise with and marry, who they work with or 
employ and ultimately, who they are afraid of and distrust. 
 
The label ‘post-violence society’ is not without its problems, not least the fact that it implies 
that the signing of a ceasefire agreement, or a comprehensive peace settlement, marks the end 
of violent hostilities and the creation of a secure society.40 In fact, it should be acknowledged 
from the outset that the label ‘post-violence’ can sometimes be a misnomer since it is possible 
for the violent death count to remain high, or even increase, shortly after the official termination 
of the war.41 The term is nevertheless useful, because it signifies a new state of affairs whereby 
the previously warring parties commit, albeit often lukewarmly, to resolve their differences in 
a non-violent manner.  
 
B. Selecting the Four Case Studies 
                                                 
38 Margaret Moore, ‘Globalization, Cosmopolitanism and Minority Nationalism’ in Michael Keating and John 
McGarry (eds), Minority Nationalism and the Changing International Order (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2001), 44. 
39 David Miller, ‘Nationality in Divided Societies’ in Alain G. Gagnon and James Tully (eds), Multinational 
Democracies (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001), 303. 
40 Pierre Du Toit, South Africa’s Brittle Peace: The Problem of Post-Settlement Violence (Basingstoke, Palgrave, 
2001). 
41 Geneva Declaration Secretariat, Global Burden of Armed Violence, ISBN 978-2-8288-0101-4 (Geneva, Geneva 
Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, 2008), 49-63. 
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Unlike most comparative works on post-violence societies, which stay within the exclusive 
ambit of political sciences,42 this study examines the peacebuilding effect of human rights as 
legal tools. At the same time, it accepts that ‘maintaining the disciplinary divide between 
comparative constitutional law and other closely-related disciplines that study the same set of 
phenomena does not make sense.’43 Consequently, it situates the legal analysis of the success 
or failure of human rights to resolve conflicts, within a broader understanding of the prevalent 
conditions and dynamics in post-violence societies. In light of this, each chapter engages with 
different disciplines: chapter two relies on peace studies literature, while chapter three draws 
from conflict resolution, legal, political science and sociological arguments. Chapter four 
focuses on a legal analysis; chapter five on legal and political science literature and chapter six 
reaches conclusions that are of interest to sociologists. Finally, chapter seven brings the 
different disciplines together and links the arguments made in the previous chapters to peace 
studies. 
 
In undertaking this interdisciplinary analysis, the study takes heed of Hirschl’s insightful 
critique that legal scholars, of whom this author is one, generally fail to adopt a rigorous 
methodological approach, thus resulting in undertheorised conclusions and cherry picking of 
the most convenient case studies.44 This resonates with criticisms from another direction, 
namely that the peacebuilding literature overly relies on single case studies, that tend to 
produce lists of ‘dos’ and ‘don’ts’, without much explanation of how these were derived 
beyond descriptive observations of what worked and what did not.45 In response to these 
critiques, the four case studies have been carefully selected by taking into account both their 
similarities and differences. On the one hand, all of them have experienced communal violence, 
the consequences of which, they are still in the process of addressing by adopting liberal 
peacebuilding strategies with a strong emphasis on human rights. On the other, these similar 
human rights policies have been applied in very different contexts, thus allowing us to assess 
how such differences impact on their effectiveness as peacebuilding tools. Comparisons 
between the case studies allow for the drawing of generalisable conclusions, and developing a 
theoretical framework on the relationship between human rights and peace. In turn, such 
conclusions make the analysis, not only relevant to the four post-violence societies that are 
being compared, but also to other contexts with similar characteristics.46 This is particularly 
fruitful in light of the fact that some of these societies may be difficult to research directly, 
either due to the volatile conditions on the ground, or because the need for a swift response 
after the eruption of violence, often makes the carrying out of in-depth research more difficult. 
                                                 
42 See eg Sumantra Bose, Contested Lands: Israel-Palestine, Kashmir, Bosnia, Cyprus and Sri Lanka (Cambridge, 
Harvard University Press, 2007); Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (2nd edn, Berkeley, University of 
California Press, 1985). Rare examples of legal analysis include Stephen Tierney, Constitutional Law and 
National Pluralism (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004); Yash Ghai (ed), Autonomy and Ethnicity 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000) and Bell, Peace Agreements and Human Rights.  
43 Ran Hirschl, ‘Editorial: From Comparative Constitutional Law to Comparative Constitutional Studies’ (2013) 
11 International Journal of Constitutional Law 1, 11.  
44 Ran Hirschl, ‘The Question of Case Selection in Comparative Constitutional Law’ (2005) 53 American Journal 
of Comparative Law 125. 
45 Betts Fetherston, ‘Peacekeeping, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding: A Reconsideration of Theoretical 
Frameworks’ (2000) 7 International Peacekeeping 190, 191. 
46 Tood Landman, Issues & Methods in Comparative Politics: An Introduction (New York, Routledge, 2000) 10. 
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Arguments have been made in the literature that the success of a peacebuilding operation can 
be affected by the post-violence society’s population size,47 types of divisions,48 relative size 
of the groups within it,49 prevailing socio-economic conditions,50 the intensity and duration of 
past violence,51 the extent of international peacebuilding intervention,52 and whether there has 
been a signing of a comprehensive peace settlement.53 The four case studies face 
commonalities and differences among them in relation to all these factors. For instance, while 
Cyprus (1,5 million), NI (1,8 million) and BiH (3,5 million) are relatively small, SA has a 
population of 56 million. Moreover, each differs in terms of the types of divisions it faces, with 
NI being divided along religious lines (Protestants and Catholics), SA along racial ones 
(between blacks, whites, coloureds and Indians, but also facing divisions among different tribal 
groups) and BiH and Cyprus being characterised by ethnic divisions (Bosniacs, Serbs and 
Croats on the one hand, and GC and TC, on the other). The groups also differ in relation to 
their relative size in their respective societies, as they are fairly equal in NI and (to a lesser 
extent) BiH, but largely different in Cyprus and SA. Specifically, Protestants and Catholics are 
divided by a 48:45 population ratio,54 while Bosniacs, Serbs and Croats make up approximately 
43, 31 and 17 per cent of the Bosnian people respectively.55 Conversely, about 8 in 10 Cypriots 
are estimated to be GC and 2 TC.56 In SA, 80 per cent are black; coloured and white people 
make up 9 per cent of the population each, and Asians are approximately 2 per cent.57 Finally, 
groups vary in terms of the relative socio-economic security that each enjoys, since (group) 
inequality prevails in all four societies.58  
                                                 
47 Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven, Yale University 
Press, 1977) 161. 
48 Stephen Cornell and Douglas Hartmann, Ethnicity and Race: Making Identities in a Changing World (Thousand 
Oaks, Pine Forge Press, 2007); Miller, ‘Nationality in Divided Societies’; Stephan Wolff, ‘Conceptualising 
Conflict Management and Settlement: Perspectives on Successes and Failures in Europe, Africa and Asia’ in 
Ulrich Schneckener and Stephan Wolff (eds), Managing and Settling Ethnic Conflicts (London, Hurst & Co 
Publishers, 2004).  
49 Benjamin Reilly, ‘Electoral Systems for Divided Societies’ (2002) 13 Journal of Democracy 156, 168. 
50 Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, 161; Davis A. James, ‘A Formal Interpretation of the Theory of 
Relative Deprivation’ (1959) 22 Sociometry 280. 
51 Chaim D. Kaufmann, ‘When All Else Fails: Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the Twentieth 
Century’ (1998) 23 International Security 120.  
52 Michael Barnett and Christoph Zurcher, ‘The Peacebuilder’s Contract: How External Statebuilding Reinforces 
Weak Statehood’ in Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk (eds), The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the 
Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations (London, Routledge, 2009); Timothy D. Sisk, ‘Pathways of the 
Political: Electoral Processes after Civil War’ in Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk (eds), The Dilemmas of 
Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations (London, Routledge, 2009). 
53 Hanna Lerner, Making Constitutions in Deeply Divided Societies (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2011). 
54 Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Census 2011: Key Statistics for Northern Ireland (Belfast, 
Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, 2012), 3. 
55 ‘Ethnic Composition of Bosnia-Herzegovina Population, By Municipalities and Settlements, 1991’, Zavod za 
statistiku Bosne i Hercegovine, Bilten no. 234, Sarajevo, 1991. (Cited in Sabrina P. Ramet, Balkan Babel: The 
Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milosević (4th edn, Boulder, Westview Press, 
2002) 241.) Most of the remaining 9 per cent described itself as ‘Yugoslav’, a category that is today obsolete. 
56 Department of Statistics and Research, Census of Population and Agriculture 1960 (Volume III - Demographic 
Characteristics) (Nicosia, Department of Statistics and Research, 1963). 
57 Statistics South Africa, Census 2011: Statistical Release (Revised) (Pretoria, Statistics South Africa, 2012). 
58 In SA, this is a consequence of apartheid policies, which have not been adequately addressed since 
democratisation (Mike Cohen, ‘South Africa’s Racial Income Inequality Persists, Census Shows’ Bloomberg, 30 
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Further to the background conditions that distinguish each of the case studies, they also differ 
in terms of the intensity of violence that they have experienced. In Cyprus, the violence erupted 
during two high intensity, very short periods between 1963-64 (with violence mostly being 
targeted towards TC) and 1974 (with the victims being mainly GC).59 The two periods resulted 
in approximately 4,300 missing persons,60 6,000 deaths61 and 200,000 displaced individuals.62 
This was different from BiH where the brutally violent conflict raged continuously between 
1992 and 1995, producing approximately 100,000 dead63 and 2,6 million displaced persons, 
who amounted to more than half of the pre-war population.64 The conflicts in NI and SA were 
different still, since the relatively low-intensity violence lasted for decades in both instances. 
In NI, the Troubles began in 1968 and officially ended following the signing of the Belfast 
Agreement in 1998, with a total death toll of about 3,500.65 In SA, the beginning of the conflict 
is more difficult to pinpoint, since the violent colonial regime gradually morphed into 
apartheid,66 until this was abolished in 1993 with the coming into force of the country’s Interim 
(first democratic) Constitution.67 Celebrations of SA’s ‘non-violent transition miracle’ are 
largely inaccurate since in the 1980s and early 1990s, approximately 15,000-25,000 SA were 
killed.68 Indicatively, 3,706 people were killed between 1993-94; 2,434 between 1994-95 and 
1,004 between 1995-96,69 while during March 1994, when the first election campaign was in 
full swing, 537 deaths were recorded, an average of 17,3 per day.70 
 
Additionally, the four case studies differ in terms of the peacebuilding strategies they have 
adopted since the reduction/stopping of the violence, and the extent to which the international 
community has been involved in these efforts. Comprehensive peace settlements have been 
                                                 
October 2012). In Cyprus, this is, at least partly, due to the UN embargo imposed on the (internationally 
unrecognised) ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ and as a result, on the vast majority of TC (United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 541 (18 November 1983), Art. 7; United Nations Security Council Resolution 550 
(11 May 1984), Art. 3). In NI this is because of employment discrimination against Catholics that existed during 
the Troubles (Edmund A. Aunger, ‘Religion and Occupational Class in Northern Ireland’ (1975) 7 Economic and 
Social Review 1). Finally, for evidence of inequality in BiH, see Marcelo Bisogno and Alberto Chong, ‘Poverty 
and Inequality in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the Civil War’ (2002) 30 World Development 61.  
59 Paul Sant Cassia, Bodies of Evidence: Burial, Memory and the Recovery of Missing Persons in Cyprus (New 
York, Berghahn Books, 2005) 35 and 52. 
60 Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus, Figures and Statistics of Missing Persons up to 31 March 2019 
(Nicosia, Committee of Missing Persons, 2019). 
61 Cassia, Bodies of Evidence 52. 
62 Global IDP Database, Profile of Internal Displacement: Cyprus (Geneva, Norwegian Refugee Council/ Global 
IDP Project, 2003). 
63 Patrick Ball, Ewa Tabeau and Philip Verwimp, The Bosnian Book of Dead: Assessment of the Database (Sussex, 
Households in Conflict Network, 2007).  
64 OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Special Report: Musical Chairs: Property Problems in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (Sarajevo, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1996), 45-46. 
65 CAIN Web Service - Conflict and Politics in Northern Ireland: Violence - Statistics and Other Data on Violence, 
available at www.cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/violence/cts/fay98.htm#tables. 
66 David Welsh, The Rise and Fall of Apartheid (Charlottesville, University of Virginia Press, 2009). 
67 Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa [Act 200 of 1993].  
68 Adrian Guelke, South Africa in Transition: The Misunderstood Miracle (London, I.B. Tauris, 1999) 45.  
69 James L. Gibson and Amanda Gouws, Overcoming Intolerance in South Africa: Experiments in Democratic 
Persuasion (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003) 18. 
70 Welsh, The Rise and Fall of Apartheid 535. 
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signed for BiH, NI and SA (the Dayton Agreement,71 the Belfast Agreement and the Final 
Constitution respectively), but one is still elusive in Cyprus, despite the fact that it has been a 
post-violence society for the longest period of time out of the four.72 Rather, both sides have 
been respecting a ceasefire since 1974 and have implemented a number of interim or temporary 
peacebuilding measures until the ongoing negotiations result in the reaching of a 
comprehensive settlement.73 The efforts to produce such a settlement are driven forward by the 
international community, in the form of the UN, which remains actively involved in the 
negotiations.74 International participation was also prevalent during the negotiations of the 
Dayton Agreement, but the USA government, which had played a leading role at the time, has 
taken a step back and left the EU and Council of Europe to provide guidance and support during 
the Agreement’s implementation phase.75 Unlike Cyprus and BiH, which have both 
experienced heavy-handed international intervention, the peacebuilding processes in the other 
two case studies have been driven by the SA government on the one hand, and the devolved 
institutions of NI and the UK government, on the other. It should be noted however, that the 
difference in the level of international involvement in the various post-violence societies is 
only a matter of degree, since both NI and SA have received international funding, which is 
often conditional on following the donors’ agenda and implementing their preferred projects.76  
 
These characteristics notwithstanding, what is even more important in terms of assessing the 
peacebuilding potential of human rights, are a series of factors that directly relate to the way 
they have been utilised in the post-violence society. The differences and similarities among the 
four case studies in relation to each of these factors give rise to endless permutations and 
provide fertile ground for comparative analysis between them. For example, chapter five argues 
that one of the factors affecting the ability of human rights to resolve conflicts is whether they 
are implemented by a body with the independence, power, resources and expertise necessary 
to undertake this task. NI and SA have responded to conflicts relating to discrimination in the 
workplace through the enactment of substantively similar laws, which are nevertheless 
enforced by institutions with very different characteristics. While the NI legislation has 
successfully addressed discrimination in the workplace, the SA law has not had the same effect. 
This observation can result in a comparison based on what Hirschl has called ‘the most similar 
cases principle’, namely an assessment of two human rights strategies that are generally 
similar, bar one characteristic, yet have resulted in different outcomes.77 The hypothesis is that 
                                                 
71 General Framework Agreement, signed on 14 December 1995. 
72 Michális Stavrou Michael, Resolving the Cyprus Conflict: Negotiating History (New York, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009). 
73 UN Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus, S/2017/20 
(New York, United Nations, 9 January 2017). 
74 For a biannual account of the UN’s efforts in this respect, see the reports of the Secretary-General, available at 
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un_documents_type/secretary-generals-
reports/?ctype=Cyprus&cbtype=cyprus.  
75 For a chronicle of the negotiations, see Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York, The Modern Library, 
1999). For an overview of the EU’s actions in BiH, see www.eubih.eu.  
76 Julie Hearn, Foreign Aid, Democratisation and Civil Society in Africa: A Study of South Africa, Ghana and 
Uganda, ISBN 1-85864-257-4 (Brighton, Institute of Development Studies, 1999). 
77 Hirschl, ‘The Question of Case Selection’. 
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the one difference between them – in this case, the characteristics of the implementing body – 
is causally related to the different outcome.  
 
Conversely, chapter six argues that an effective communication strategy between the 
peacebuilders and their target audience is instrumental for inducing social and psychological 
changes within the post-violence society. BiH and SA have each remedied violently displaced 
individuals in different ways, but they have both neglected to communicate the symbolic 
importance of these remedies to the victims. In both instances, the provision of a legal remedy 
has failed to result in meaningful social and psychological changes. This allows for a 
comparison based on the ‘most different cases principle’, whereby two cases which are largely 
dissimilar, but share a common characteristic and result in the same outcome, are examined.78 
Here, the hypothesis is that the similarity (the common failure to adopt a communication 
strategy) explains the similar outcome (the inability of the remedies to result in social and 
psychological changes).  
 
(V) Conclusion 
Over the last decade, commentators have assessed the success of peacebuilding operations and 
found them wanting. Among the criticisms that have been levelled against existing strategies, 
is the fact that their focus on building institutions and developing the law, has not been matched 
by a concern of how people are affected by, and perceive, these institutions.79 Consequently, 
the peace that the liberal recipe gives rise to is ‘hollow’80 and looks more coherent from the 
outside than the inside.81 Moreover, current peacebuilding operations have been criticised for 
adopting excessively uniform policies with little understanding or care that these might not fit 
the specific contexts of different post-violence societies.82 Related is the concern that this, 
together with the way peacebuilding operations are often structured and funded, tends to 
empower international actors to the detriment of local ones.83 Finally, allegations have been 
made that the assumptions of liberal peacebuilding, most predominantly the urge to push for 
democratisation and market liberalisation have often encouraged, rather than successfully 
reduced, violent outbreaks.84 Even in the midst of such criticisms however, reliance on human 
rights, as a conflict resolution strategy, has survived unscathed. The need to protect them in 
order to build peace is presented as a matter of common sense, a statement which almost by 
default does not need to be supported by arguments or empirical evidence. Moreover, while 
valuable in terms of challenging existing assumptions and practices, these critiques have 
sometimes been too abstract and negative in their focus, thus failing to identify possible 
                                                 
78 Ibid. 
79 Richmond, ‘A Post-Liberal Peace’, 569. 
80 Mac Ginty, ‘Indigenous Peace-Making’, 158. 
81 Oliver Richmond, ‘UN Peacebuilding Operations and the Dilemma of the Peacebuilding Consensus’ (2004) 11 
International Peacekeeping 83, 91. 
82 Patricia Lundy and Mark McGovern, ‘The Role of Community in Participatory Transitional Justice’ in Kieran 
McEvoy and Lorna McGregor (eds), Transitional Justice from Below: Grassroots Activism and the Struggle for 
Change (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2008). 
83 Severine Autesserre, Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
84 Roland Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2004). 
 17 
alternative strategies or make constructive suggestions about how such limitations can be 
addressed.85 This study seeks to both add to, and develop, such critiques. On the one hand, it 
confirms some of the abovementioned limitations and tailors them specifically to the protection 
of human rights. It concludes that in a sobering number of instances, human rights could, and 
should, have done better. On the other, it proposes practical recommendations on how best to 
respond to these limitations. Taking these seriously, can make human rights not only popular 
peacebuilding tools, but also effective ones. 
  
                                                 
85 Mac Ginty, ‘Indigenous Peace-Making’, 159. Also see Oliver Richmond and Roger Mac Ginty, ‘Where Now 
for the Critique of the Liberal Peace?’ (2015) 50 Cooperation and Conflict 171. 
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Chapter 2 – Clarifying the End: A Workable Definition of Peace 
 
I. Introduction 
If one’s objective is to assess the relationship between human rights and peace, it becomes 
necessary to understand what is meant by peace in the first place. Existing accounts of the term 
have tended to be either completely abstract, or conversely, derive their content from 
peacebuilding practices on the ground. Section II assesses the two methods of defining peace 
and concludes that neither provides a satisfactory starting point for elucidating the connections 
between it and human rights. On the one hand, the most popular abstract account, Galtung’s 
definition of positive and negative peace, is promising but ultimately unworkable because of 
its broad and all-inclusive nature.86 On the other, more practical definitions are also 
unsatisfactory, since they seem to be guided by nothing more theoretically robust than the urge 
to reproduce the trappings of already developed and liberal societies.87 
 
Considering the limitations of current accounts, Section III proposes a new definition of peace 
which consists of three elements. The first element, security, exists when the conditions on the 
ground prevent a sense of fear from war, internal conflict or serious crime. The second, justice, 
demands that victims and the society at large are remedied and confident that the injustices of 
the past will not be repeated in the future, while the final element, reconciliation, requires the 
creation of meaningful relationships of cooperation – on the personal and political levels – 
between former enemy parties. Each of these elements requires an objective improvement in 
the conditions prevailing in the post-violence society, through the establishment of relevant 
processes and institutions, but also a subjective change in people’s perceptions of the conflict 
and its consequences.  
 
This account of peace is both theoretically and practically informed. It is theoretically sound 
because it offers arguments in favour of the different elements of peace, rather than merely 
assuming their desirability. Moreover, it elaborates on the inter-relationship of the three 
elements by arguing that in addition to promoting, they can also contradict with, each other. It 
is only when a balance has been struck between them, and maintained for a significant period 
of time, that peace within the post-violence society has been built. At the same time, the 
definition can have a practical impact since it is achievable and not all-encompassing. It creates 
clear objectives that post-violence societies should be working towards and lays the 
foundations for explaining how different peacebuilding tools, such as human rights, can 
contribute to their achievement. 
 
II. Rejecting the Current Accounts of Peace 
One way of understanding what is meant by peace is to focus on peacebuilders’ efforts within 
post-violence societies and determine what it is they are working towards. Despite the obvious 
interest that the peacebuilding literature should have in defining its end objective, there is little 
                                                 
86 Johan Galtung, ‘An Editorial’ (1964) 1 Journal of Peace Research 1. 
87 Oliver Richmond, The Transformation of Peace (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 
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agreement among key players about what a successful operation looks like. For example, the 
1992-93 peace intervention in Cambodia has variously been described as a ‘success’, a ‘partial 
success’ and a ‘failure’.88 This point is also more generally made when examining in greater 
detail the UN’s definition of peace. McAuliffe asserts that  
it is clear that the UN’s ultimate purpose in all peace missions is what it labels ‘sustainable 
peace’ (defined as the capacity of conflict parties to move political or economic struggles from 
the battlefield and into an institutional framework where disputes can be resolved).89  
 
The two most common indicators that this move has been completed and ‘sustainable peace’ 
has been achieved, are a drop in the level of violence and the organisation of ‘free and fair 
elections’, both of which are relatively easy to measure and verify.90 However, as soon as 
peacebuilding operations place emphasis on a wider range of objectives, as this section 
suggests they should, what is meant by ‘peace’ becomes less clear and subject to greater 
controversy.  
 
Part of the challenge with the practical literature’s definition of peace is that it engages with 
the term only indirectly by focusing on the methods and tools that are expected to promote it.91 
Thus, starting from the premise that ‘[t]he concept of peace is easy to grasp’, An Agenda for 
Peace defines peacebuilding as consisting of ‘comprehensive efforts to identify and support 
structures which will tend to consolidate peace’.92 Problematically, no explanation is 
forthcoming about why or how such support structures will, in fact, consolidate peace or what 
is meant by the term in the first place. Examples of such structures listed in the report include 
those relating to the disarming of previously warring parties, repatriating refugees, monitoring 
elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights and reforming and strengthening 
governmental institutions.93 The long list of peacebuilding methods also generally comprises 
of building memorialisation sites,94 establishing Truth Commissions,95 holding criminal trials96 
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93 Ibid. 
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Challenges of Evaluating the Impact of Memorialization in Societies in Transition’ (2010) 4 International Journal 
of Transitional Justice 397.  
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(London, Routledge, 2011).  
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and strengthening other ‘peace enhancing structures’,97 such as a social free market98 and an 
effective and legitimate justice system.99 It appears therefore, that while a lot has been written 
on peacebuilding methods, there has been no debate as to what qualities peace should consist 
of, leaving peacebuilders with ‘no clear idea of what “success” or “failure” actually mean’.100 
Consequently, there is no analysis as to whether, how and the conditions under which, these 
methods connect and contribute to the intended peace outcome.101  
 
Despite peacebuilding actors not generally having participated in the definitional debate 
directly, they seem to have an implied understanding of the term. Richmond traces the 
development of the international community’s efforts to promote peace over the years and 
concludes that decisions as to which peacebuilding methods are preferred, have been affected 
by unarticulated definitions of the concept.102 Early peacekeeping operations used to focus on 
keeping combatants separate rather than resolving their differences, because at the time, peace 
was understood as (just) the absence of violence.103 Conversely, current peacebuilding 
operations are premised on the idea that what is needed to build peace are liberal processes, 
namely democratisation, market liberalisation and the rule of law. Liberal peacebuilding seeks 
to make post-violence societies ‘normal’ states by fast-forwarding the processes that liberal 
societies adopted over the last two or three centuries. It focuses on organising elections, passing 
laws that will allow the operation of a free market, strengthening the judiciary, developing a 
working civil service and protecting human rights, expecting that since the trappings of 
liberalism are there, over time, these societies will adopt liberal behaviours as well.104 
However, conceptualising peace as consisting of institutions, rather than values, means that the 
question of what these should achieve, or what the post-violence society should look like at the 
end of the peacebuilding process, is secondary to the very act of establishing them.105 
Therefore, current implied definitions of peace are inappropriate for the purposes of this study 
for two reasons: first, despite the fact that they are couched in liberal terms, they pay no, or 
little, direct attention to the important social and human consequences of peacebuilding.106 
Second, their strong emphasis on institutions and processes, including those promoting the 
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protection of human rights, risks giving rise to circular arguments, if the aim is to examine the 
relationship between peace and rights in the first place. 
 
An alternative method of deriving a definition of peace would be to focus on more theoretical 
accounts of the term. Of these, by far the most developed is the one suggested by Johan 
Galtung.107 Traditionally, peace had been synonymous with the latin ‘pax’, which was 
understood as the absence of war. However, this account missed the positive characteristics of 
peace and ignored any further action that had to be taken after the signing of the ceasefire 
agreement.108 Galtung’s work has been invaluable in making the once controversial, but now 
widely accepted argument, that peace is a more comprehensive concept.109 In addition to the 
absence of war, what Galtung calls ‘negative peace’, we should focus on ‘positive peace’, a 
term that has developed over time to mean the building of positive relationships between 
previously warring parties.110 The fact that part of the definition rests on the elimination of 
violence makes it intuitively appealing since that is every peacebuilder’s primary goal. At the 
same time, its broader emphasis on positive relations adds sophistication, a characteristic that 
was missing from wholly negative accounts.  
 
Galtung defined peace as the absence of violence, with violence being present when an 
individual cannot achieve his full potential due to his surrounding conditions.111 The most 
obvious example of violence is physical, or ‘direct violence’, which is the intentional causing 
of harm from one person to the other. Clearly, if a person’s potential is to live approximately 
to the age of 80, but s/he is killed during a war when s/he is 25, his/her ‘potential realizations’ 
have been limited.112 Originally, Galtung argued that the absence of direct violence was 
negative peace, but that a complete theory of peace also required the absence of structural and 
cultural violence, what he called ‘positive peace’.113 Structural violence is caused indirectly if 
a person limits another’s potential simply by doing the job prescribed to him by an unfair 
structure, such as a discriminatory system of government. The third type of violence, cultural 
violence, exists when people use their history, trauma and myths to excuse or justify direct or 
structural violence.114 A classic example of this is nationalistic propaganda portraying the 
‘other’ as less than human. Such attitudes are violent both because they are harmful in 
themselves and because they excuse or justify the other two types of violence, thus making 
their occurrence even more likely. Through this expanded definition, Galtung persuasively 
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illustrated that peace was absent in societies, which did not suffer from physical violence, yet 
were only superficially calm. 
 
Galtung’s theory is persuasive because it acknowledges that physical violence does not simply 
start in the absence of underlying problems. This leads to the correct conclusion that merely 
stopping the killing is in itself not enough since if such problems remain unaddressed, they will 
eventually resurface again. Ultimately however, Galtung’s account of peace should be rejected 
due to its lack of clarity in several of its key assertions, which make its practical application 
impossible. For instance, Galtung frequently refers to the ‘absence of violence’ as a necessary 
condition for peace, but it is unclear whether this requires the its reduction or complete 
elimination.115 While in 1969 he urged readers to ‘imagine we were able to calculate the losses 
incurred by the two forms of violence, or the gains that would accrue to mankind if they could 
be eliminated’,116 in 1985 he referred to peace as the ‘reduction of violence’.117 More recently, 
Galtung defined negative peace as consisting of ‘processes of violence reduction’,118 yet in the 
same text and almost immediately after, he concluded that ‘Negative peace is the absence of 
violence of all kinds.’119 On the one hand, the choice of the word ‘absence’ suggests that 
negative peace requires the complete elimination of violence, something supported by the fact 
that Galtung does not describe or mention a threshold under which violence has been 
adequately reduced to make the society a peaceful one. On the other, requiring its complete 
elimination is impossible, since different types of violence can be reduced by using potentially 
conflicting methods. For instance, while direct violence could theoretically be eradicated by 
adopting excessively strict criminal laws, this would have been achieved by increasing 
structural violence, thus undermining Galtung’s main thesis that peace should be achieved 
through peaceful means.120  
 
An even greater problem with defining peace as the absence of structural and cultural violence 
is that this is not a positive conception of peace at all, but rather, a sophisticated account of 
negative peace. Responding to this, and although he never explicitly rejected his previous 
definition of the term, Galtung gradually came to view positive peace as the creation of direct 
peace, cultural peace and structural peace.121 Now, negative peace was the absence of all kinds 
of violence and positive peace consisted of these more positive values.122 Yet, this new 
definition of peace is also ambiguous since it consists of ill-defined concepts, which lack a 
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clear link to peacebuilding measures on the ground. For instance, Galtung argues that positive 
peace is achieved through ‘processes of life enhancement’123 and more specifically, a ‘culture 
of peace, confirming and stimulating an equitable economy and an equal polity’,124 without 
explaining what each of these phrases means.125 He simply states that the field of ‘equity of the 
economy’ is theoretically and practically very underdeveloped, with the International Covenant 
on Economic Social and Cultural Rights being a step towards its achievement and that ‘equality 
of the polity’ is where democracy and human rights enter, not only within countries, but also 
among them.126 The broadness and vagueness of these definitions however, leave the reader 
wondering what exactly needs to be done to promote positive peace on the ground. Moreover, 
it is unclear how these positive values can be achieved and how they connect to peace exactly. 
For example, Galtung states that direct positive peace consists of ‘verbal and physical 
kindness’, the epitome of which is love, ‘a union of bodies, minds and spirits.’127 However, 
arguably such feelings are impossible among strangers generally, let alone between enemy 
groups in post-violence societies. Similarly, he associates structural positive peace with values 
such as integration, solidarity and participation, and cultural positive peace with democracy, 
human rights, peace education and peace journalism.128 Again though, he does not explain how 
these general principles can be promoted by peacebuilding measures on the ground and in what 
way exactly. It seems, therefore, that despite Galtung’s assertions that peace should ‘refer to 
something attainable and also in fact attained, not to something utopian’, his, is mainly an 
idealistic account, with little application in practice.129 
 
Galtung’s is the most popular theoretical definition of peace, but not the only one. Yet, these 
alternative definitions are also suffering from a range of limitations. For instance, the literature 
now consists of references to stable,130 (self-) sustainable,131 just,132 liberal,133 and real peace.134 
Often, such labels are presented as being self-explanatory, since neither the adjective that 
describes peace in each instance, nor the term ‘peace’ itself, are defined further. Reading 
between the lines, this literature suggests that the term ‘peace’ on its own implies the absence 
of war or violence, while the prefix adjective is an add-on of a desirable characteristic that this 
non-violent state of affairs should also possess. For instance, Allan distinguishes between 
different levels of peace by arguing that ‘stable peace’ defines a situation where the probability 
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of war is not entertained by the people; ‘just peace’ exists when all parties are satisfied because 
their relations are regulated in a legitimate way; and (borrowing from Galtung) ‘positive peace’ 
is established when structural violence is absent.135 Such definitions however, are problematic 
for three distinct reasons: first, the idea of security (encapsulated in stable peace) and justice 
(captured in the other two terms) should be considered inherent characteristics of the concept, 
rather than add-ons that might or might not accompany peace.136 Second, prefacing the term 
with an adjective does not solve the problem of a lack of a definition, but simply shifts attention 
from one term that is difficult to define, to two. Thus, the Brahimi report interchangeably refers 
to ‘stable’ and ‘sustainable’ peace,137 but does not clarify what characteristics each ‘type’ of 
peace should possess, which peacebuilding strategies have been successful in promoting one 
or both of them, and how. Finally, references to ‘just peace’ prioritise the elements of justice 
and security over reconciliation, presumably because of an assumption that this follows 
naturally when the first two have been established. As the tripartite definition proposed in the 
next section suggests however, this assumption is faulty, since reconciliation might be 
promoted by security and justice, but can also contradict with them.  
 
III. Forging a New Definition of Peace 
As a result of the limitations of current definitions of peace, a new account of the concept, 
which relies on striking a balance between security, justice and reconciliation, is proposed 
instead. The notion that peace consists of different elements is not necessarily novel, with 
Baillet and Larsen, for instance, referring to different ‘Components of Peace’.138 However, 
these components quickly dissolve into a long list of good things that the authors would like to 
see in any society – such as the elimination of inequality, exclusion, and poverty; and education 
on human rights, fundamental freedoms, non-violent dispute resolution, and the protection of 
the environment – without an explanation on how each links to peace. Conversely, the choices 
of security, justice and reconciliation as elements of peace are based on both theoretical insights 
and experiences from peacebuilding practice. Thus, the importance of security has been 
highlighted in the literature on disarmament139 and police reform140 and has also been 
acknowledged by Boulding who argues that ‘stable peace is a situation in which the probability 
of war is so small that it does not really enter the calculations of the people involved’.141 At the 
same time, its significance is illustrated in practice through the passing of international treaties, 
such as the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of 
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Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, and the attention that the reform of the security 
sector has received by peacebuilders in various post-violence societies.142  
 
The second element of peace is also frequently perceived as being key in the literature with 
numerous authors having attempted to define what is meant by (transitional) justice in post-
violence contexts.143 The justification behind such attempts has generally been that ‘the 
absence of justice is often the primary reason for the absence of peace’.144 In practice, the 
emphasis on justice has been reflected through the creation of the International Criminal 
Court,145 the development of tools for the remedying of displaced people146 and the attention 
paid to reforming domestic judicial systems.147 Finally, the third element of peace, 
reconciliation, is considered increasingly important and has produced vibrant debates on how 
truth commissions148 and other reconciliation-promoting methods, such as peace education149 
and peace journalism,150 can be utilised in post-violence societies. The growing literature on 
reconciliation also includes analysis of related theoretical concepts, such as trust,151 
forgiveness,152 empathy and the rehumanisation of the enemy.153 The significance of this 
element of peace has been acknowledged by the UN Secretary-General, who noted as early as 
1995 that ‘international intervention must extend beyond military and humanitarian tasks and 
must include the promotion of national reconciliation’.154  
 
The elements’ importance is also confirmed when they are compared to Galtung’s three types 
of violence. Although the two definitions of peace are different, there is a clear connection 
between security and the absence of direct violence, justice and the absence of structural 
violence, and reconciliation and the absence of cultural violence. These connections 
notwithstanding, the proposed definition’s main distinguishing feature from Galtung’s is that 
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it creates space for the positive qualities that a peaceful society must possess, while 
simultaneously remaining achievable. For example, security varies from the absence of direct 
violence because its promotion requires the taking of additional steps, such as effective 
disarmament of ex-combatants and the proper training of the police. Similarly, justice is a 
different concept from the absence of structural violence because it also imposes positive, but 
realistic obligations on the state: remedying past injustices and ensuring that they are not 
repeated in the future. Finally, a post-violence society is not reconciled simply because 
negative feelings against other groups are not uttered out loud (the absence of cultural 
violence). Reconciliation, which involves building positive relationships between people, 
requires cooperation among ex-enemy groups, which does not occur naturally even when 
cultural violence is eliminated. Nevertheless, while the three elements are broader than 
negative peace, they also avoid the lack of clarity and utopian character of Galtung’s positive 
account. 
 
The tripartite definition is also different from the implied understanding of liberal peace. The 
premise of liberal peacebuilding is that peace has been built in a post-violence society upon the 
establishment of liberal institutions, laws and procedures.155 To the extent that perceptions, 
feelings or reactions of the local population are considered, it is expected that these will become 
more peace-friendly as a direct consequence of creating the liberal structures.156 Conversely, 
the tripartite definition is based on a more nuanced understanding of what is required to build 
peace, by focusing equally on an objective and a subjective sense of the concept.157 The term 
‘objective’ does not necessarily imply that every outside observer has exactly the same view 
of what a peaceful society should look like. Rather, it derives from the belief that outsiders, 
who are not as familiar with the intricate dynamics of a post-violence society, are more likely 
to pay closer attention to laws, processes and institutions, the establishment of which, is 
observable and can be confirmed as a matter of fact. Conversely, for insiders, the relationships 
between individuals, or groups, are more important than the existence of the structures 
themselves. As a result, they are more likely to pay attention to subjective peace, meaning that 
they will assess the success of peacebuilding operations, not only by focusing on the launching 
of specific initiatives, but also on how these are experienced by, and affect themselves and the 
people around them, which is a more subjective exercise. There is a risk that a definition of 
peace that solely emphasises people’s perceptions makes subjectivity a way of circumventing 
material change (by just fooling people into feeling better, rather than bringing about tangible 
improvements) or psychologising a conflict that has its roots in injustices. At the same time, a 
definition that is exclusively focused on observable and measurable change, ill-advisedly 
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removes the human experience from the equation. It is only by placing emphasis on both, that 
the Skylla and Charybdis can be avoided.158 
 
Although attention has been paid to security, justice and reconciliation both in the theoretical 
literature and when designing peacebuilding mechanisms in practice, there has not been a 
concerted effort to examine how the three elements connect to create peaceful societies.159 
However, understanding one element independently from the other two and discussing which 
strategies can promote each of them in isolation, is unsatisfactory because it ignores key links 
between the elements themselves and between them and peace. Security, justice and 
reconciliation are distinct, and different methods and tools are available to peacebuilders for 
their achievement. Nonetheless, they are also connected in that the promotion of one could 
make the achievement of the others more likely. Thus, as the situation in a post-violence society 
becomes more secure, justice becomes easier to administer, since judicial decisions can be 
based on merit, rather than be influenced by the power of the parties.160 This was the case in 
BiH, where shortly after the war, the domestic judiciary was reluctant to find that the dominant 
ethnic group in each entity was still acting in a discriminatory manner against the members of 
the other two.161 Conversely, 20 years later, and with the possibility of returning back to 
violence being a more distant one, judges have become more willing to decide legal cases 
neutrally.162 At the same time, the promotion of justice by, for example, prosecuting past 
offenders, contributes to greater security as it removes potentially dangerous actors from 
society and positions of authority.163 Similarly, justice and reconciliation are also connected 
because remedying past injustices and ensuring that they will not be repeated in the future, 
results in a more hospitable climate for reconciliation.164 Equally important is the positive 
relationship between that and security because only if people can leave the fear of the conflict 
behind them, can they start trusting and cooperating with the other.165 Finally, this relationship 
also works in the opposite direction, since the improvement in the cooperation among members 
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of previously warring parties and the consequent creation of a peace dividend, makes it less 
likely that they will be interested in resuming the violence and therefore, promotes security. 
 
While these positive connections between the different elements should be made explicit, the 
definition of peace also rests on the possible tension between them, hence the need to balance 
them against each other.166 For instance, justice might demand that all perpetrators are punished 
for their actions, which could in turn, result in increased tension between the previously warring 
parties and even, lead to renewed violence.167 Similarly, trials, which by their nature produce 
clear winners and losers, can also damage reconciliation efforts.168 As a result, several post-
violence societies have adopted strategies that limit the accountability of past offenders in the 
name of reconciliation.169 The need to find an equilibrium between the elements of peace has 
also been recognised by the UN, which argued that ‘[a]t times, the goals of justice and 
reconciliation compete with each other. Each society needs to form a view about how to strike 
the right balance between them.’170  
 
Due to the possible tension between the three elements, absolute security, justice and 
reconciliation are unattainable and unnecessary for peace to be built. Instead, all three must 
meet a certain threshold and, after that is satisfied, they should be balanced against each other 
so that the maximum of each can be achieved without undermining the other elements.171 It is 
always hard to abstractly define how much of each element is enough, but, upon inspection, it 
is possible to determine whether a given society is sufficiently secure, just or reconciled, based 
on the situation on the ground. When the balance between the three elements has been struck, 
the longer it is maintained, the more peaceful that society becomes for two reasons.172 First, 
peace itself increases the resilience of a peaceful society. Although soon after the war the 
parties might feel they can benefit more if they continue fighting, the longer peace persists, the 
more likely they are to want to continue enjoying the benefits conferred by it, to which they 
are now accustomed.173 Second, peace becomes more durable because, over time, the society 
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in question will have successfully resolved a number of divisive conflicts, thus making it easier 
to address any subsequent ones.174  
 
The tripartite definition results in a dynamic conception of peace. It acknowledges that peace 
is not a state of bliss, but exists in a society where a balance between the three elements is 
constantly negotiated. This balancing exercise and its implementation in practice are aided by 
the fact that the definition draws a clear connecting line between peace, its elements and the 
peacebuilding measures that promote them. Where the different elements contradict, difficult 
decisions will still have to be made, but at least, they will be made transparently. At the same 
time, the specific balance that must be struck between the elements changes, depending on the 
context of each post-violence society and the timing at which the tension arises. This is in line 
with the widely accepted view, at least on paper, that we should resist the tendency to adopt 
virtually identical peacebuilding strategies in vastly different post-violence contexts.175 Rather, 
we should have a clear understanding of what is meant by the different elements and, based on 
this, devise a coherent strategy on how they can be promoted, bearing in mind each society’s 
unique characteristics. 
 
A. Security as the First Element of Peace 
The first element within the proposed definition of peace is security, which exists when the 
conditions on the ground prevent fear from war, internal conflict or serious crime. Security 
from physical threats is essential to any definition of peace because people’s first concern 
during and after the eruption of violence is their physical well-being. As Doyle and Sambanis 
put it, ‘[t]he first step is security. A secure environment is the sine qua non of the new 
beginning of peace.’176 Illustrative of this is the case of Cyprus, where mass scale violence has 
not broken out on the island in the last 45 years. Despite the relatively secure conditions, more 
than 70 per cent of Greek and Turkish Cypriots believe that security should be the ‘highest 
priority item’ during the peace negotiations.177 In addition to a subjectively perceived sense of 
insecurity, as in the case of Cyprus, it is possible that a society is experiencing real violence, 
even after the signing of a ceasefire or a comprehensive peace settlement.178 This might be 
because the previously warring parties do not have a genuine willingness to stop the hostilities, 
spoilers are trying to reignite war for their own interests, or networks and structures associated 
with the war economy have remained in place.179 Lack of security, whether objective or 
subjective, makes it impossible for people to plan their future and put the conflict behind them 
due to concerns that any attempts to do so, will be undermined by more violence. A society 
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that operates under such constant threats, is always in a state of emergency and until these are 
dismissed, cannot be entirely peaceful.  
 
Until the end of the Cold War, the clear answer to whom security was for, was the state, since 
an assumption existed that if the state was secure, so were its subjects.180 This traditional 
understanding of the concept was rightly challenged in a 1994 United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) Report which argued in favour of a new, ‘human security’ ideal that 
focused on individuals instead of states.181 The report rejected the traditional approach since 
threats to people’s security come, not only from other states, but also from non-state actors or 
the state itself. Making the state more secure and powerful does not always result in the 
increased protection of the people and can even have the reverse effect. The human security 
definition is particularly important when defining security as one of the elements of peace in 
post-violence societies, where the state was at least until recently, trying to protect only some 
of its citizens and was turning against the rest.182 Thus, a necessary element for peace is the 
security of all the individuals residing in the state, irrespective of their group membership or 
connections with the government. 
 
Perhaps the question that has generated the most debate in the security literature concerns the 
types of threats people must be protected from. The UNDP Report adopted an excessively 
broad approach, arguing that the notion of security is ‘all-encompassing’ and that ‘most’ of the 
threats that fall under this heading can be grouped in seven categories: (i) economic security 
(freedom from poverty); (ii) food security (physical and economic access to food); (iii) health 
security; (iv) environmental security; (v) personal security (physical safety); (vi) community 
security (survival of traditional cultures and ethnic groups); and (vii) political security 
(enjoyment of civil and political rights).183 The Report states that the categories are 
interconnected since a threat of one type can influence all forms of human security.184 
However, such a broad definition is problematic because the causes of, and ways to deal with, 
physical threats are very different from those concerning other dangers. The only reason for 
including different types of threats under the single concept of security was to send the message 
that governments should prioritise other policy areas, aside from physical security, as well. 
Nevertheless, the very broadness of the term defeats this purpose because by prioritising 
everything, we are prioritising nothing.185 Furthermore, an all-inclusive definition of security 
suggests that there are no limits to the concept’s expansion, illustrated by the fact that despite 
the UNDP’s broad definition, scholars have suggested additional threats that should be dealt 
with under the security label. For example, Reed and Tehranian also argue for the protection 
of psychological security (involving conditions establishing respectful, loving and humane 
interpersonal relations) and communication security (concerning freedom of, and balance in, 
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information flows).186 However, ‘the broad vision of human security is ultimately nothing more 
than a shopping list. […] At a certain point, human security becomes a loose synonym for “bad 
things that can happen”’, thus losing its useful purpose as a single concept.187 
 
Instead, a narrower definition of human security, which focuses on protecting people only from 
physical threats, should be adopted. Such threats could be the result of war, internal conflict or 
serious crime such as gang violence, which tends to increase after the war has ended.188 
Physical security should be singled out from the seven UNDP categories because first, it is the 
one most directly related to post-violence contexts and second, a narrower definition of the 
term makes it more practically useful. The importance of physical security was highlighted by 
the UNDP itself, which stated that ‘[p]erhaps no other aspect of human security is so vital for 
people as their security from physical violence.’189 Furthermore, the broad nature of the 
UNDP’s definition was even criticised by Canada, one of the most enthusiastic supporters of 
the concept of human security, for undermining the importance of threats relating to violent 
conflict.190 An all-inclusive definition could imply that physical security is almost easy to 
guarantee, especially when compared to categories such as environmental or health security, 
which are not completely within human control. In contrast, a narrow definition allows policy 
makers to clearly identify the issues that must be dealt with for security to be achieved and 
connect them with peacebuilding policies on the ground. This leads to the next question, 
namely, the type of policies that should be adopted in post-violence societies in order to 
promote security. 
 
Security might be undermined because perpetrators of human rights violations remain 
unpunished after the end of the conflict,191 by the high crime rates in the post-violence 
society,192 or due to a popular belief that the enemy may still pose a threat.193 As a result, 
different societies are likely to respond to their lack of security in different ways,194 but they 
should all adopt measures that target and address these challenges directly, rather than expect 
that related peacebuilding initiatives, such as strengthening the judiciary, will be sufficient.195 
Dilemmas as to what these measures should look like arise both in the short and medium term 
after the violence has ceased. A short-term security dilemma concerns the process and timing 
of disarmament; this is a delicate decision because on the one hand, ex-combatants should be 
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disarmed early on to make people feel safe. On the other, disarmament should not take place 
too soon because ex-fighters might be afraid that they are losing their power with nothing in 
return, thus being encouraged to act as spoilers.196 The stakes are high since, if the process 
fails, citizens may suffer from ‘microinsecurity’, where individuals fear that they will be the 
victims of crimes perpetrated by former soldiers, or ‘macroinsecurity’ which is the fear that the 
state might be overthrown by insurrection.197 Equally important are medium-term security 
dilemmas, such as the reform of the police.198 A legitimate and properly working police force 
can promote security in an objective sense by reducing crime rates in the country, but also 
subjectively, since it affects the public’s confidence in the state’s ability to preserve the social 
order.199 At the same time, and pointing to the interconnectedness between the elements of 
peace, a well organised and legitimate effort to reform the police, could have a positive effect 
on reconciliation. For instance, the Patten Commission in NI was tasked with making 
recommendations for the reform of the – then – Royal Ulster Constabulary and therefore 
promoting security, but during the course of public meetings that it organised, it also heard 
personal stories from victims of police violence that would usually have been told to a Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission.200 
 
The final question that should be asked with regards to security relates to the mechanics of the 
proposed definition of peace and is concerned with how much security is necessary in a given 
society and at what cost. It is wrong to assume that little security is really no security; rather, 
security is a matter of degree and peacebuilders should be concerned with how much of it is 
enough.201 This is because security has a cost, not only in financial terms, an important factor 
in post-violence societies, but also in terms of potentially undermining justice and 
reconciliation. A minimum level of security is needed, but how much is desirable beyond that 
depends on how much already exists. So, if people are, and feel, relatively secure, 
peacebuilders might prefer to focus their resources on something else, even if investing in 
security could have increased it by a bit more.202 Therefore, optimum security is achieved when 
physical safety exists to the greatest degree that is practically possible, without compromising 
justice and reconciliation.  
 
B. Justice as the Second Element of Peace 
Justice, the second element of peace, is understood as remedying past injustices that were 
caused before or during the eruption of violence and ensuring that they will not be repeated in 
the future. Although the post-violence justice described here is connected to the more general 
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definition of justice in liberal societies, the two differ in significant ways. For instance, issues 
such as access to courts and social equity are relevant to both types of societies, but post-
violence justice is primarily concerned with them to the extent that they have to do with the 
remedying of past, or preventing of future, injustices. Additionally, justice-promoting 
institutions in post-violence societies often deal with issues that are not so widespread in mostly 
liberal contexts, such as remedying large numbers of displaced people. As time passes, the 
concerns of post-violence justice become less important and are replaced by those of ordinary 
justice;203 however, here we are only concerned with the former.  
 
Justice in post-violence societies has been deemed important since the early inception of 
peacebuilding, with practically every human rights treaty stressing in its preamble the need for 
‘peace and justice in the world’.204 These two concepts have been connected in the literature in 
two ways: first, communal violence is usually fuelled by feelings of injustice. Leaving such 
injustices unremedied and allowing them to continue after the violence has ended, sends people 
the message that nothing has changed.205 This, in turn, is likely to result in frustration and 
eventually even more violence, until the victims of the injustice obtain what they believe they 
are entitled to.206 It is for this reason that justice requires, not only the existence of objectively 
observable institutions dealing with past grievances, but also that the public subjectively 
believes that these have been addressed. Second, the promotion of justice legitimises the peace 
agreement and the new state of affairs by distinguishing the actions of the new regime from 
the illegitimate acts caused during the violence.207 The impact of justice on legitimacy was 
highlighted by Boulding, who argued that a  
system of peace which is perceived by increasing numbers of its participants to have 
elements of injustice will be subject to increasing strain. […] The sense of injustice 
ultimately erodes the whole legitimacy of the system and it collapses.208  
 
However, in addition to the positive connections between justice and peace in the literature, 
arguments have also been made that the two are incompatible with each other. In 1996 and 
shortly after the Dayton Agreement ending the war in BiH had been signed, an influential and 
anonymous article was written by one of the people involved in the negotiations.209 Outlining 
what has become known as the ‘peace v justice’ debate, it argued that the international 
community’s insistence on the protection of human rights (what it called ‘justice’) undermined 
the likelihood of peace being achieved, since it delayed the conclusion of the peace settlement 
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between the parties.210 Nonetheless, although the anonymous article referred to ‘peace’ and 
‘justice’, it did not use the two terms in the same way they are being understood here. By 
‘peace’ the author essentially meant the stopping of hostilities, which resembles the definition 
of security, while by ‘justice’ s/he was referring to the protection of human rights. Essentially, 
s/he was arguing that insistence on full compliance with human rights in a post-violence 
context might undermine security, an argument that is explored in more detail in subsequent 
chapters. In any case, the proposed definition of peace, which is based on the idea that the 
elements might contradict with each other, confirms the broader point made in the ‘peace v 
justice’ literature, namely that the promotion of justice is not always conductive to 
peacebuilding efforts.211 Rather, justice-promoting measures might contradict with security or 
reconciliation considerations, and therefore with the broader objectives of peace. This is not to 
say however, that justice cannot also make important positive contributions to peacebuilding 
objectives. 
 
Perhaps the clearest indication of the importance of justice for peace is the rich and growing 
literature on transitional justice. Despite the important lessons that can be learned from this 
literature, the term ‘transitional justice’ will not be used here, as it relies on three assumptions 
that are best reconsidered. The first is the belief that transitional justice can be promoted 
through, and therefore emphasis must be placed on, addressing violent crimes rather than other 
types of injustices.212 This bias has resulted in a consistent lack of attention to violations of 
socio-economic rights, thus providing a skewed understanding of justice in post-violence 
societies.213 This is particularly problematic because reparating victims for past violent crimes 
is likely to have a lesser impact in terms of building peace in contexts where poverty and social 
inequalities persist.214 Conversely, the current definition considers, not only retributive, but 
also distributive justice, that is often equally important, yet neglected, in the aftermath of 
violence.215 At the same time, it favours a retributive conception of justice over a restorative 
one because the latter, with its focus on rehabilitating the offenders and mending their 
relationship with victims and the society at large, is encapsulated within the element of 
reconciliation.216  
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The second assumption that merits reconsideration is the belief that transitional justice has been 
delivered when the relevant institutions have been set up.217 In contrast, post-violence justice 
considers institution-building as an important first step, but as ultimately incapable of 
exhausting its demands. In addition to the establishment and strengthening of liberal 
institutions, post-violence justice focuses on the experiences and perceptions of victims, 
perpetrators and members of the society at large. This suggests that in one sense at least, post-
violence justice is broader than traditional conceptions of transitional justice, since it envisions 
addressing injustices through a range of tools, some of which are institution-focused, and others 
that are people-centred. Examples of the former involve trials, vetting and reparation 
programmes, while instances of the latter could be the issuing of apologies from the state for 
past unjust policies or actions218 and the provision of better educational, housing and economic 
opportunities to the groups that suffered from injustices.219 
 
At the same time, the definition of post-violence justice is also narrower than that of its 
transitional counterpart, which points to the last set of assumptions that must be reconsidered. 
Illustrative of this is Teitel’s account, which contends that the main purpose of transitional 
justice is to assist in the change from a less to a more liberal society through a ‘collective public 
ritual’, irrespective of that ritual’s content.220 Transitional justice can consist of both ‘amnesties 
and punishment [which] are two sides of the same coin: [they are] legal rites that visibly and 
forcefully demonstrate the change in sovereignty that makes for political transition.’221 
However, this definition lacks even minimum justice criteria; ultimately anything can be part 
of transitional justice as long as it signifies change in some way. This broad but shallow 
definition is problematic as it compromises justice for the sake of transition; yet, such a 
compromise should be viewed with suspicion, not least because of the lack of a general 
agreement as to what it is we are (and should be) transitioning to.  
 
Transitional justice has been broadened to such an extent that it has even been used in contexts 
that are not undergoing a peacebuilding process at all.222 While this might be seen as a welcome 
transplantation of justice considerations to different settings, the increased elasticity of the 
concept risks degenerating it into amorphousness.223 An additional limitation of such a broad 
definition is that if everything that helps in the transition is part of transitional justice, it leaves 
little or no content for the other two elements of peace. This is not only troublesome because 
                                                 
217 Chandra Lekha Sriram, ‘Justice as Peace? Liberal Peacebuilding and Strategies of Transnational Justice’ 
(2007) 21 Global Society 579.  
218 Patricia Lundy and Bill Rolston, ‘Redress for Past Harms? Official Apologies in Northern Ireland’ (2016) 20 
International Journal of Human Rights 104. 
219 Nevin T. Aiken, ‘Learning to Live Together: Transitional Justice and Intergroup Reconciliation in Northern 
Ireland’ (2010) 4 International Journal of Transitional Justice 166. Such measures were also recommended by 
the TRC in SA (TRC, Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Pretoria, TRC, 1998), Volume 5, ch 
5, [78], [102], [107]-[108] and [113].) 
220 Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000) 49. 
221 Ibid 59. 
222 Stephen Winter, Transitional Justice in Established Democracies: A Political Theory (Basingstoke, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2014). 
223 Tom Gerard Daly, The Alchemists: Questioning Our Faith in Courts as Democracy-Builders (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2017) 48. 
 36 
it is descriptively inaccurate, but also because by classifying all peacebuilding strategies as 
instances of transitional justice, one is left unable to decide between them when these conflict 
with each other. For example, some argue that transitional justice may require the forgiveness 
rather than punishment of war criminals,224 while others counter that only by punishing the 
perpetrators can society move forward.225 Yet, by conceptualising both alternatives as 
‘transitional justice’, a choice between them becomes arbitrary. Conversely, a narrower 
definition of post-violence justice as the remedying of past injustices provides a clear answer 
to this dilemma by offering reasons for the punishment of criminals. Perpetrators, whether of 
violent crimes or discriminatory policies, must be identified – and ideally punished – because 
it would preserve a sense of injustice if they did not pay for their crimes.226 While amnesties 
acknowledge the existence of perpetrators (since for an amnesty to be given, a crime must have 
been committed), this acknowledgment might be perceived as empty, thus unable to appeal to 
the people’s sense of justice.227 This is not to argue that amnesties are never appropriate in 
post-violence contexts; they might be necessary to appease a still powerful and armed 
opposition (thus promoting security) or because forgiving the perpetrators might be the best 
way to achieve reconciliation.228 Yet, in such cases, amnesties are used not because of justice’s 
demands, but despite them, as promoting security or reconciliation is considered more pressing 
in the circumstances. 
 
Since injustices vary from society to society, there is a need to adopt context-specific justice-
promoting measures. While, for instance, BiH’s violent war might require a focus on retributive 
justice, the fact that the conflict in NI was fuelled by socio-economic inequalities puts 
additional emphasis on distributive considerations.229 Such differences notwithstanding, 
undoing injustices always requires that attention is paid to both the perpetrators and victims. 
Efforts to identify and punish the perpetrators are important, but remedying victims to the 
greatest possible extent for the harm they have suffered, is also necessary. Of course, ‘victims’ 
do not form a single homogeneous category of people with the same justice preferences and 
needs.230 Rather, these preferences change, depending on the specific injustice that different 
victims have suffered from. If the injustice is in the form of physical harm or discrimination, it 
might be necessary to provide monetary or in-kind compensation. Alternatively, if it concerns 
forced displacement, remedying it might require that the victim either receives restitution of 
his property or is fairly compensated for it. Moreover, victims often claim that an equally 
important way of promoting justice is the issuing of an apology from the state or perpetrators 
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for their unjust conduct.231 Finally, in addition to providing personalised remedies to individual 
victims, justice can also require the adoption of more holistic measures. Take, for instance, 
post-apartheid SA where decade-long discriminatory practices affected all areas of life for 
millions of people. One way of addressing this injustice and reducing the socio-economic gap 
that has been created as a result, is to adopt countrywide policies that provide better 
educational, housing and economic opportunities to the disadvantaged communities.232 
 
The need to pay close attention to victims and perpetrators suggests that peacebuilders should 
have a nuanced understanding of who falls in each category and what is entailed through 
membership in such a group. Rather simplistic depictions of post-violence societies falsely 
distinguish between ‘noble victims’ and diametrically opposed ‘nefarious victimizers’, without 
acknowledging that someone might, in fact, meet the definitions for both.233 At the same time, 
victims tend to be presented as innocent and helpless, which in turn creates political advantages 
for them.234 In particular, the ‘victim’ label makes it easier for a group to attract sympathy and 
support, while portraying any attacks perpetrated by its members as actions of self-defence and 
therefore, legitimate.235 Concurrently, the label of ‘perpetrator’ should also be used with 
caution, since it can group together actors with ranging levels of culpability.236 Thus, effective 
peacebuilding strategies must take these considerations into account and ensure that 
oversimplifications about the status of different parties are avoided. 
 
Finally, because of the balancing exercise that takes place between the three elements of peace, 
the requirements of justice are often not fully respected in post-violence societies. Practical 
difficulties, such as the passage of time,237 the unreliability of evidence238 and the large 
numbers of victims and/or perpetrators,239 also suggest that the injustices of the past will not 
be remedied completely.240 Furthermore, the emphasis the definition places on people’s 
experiences and expectations, rather than just the establishment of institutions, makes it 
unlikely that perfect justice will be achieved in the eyes of the victims. Illustrative of this is the 
reaction of Munira Subašić, leader of the Mothers of the Enclaves of Srebrenica and Žepa in 
BiH, following General Krstić’s conviction by the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
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Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).241 Disappointed, she announced that she did not think that justice 
had been served because Krstić, at the time an old man, had been sentenced to a 46-year prison 
term, instead of receiving life imprisonment.242 In light of these challenges, peacebuilders are 
advised that what is important is that post-violence justice is present to a satisfactory, rather 
than full, extent.243 
 
C. Reconciliation as the Third Element of Peace 
The third element of peace is reconciliation and like the other two, its definition has been 
contested; there are, for example, disagreements as to whether it involves personal or political 
reconciliation and whether it should be understood as a process or an outcome.244 This section 
defines reconciliation in terms of both the outcome it is intended to promote and the methods 
used to achieve this. It argues that the end result of this process should be meaningful 
cooperation between members of different groups on a personal and political level. Willingness 
to cooperate on a personal level is likely to encourage political cooperation because whether 
political parties representing different communities are prepared to work together, at least 
partly depends on the attitudes of their members. On the other hand, political cooperation 
promotes good personal relations since these are more likely to be undermined by politicians 
who encourage inter-group animosity to win easy votes.245 The outcome of meaningful 
personal and political cooperation is achieved when a certain process is followed. Specifically, 
people must start trusting, which in turn requires that they no longer dehumanise, each other.  
 
The trust and rehumanisation of the enemy that are necessary steps for reconciliation can be 
promoted by removing the hurdles that prevent former enemies from being perceived as 
people.246 During the period of violence, negative stereotyping, propaganda against and fear of 
the other side usually make people view members of the opposing group as less than human.247 
The fact that members of the other group could be feeling scared of, victimised by, or ashamed 
of the actions of their fellow group members, or that all sides caused atrocities during a war is 
completely lost on most people.248 For instance, when interviewed, members of different ethnic 
groups in BiH expressed feelings that they were the biggest victims of the conflict and that 
while atrocities had been carried out by all sides, the ones committed by other groups were 
premeditated, while those involving their own people were just individual excesses.249 As 
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negative stereotyping of the other becomes more common, the individuality of the stereotyped 
group’s members is lost and their dehumanisation becomes easier.250 Such stereotyping, 
portraying whole groups of people as less than human, predatory and unreasonable in their 
personal and political relationships, is the biggest hurdle to meaningful cooperation and it is 
this that reconciliation methods should attempt to address.  
 
Two important distinctions should be made when clarifying the meaning of reconciliation. The 
first is between meaningful cooperation and inter-group harmony, with the former being a 
much more modest aim than the arguably utopian goal of achieving the latter.251 As Govier and 
Verwoerd put it, a ‘realistic goal in contexts of reconciliation is not total harmony; nor is it a 
state of blissfully enduring unity.’252 In order for harmony to exist, there must be compatibility 
of the groups’ needs and interests, but competitive politics in post-violence societies operate 
by highlighting precisely this lack of compatibility.253 Moreover, had such compatibility 
existed, it is unlikely that the society would have resorted to violence in the first place. Separate 
groups, characterised by distinct identities, needs and interests, do not have to be assimilated 
for reconciliation to be achieved. Reconciliation does not require the elimination of differences, 
but the ability to live with these differences through cooperation.254 This cooperation can be 
attained when there is an adequate amount of trust, a confident expectation that one will act in 
a manner which will not take advantage of the other’s vulnerability.255 
  
The second distinction that must be made is between meaningful cooperation and mere co-
existence among members of the previously warring parties. If people are living next to each 
other without communicating, cooperating or having common goals, wishing that they did not 
have to mingle with the other group at all, there is no real reconciliation.256 It is just a brief 
pause before the racist perceptions of each group resurface and potentially even reignite the 
violence. If the UN is right that post-violence societies need a ‘society wide system of values 
[…] to put a premium on peace, to desire peace, to seek peace and to stand for peace’, then 
reconciliation must mean more than simple co-existence.257 Rejecting this minimalist 
definition however, does not mean that meaningful cooperation necessarily stems from 
altruistic goals of loving one’s enemy. It could result from the simple understanding that unless 
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the members of the previously warring groups reconcile, the alternative will be catastrophic 
for all of them.258 
 
An argument could be made that the definition of reconciliation as the meaningful cooperation 
between different groups is too ambitious; a better (and more achievable) alternative is to focus 
instead, on the need to respect the rights of others.259 In every society, whether it is a post-
violence one or not, there are disagreements about what should be the preferred course of action 
in relation to different political conflicts. Unless structured debates can take place and 
ultimately lead to a negotiated outcome, these political conflicts can paralyse the country.260 
Conceptualising reconciliation as the need to respect the rights of others helps address this 
danger because it provides a discourse and vocabulary through which such debates can take 
place. Additionally, explicitly linking reconciliation with human rights allays suspicions that 
have been raised in some post-violence societies that talk of reconciliation is, in fact, an attempt 
to silence the weaker party. This has, for instance, been the case in NI, where Nationalists argue 
that the agenda for reconciliation and improvement of community relations is promoted by 
clouding the political nature of the conflict, the long-term inequality that has fuelled the 
violence and the role of the state in maintaining this.261 Conversely, if reconciliation was 
understood as the protection of human rights, such challenges would be overcome, since these 
are precisely the issues that human rights are designed to address.  
 
Arguably however, this understanding of reconciliation is too restrictive because it ignores the 
fact that not every political conflict can be understood as a human rights dilemma.262 Moreover, 
in the likely scenario where the parties are not in agreement as to what each competing right 
entails, expressing the political conflict in rights terms, only rephrases, rather than resolves, the 
problem. A third consideration is that while the protection of human rights might indeed 
promote reconciliation, the two might also be seen as antithetical to, or at least, not always 
compatible with, each other, since the former is about challenging governments and reforming 
the law, while the latter focuses on relationship-building among individuals.263 Finally, this 
definition should be avoided because of its unsuitability in answering the question at hand: 
since our objective is to clarify the relationship between rights and peace (and consequently, 
between rights and reconciliation), any analysis becomes circular if reconciliation itself is 
defined as the respect of other people’s rights. 
 
Thus, reconciliation is best understood as having been achieved when hostile feelings are 
slowly transformed into a tendency to not dehumanise the members of other groups and then, 
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into the development of trust and willingness to cooperate. Even in the most favourable 
conditions, this takes years to complete; reconciliation does not occur naturally, it needs effort 
and time and is rarely the result of a linear process.264 While positive attitudes between 
individuals from different groups might develop in the workplace, social pressures might 
prevent them from materialising in their personal lives.265 Further, such positive attitudes might 
increase or decrease depending on a number of external factors, such as economic crises or 
spoilers.266 Consequently, a number of reconciliation-promoting methods, both bottom-up and 
top-down, and spanning different periods of time have to be used. Each method has its strengths 
and weaknesses and might work with some people, but not others, so a combined effort is 
preferable. The blend of methods that should be used depends on factors, such as the specific 
challenges faced within the post-violence society, the resources available and the cultures of 
the groups involved.267  
  
Common examples of reconciliation-promoting mechanisms are Truth Commissions and 
communication workshops. Truth Commissions, like the one that was established in SA, can 
help build reconciliation by providing evidence about the atrocities that took place during the 
period of violence and eliminating some of the myths that were circulated before and during 
its occurrence.268 Such myths, an outcome of negative stereotyping, include suggestions that 
only one side was the perpetrator of crimes or that every member of that group enthusiastically 
endorsed the violations. On the other hand, communication workshops can lead to 
reconciliation by encouraging participants to listen to the other’s story in order to appreciate 
that s/he is not the monster that s/he is portrayed to be.269 Understanding a person’s motives in 
acting in a specific way or making a particular demand, makes it more likely that this will be 
accepted as reasonable, and as a result, encourages compromise between the different 
parties.270 When in place, these mechanisms promote reconciliation in the eyes of an outside 
observer and start promoting subjective feelings of reconciliation as well. However, the 
development of sufficient levels of trust in order to allow meaningful cooperation, is a unique 
journey for each person and, almost always, spans beyond the completion of the work of formal 
institutions. 
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IV. Conclusion 
This chapter started from the premise that any robust analysis of the relationship between peace 
and human rights requires that the two terms are defined. Focusing on the first of the two terms, 
it argued that current definitions are either extrapolated from peacebuilding practice, or derived 
from a wholly abstract analysis. Both suffer from significant shortcomings. Since neither of 
the two accounts of peace provides a satisfactory foundation for answering the question at 
hand, a new definition, consisting of the elements of security, justice and reconciliation, was 
proposed. An advantage of this definition is that it draws a clear line connecting the different 
elements of peace and the tools that should be used to achieve them. The definition does not 
make decisions about what peacebuilding tools should be used, when and in what way, easy to 
reach; it does however make them more transparent. Relying on this definition, the following 
chapter turns to human rights as one example of peacebuilding tools and argues that under the 
right conditions, their protection can indeed contribute to both an objectively observable and a 
subjectively perceived sense of peace in the post-violence society. 
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Chapter 3 – The Means and the End Connected: 
A Framework for the Relationship Between Human Rights and Peace 
 
I. Introduction 
If the end objective of peacebuilding processes should be to strike a balance between 
considerations of security, justice and reconciliation, one means through which this can be 
achieved is the protection of human rights. Human rights, as defined in Section II, are 
concerned with the legal protection of values on both the domestic and the international plane. 
Such protection could involve the adjudication of human rights cases in national or 
international courts, or the enactment and enforcement of human rights laws or policies by state 
officials or international peacebuilders. This definition relies on a fairly limited understanding 
of human rights as legal rights and does not take into account, for example, the ways in which 
their moral counterparts can inform school curriculums271 or contribute to the psychological 
support provided by victim groups.272 Yet, it is considered appropriate for elucidating the 
relationship between human rights and peace in practice, because it reflects the way in which 
they have been understood and utilised by peacebuilders themselves. Section III proceeds to 
argue that despite the existence of references in the literature to instances when the protection 
of human rights contributed to security, justice or reconciliation, these are usually merely 
examples or intuitions of a positive relationship between them and peace. Instead, what is 
needed, is a comprehensive framework that explains how human rights protection relates to the 
building of peaceful relationships, in a way that can shape practices on the ground.  
 
This framework centres around the process of conflict resolution. Conflicts, Section IV 
maintains, are incompatibilities of positions on any given subject matter, and as such, they are 
natural and frequently occurring phenomena in all democracies. When they remain 
unaddressed, they can become dangerous, while their successful resolution can result in the 
promotion of security, justice and reconciliation. Bearing in mind that conflicts are complex 
phenomena with personal, social and structural dimensions, the adoption of strategies that 
address all of these is necessary. Thus, the extent to which human rights are effective 
peacebuilding tools depends on their ability to respond to such diverse demands of the conflict 
resolution process. Section V argues that human rights can have this effect in two ways: on the 
one hand, their adjudication in a court of law can provide guidance as to the best ways to 
address incompatibilities of positions; on the other, they can inspire the adoption, and push for 
the implementation, of laws and policies that are designed to address such conflicts. Combined, 
these strategies can induce legal and institutional reforms imperative for the building of 
objective peace, while also contributing to the promotion of socio-economic and psychological 
changes necessary for developing subjective feelings of security, justice and reconciliation. 
Yet, the contributions that human rights can make to the conflict resolution process are neither 
automatic nor unqualified; for them to materialise, peacebuilders must ensure that certain 
                                                 
271 Michalinos Zembylas and et al., ‘Human Rights and the Ethno-Nationalist Problematic through the Eyes of 
Greek-Cypriot Teachers’ (2016) 11 Education Citizenship and Social Justice 19. 
272 Brandon Hamber, Dealing with Painful Memories and Violent Pasts: Towards a Framework for Contextual 
Understanding (Berghof Handbook Dialogue Series No 11, Berlin, Berghof Foundation, 2015). 
 44 
conditions are in place. Consequently, the main advantage of the proposed framework is that 
it elucidates the specific ways in which human rights can help build peace and the conditions 
that must be present for this to happen, so that peacebuilders can strategically target their efforts 
and resources accordingly.  
 
II. Defining the Means 
Human rights have been the subject of an impressive number of academic debates that seek to 
define, justify and explain their content.273 Yet, when the Brahimi Report states that ‘the human 
rights component of a peace operation is indeed critical to effective peace-building’, but offers 
no definition of ‘human rights’, it creates the misleading impression that there is a consensus 
as to what this means.274 Addressing this limitation, the study proposes a working definition of 
the term. This is not intended to offer ‘the best philosophical account of human rights’ or even 
suggest that such an account exists.275 It, moreover, does not seek to convince the reader that 
any alternative understanding of the term is wrong, or produce an exhaustive list of the 
characteristics that human rights generally possess. Rather, it clarifies what peacebuilders 
themselves imply when they refer to ‘human rights’. It argues, in particular, that when they 
discuss and work towards their protection, peacebuilders have in mind institutions and 
mechanisms that safeguard legal human rights. While this definition might be criticised as 
being too narrow or artificially restricted, an alternative account that also focused on the 
protection of moral human rights would have achieved definitional inclusion to the detriment 
of accuracy as to how the term is understood and used in practice.  
 
Statements emphasising the importance of ‘the human rights component of a peace operation’, 
like the ones found in the Brahimi Report, leave unclear whether they refer to the protection of 
moral or legal human rights.276 At the same time, philosophical accounts vary widely on 
whether these are one and the same thing,277 or completely disconnected from each other.278 
Arguably, a distinction between the two should be maintained since each has a different scope 
and content, gives rise to distinct remedies and contributes to peacebuilding efforts in varying 
ways.279 A moral right is created when there are sufficient moral interests to something, which 
are not undermined by other conflicting considerations.280 Only if a legal institution decided 
that this moral right should also be legally protected and enforceable would this turn into a 
legal right as well.281 The justifications for the existence of a moral right usually play a role in 
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the decision to create an equivalent legal right, but additional factors are also relevant.282 The 
most important of these factors concerns the appropriateness of legal institutions, such as the 
judiciary, to decide certain issues and points to the fact that not every moral right should also 
be converted into a legal one. Thus, a moral right might protect important interests, which 
should, nevertheless, not be the concern of the law, because legal institutions are not always 
well-suited to deal with morality’s demands. In Buchanan’s words, ‘[j]ustifying assertions 
about the existence of certain moral rights is one thing; justifying an institutionalized system 
[…] to realize them is quite another.’283 An additional difference between moral and legal rights 
is that the two result in different types of remedies. Not converting a moral right into a legal 
one does not mean that no right exists; it simply suggests that any recourse for a failure of the 
duty-bearer to comply with his obligations rests in morality rather than legal sanctions.284 Thus, 
the violation of moral rights will result in the social condemnation of the perpetrator, while that 
of legal rights will also have legal consequences.  
 
The different characteristics of moral and legal rights mean that they tend to be used in distinct 
ways by various actors. On the one hand, moral rights are usually relied on by politicians as a 
way of lending popular support to their policies, or by international peacebuilders when they 
want to provide added legitimacy to their practices or general presence in the post-violence 
society.285 Moral human rights are also valuable peacebuilding tools when they are used by 
teachers or civil society organisations to educate the public at large of the values that they give 
effect to.286 On the other hand, legal human rights are tools usually used in more formal 
processes of domestic or international institutions. The most common example of such 
institutions are courts, but other bodies can also be responsible for ensuring that legal human 
rights are respected, protected and fulfilled. These bodies could be part of the executive287 or 
the legislature,288 might be created on an ad hoc basis by international peacebuilders with 
temporary powers to act within the post-violence society,289 or could be specialised 
                                                 
282 Joseph Raz, ‘Rights and Individual Well-Being’ (1992) 5 Ratio Juris 127, 140. 
283 Buchanan, The Heart of Human Rights 51. 
284 John Skorupski, ‘Human Rights’ in Samantha Beeson and John Tasioulas (eds), The Philosophy of 
International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010). 
285 Kevin Boyle, ‘Linking Human Rights and Other Goals’ in John Morison, Kieran McEvoy and Gordon Anthony 
(eds), Judges, Transition, and Human Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007).  
286 Betty A. Reardon, ‘Human Rights as Education for Peace’ in George J. Andreopoulos and Richard Pierre 
Claude (eds), Human Rights Education for the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1997); Owen M. Fiss, ‘Human Rights as Social Ideals’ in Carla Hesse and Robert Post (eds), Human Rights 
in Political Transitions: Gettysburg to Bosnia (New York, Zone Books, 1999). 
287 See, eg, the Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees in BiH, available at 
www.vijeceministara.gov.ba/ministarstva/ljudska_prava_i_izbjeglice/default.aspx?id=120&langTag=en-US. 
Also, the Office of the Custodian, responsible for the protection of TC properties, is part of the Ministry of Interior 
of the Republic of Cyprus (Nasia Hadjigeorgiou, ‘Case Note on Kazali and Others v Cyprus’ (2013) 2 Cyprus 
Human Rights Law Review 103.)  
288 See, eg, the Joint Committee on Human Rights in the UK. (Courtney Hillebrecht, ‘Implementing International 
Human Rights Law at Home: Domestic Politics and the European Court of Human Rights’ (2012) 13 Human 
Rights Review 279.) 
289 See, eg, the Office of High Representative in BiH. (Richard Caplan, ‘Who Guards the Guardians? International 
Accountability in Bosnia’ in David Chandler (ed), Peace without Politics? Ten Years of International State 
Building in Bosnia (London, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2006).)  
 46 
administrative290 or quasi-judicial institutions291 that were formed to implement specific human 
rights-inspired legislation. When peacebuilders rely on human rights in the context of these 
institutions, they do so with particular objectives in mind, such as giving effect to a specific 
policy, or implementing a particular law.  
 
A right, like the right to life or equality, might have both a moral and a legal facet, meaning 
that it can be used both for rhetorical or educational purposes, and in legal institutions. At the 
same time, it is possible that a right only has a moral facet in the sense that references to it have 
a moral punch, but it is not in itself legally enforceable. A case in point is the right to peace 
itself. Scholars have been discussing the human right to peace and its content for decades, a 
debate that has also been picked up by UN General Assembly.292 This has resulted in the 
passing of the Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace, which recognised 
that peace ‘is mankind’s paramount value’,293 and the Declaration of the Right of Peoples to 
Peace, which reaffirmed the existence of the right and asserted that ‘the maintenance of a 
peaceful life for peoples is the sacred duty of each state’.294 Further, references to the right to 
peace have re-emerged, since 2012, within the UN Human Rights Council due to the initiative 
of a non-governmental organisation, the Spanish Society for International Human Rights 
Law.295 Nevertheless, arguments that the right to peace also has a legal content or is legally 
enforceable remain largely underexplored and unpersuasive.296 While a political argument 
along the lines of the General Assembly resolutions can be made for the existence of a moral 
right to peace, it is unclear how it would ever be used in a court of law, since fundamental 
questions, such as the identities of the right-holder and the duty-bearer, and the legal 
obligations that the right gives rise to, remain unanswered.  
 
There are therefore, good reasons why legal and moral human rights should remain separate; 
key among them is the need to distinguish between those rights that can appropriately be 
protected by legal or quasi-legal institutions and those that are better left in the moral realm. 
This distinction is not only theoretically persuasive, but also practically important for the 
conclusions of the book, which are only concerned with the relationship between peace and the 
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protection of legal human rights. The choice to limit the analysis in this manner reflects the 
way peacebuilders themselves have understood the tools they have at their disposal. When UN 
reports refer to ‘human rights’, they do not explicitly restrict themselves to their legal 
protection. Nevertheless, the examples they offer of how human rights can contribute to peace 
always seem to focus on their legal, rather than moral, facet.297 Thus, An Agenda for Peace 
refers to the need to ‘identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace’ and 
uses the monitoring of elections and the protection of human rights as examples.298 Further, 
the Brahimi Report recommends that the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
increases its peacebuilding efforts by creating ‘model databases for human rights field 
work’.299 Finally, the UN Secretary-General has noted that ‘[t]he establishment of independent 
national human rights commissions is one complementary strategy that has shown promise for 
helping to restore […] peaceful dispute resolution’.300 Nowhere in these key UN documents 
are there signs of moral human rights being perceived as instrumental peacebuilding tools.  
 
This emphasis on legal human rights is also reflected in peacebuilding operations within post-
violence societies themselves. While, for example, there has been a growing literature on the 
importance of moral rights in relation to peace education,301 and even some small-scale 
grassroots attempts to apply the theoretical findings in practice,302 most peacebuilding 
strategies are still focused on the contributions of legal rights.303 Thus, considerable attention 
and resources have been invested in the reform of the judiciary, the development of the rule of 
law and the creation of legal remedies for past injustices.304 This is not surprising: moral rights 
are not as intellectually disciplined or clear in their content as their legal counterparts. This 
renders them susceptible to abuse by politically partisan groups seeking to undermine the peace 
process, a danger that peacebuilders are, understandably, keen to avoid.305 Conversely, legal 
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rights are preferred among peacebuilders because they are more in line with their liberal agenda 
and its focus on the reform of laws and institutions.306 Finally, legal tools are more readily 
relied on because they are easier to deploy and utilise than moral human rights and their impact 
is simpler to measure, assess and fund.307  
 
Since the objective is to devise a framework that describes how human rights relate to 
peacebuilding efforts in practice, the preferences of those who utilise them are important. It is 
for this reason that the ensuing analysis will also not be dealing with the impact of socio-
economic rights in peacebuilding efforts. While such rights can provide the impetus for the 
development of socio-economic reform policies necessary for peace,308 they have not attracted 
much attention by peacebuilders themselves.309 Thus, UN reports often refer to the 
development of democratic institutions,310 the elimination of discrimination among ethnic 
groups311 and responses to past violence,312 all of which relate to protection of civil and political 
rights, but there is little mention of the right to food, housing or education, beyond the general 
push to transform post-violence societies into liberal economies.313 Furthermore, the specific 
contributions that socio-economic rights can make to peace, the considerations of who should 
use them and in what way in order to induce such reforms, and the conditions that must be 
present for these to materialise, arguably differ from those relating to civil and political rights. 
An assessment of their potential peacebuilding effects is therefore crucial, but it is not an 
exercise that can be undertaken here. This is not to suggest that socio-economic reforms remain 
exclusively outside the focus of the book. In fact, several of the rights that are explored, such 
as the right to property or freedom from discrimination (especially in the workplace) are 
directly connected to such reforms. However, the analysis will only be focusing on those, rather 
than also exploring the (albeit potentially fruitful) relationship between them and the protection 
of a category of rights that has remained largely ignored by peacebuilders themselves.  
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The proposed framework is also only concerned with individual, rather than group rights, but 
for different reasons. Although the peacebuilding contributions,314 and even very existence,315 
of group rights are still being debated in the literature, peacebuilding reports and practice have 
already acknowledged them as important conflict resolution tools. For instance, An Agenda for 
Peace calls for a ‘a deeper understanding and respect for the rights of minorities’, which will 
contribute to a greater stability of states.316 At the same time, the UN has supported peace 
agreements, such as the Annan Plan that was put to a referendum in Cyprus in 2004, which 
heavily relied on group rights, such as the veto power of ethnic groups in political decisions317 
and the provision of ethnic quotas on the number of people that would be allowed to reside in 
a given geographical area within the post-violence society.318 Nevertheless, the specific 
contributions that group rights can make to peacebuilding efforts differ from those of individual 
rights and should be explored separately. Moreover, while potentially beneficial to promoting 
a sense of security among previously warring parties,319 the possibility of abuse of group rights 
is much higher than that of their individual counterparts and merits specific attention that 
cannot be devoted here.320 Finally, judges have already recognised that individual and group 
rights may conflict with each other, thus making it dangerous to place the two under the 
umbrella term of ‘human rights’.321 
 
III. The Means and the End Unconnected 
Human rights can indeed make positive contributions to each of the elements of peace. For 
instance, especially in contexts where the police force was perceived as having played a role 
in the continuation of the violence by favouring one community over the other, its reform can 
send the message that things are changing and help promote security.322 While not every aspect 
of police reform is connected to human rights, they can provide clear guidance on the types of 
changes that should be adopted in order to make this process both more effective and legitimate 
in the eyes of the people.323 Thus, when the Patten Commission in NI was asked to make 
recommendations for the reform of the – then – Royal Ulster Constabulary, it gave a 
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prominence to human rights that even human rights activists had not dared predict.324 For 
instance, it recommended the introduction of ‘a comprehensive programme of action to focus 
policing in NI on a human rights-based approach’;325 the adoption of a new Code of Ethics, 
integrating the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) into police practice;326 and the 
hiring of a human rights legal expert in the police legal services.327 It moreover, suggested that 
the performance of the police service with regard to human rights be closely monitored by the 
new Policing Board,328 a body that would include at least one member with a human rights 
background.329 
 
An additional peacebuilding contribution of human rights concerns the way in which they can 
inform policies intended to remedy those who have suffered from past injustices. For instance, 
the right to property is directly associated with the remedying of displaced people,330 while the 
right to life has provided useful guidance on the procedural requirements that the authorities 
should comply with, when investigating conflict-related deaths331 or disappearances.332 By 
inspiring and shaping such remedies, human rights can empower victims and create a sense, 
both among them and the general population at large, that the injustices of the past are being 
overcome.333 Similarly, a key assumption of peacebuilding strategies such as Truth 
Commissions and even criminal trials is that ‘[i]t is essential for reconciliation to have the 
parties agree on the historical responsibility of human rights abuses’.334 Finally, it has been 
argued that ideas that are popularly associated with human rights, such as dignity and respect 
of the person, could promote reconciliation.335 When the reasoning of legal institutions is 
influenced by, and refers to, such principles, the expectation is that this could encourage people 
to live by them, therefore enhance feelings of rehumanisation and trust.336 
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While these accurately describe contributions that human rights can make to peacebuilding 
efforts, the first two, relating to the reform of the police and the remedying of specific 
injustices, merely offer examples of the positive relationship between human rights and 
security, and human rights and justice respectively. At the same time, the expectation that the 
‘truth’ about human rights violations, or merely the use of human rights language by a legal 
institution, can contribute to feelings of reconciliation, is only an intuition. On the one hand, it 
has been argued that truth and reconciliation are not necessarily compatible objectives and that 
efforts to promote the former can, in fact, undermine the latter.337 On the other, rarely is 
empirical evidence presented that the public is familiar with human rights initiatives, or likely 
to change its perceptions of the conflict because human rights language has been used as part 
of the legal process.338 Such examples and intuitions of the positive relationship between peace 
and human rights are not necessarily wrong or factually incorrect. They do however, lack 
analytical robustness and therefore, should not be used to draw lessons about the relationship 
between the two concepts more generally. In McAuliffe’s words, 
[e]ven the most basic or generic theory of change in the transformative transitional justice 
literature would explicitly outline a link between a transitional justice intervention, a change 
process and ultimate goals, the input needs, the actors involved, internal or external risks, 
obstacles to success and potential knock-on effects. Such thinking, however, has rarely been 
present in a literature that assumes better insight, participatory ethics or broader articulation of 
[…] rights have an inherent potency to transform structures and behaviours.339 
 
Briefly, expectations about the peacebuilding potential of human rights have been justified in 
the literature in two ways. The first is based on the idea that the failure to protect human rights 
is likely to result in an eruption of violence. This justification is mentioned in the Brahimi 
Report and An Agenda for Peace, which argue for the protection of human rights as an effective 
conflict prevention method.340 Nevertheless, there is, at most, some evidence that violations of 
civil and political rights, or of economic rights coupled with discrimination, are among the 
factors that can promote violence; uprisings are not necessary and unavoidable consequences 
of all human rights violations.341 Moreover, even in cases where violence does erupt, it does 
not follow that protecting human rights can stop the fighting after it has already broken out. 
And even if it did, stopping violence is not synonymous with building peace; rather, a secure 
environment is just the first step in achieving the overall objective.342 This leads to the second 
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justification for their protection, namely, that if human rights violations caused the eruption of 
violence, safeguarding those rights can undo that and build peace. Thus, an Agenda for Peace 
states that ‘the sources of war are pervasive and deep’ and to address them, we must enhance 
our respect for human rights.343 However, large-scale human rights violations can cause deep 
personal, psychological, cultural, social, economic and political rifts.344 Protecting human 
rights might successfully address each of these problems to different degrees. Yet, the Agenda 
does not provide any further explanation about the extent to which these problems can be 
resolved through the protection of human rights, how or why. It is this gap in our understanding 
of the relationship between the two concepts that the book seeks to address. 
 
IV. Resolving Conflicts and Building Peace  
The framework that will be used to explore the relationship between human rights and peace 
relies on the idea of conflict resolution, thus making it necessary to define what is meant by 
‘conflict’ in the first place. A conflict can be understood both as a violent dispute and, more 
generally, as an ‘incompatibility of goals’345 or an ‘incompatibility of positions’.346 The former 
of the two definitions should be rejected for the purposes of this analysis because it focuses too 
narrowly on a specific manifestation of a dispute and loses sight of the reasons why it became 
violent, and what can be done to address it.347 Conversely, the latter is much more suitable 
because its broad nature includes both violent and non-violent disagreements and offers a good 
starting point for a comprehensive theory that encapsulates a range of peacebuilding dilemmas. 
If conflicts are understood as incompatibilities of positions, it becomes clear that they are a 
universal feature of all human societies,348 ‘an intrinsic and inevitable aspect of social 
change’,349 and a necessary part of life in all healthy democratic states that accept and 
encourage divergence of opinion.350 It is for this reason that the book adopts the term ‘post-
violence’ rather than ‘post-conflict’ since there can be no society that is completely devoid of 
conflict. Moreover, a distinction between constructive and destructive conflicts, like the one 
made by Deutsch, is both unhelpful and factually misleading.351 What is problematic is not the 
existence of specific types of conflicts per se, but the failure to respond to them in the 
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appropriate way. If they are addressed constructively, they can act as the impetus for society’s 
development and progress.352 It is only when they are ignored and allowed to fester that 
disillusionment among the population can result in their more negative manifestations, 
including violence.353  
 
References to conflicts are sometimes understood as alluding to behaviour and actions that 
create objectively observable tension among the parties.354 Alternatively, other commentators 
have emphasised their expressive or perceived nature, with conflicts arising whenever the 
parties believe they have incompatible objectives.355 Thus, in contrast to Deutsch’s argument 
that a conflict arises ‘whenever incompatible actions occur’,356 Bar-Tal contents that  
a conflict becomes reality for society members only when a particular situation is identified as 
conflictive by them. […] From the psychological perspective of conflict analysis, outbreaks of 
conflicts are dependent on the appearance of particular perceptions, beliefs, attitudes and 
motivations, all of which must change for conflict resolution to occur.357 
 
Differently to these positions, a conflict is defined here as an ‘empirical phenomenon’358 and 
‘a psychological state of affairs’,359 thus suggesting that the ideal way of responding to it is by 
addressing the challenges that emerge at both levels. Examples of conflicts include 
disagreements as to the best strategy for reforming the police, the remedies that should be 
provided to the displaced, or the types of powers that must be afforded to institutions 
investigating the fate of missing persons. When such disagreements are publicly articulated 
and manifest as empirical phenomena, a failure of the parties to adopt strategies that respond 
to them (such as agreeing on a specific plan for the reform of the police or on a policy for 
remedying victims) is apparent to an outside observer and objectively undermines security, 
justice and reconciliation. Conversely, conflicts as psychological states of affairs may arise 
before their manifestation as empirical phenomena, at the same time as this manifestation, or 
could linger even after the objectively observable disagreement has been resolved through the 
adoption of a formal process. Thus, if the examples above are also seen as psychological 
incompatibilities of positions, the conflicts will be resolved in this respect when the general 
public experiences and appreciates the benefits of a reformed police, the victims feel remedied 
for their forced displacement and satisfied with the outcome of the investigations concerning 
the missing persons. These positive changes in the beliefs and attitudes of the public are likely 
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to aid the peacebuilding process by improving subjective perceptions about the extent to which 
security, justice and reconciliation are present in the post-violence society. 
 
This more complex understanding of the nature of conflict was identified early on by authors 
such as Johan Galtung, who argued that the ‘contradiction’ at the heart of the dispute can 
manifest as a ‘behaviour’, an ‘attitude’, or both.360 Thus, a contradiction could be ‘real’, 
resulting in a conflict at the manifest level, or ‘perceived’, arising as a dispute at the latent 
level.361 The terminology adopted by Galtung, and the distinction between real and perceived 
conflicts, should not be taken to mean that the former is somehow more difficult to resolve 
than the latter. Rather, in order for a conflict to be successfully resolved, it is almost always 
necessary to respond to it on both the manifest and the latent level, with each posing different, 
but equally challenging demands. Appreciating the importance of each level is imperative 
because negative behaviours can result in negative attitudes and vice-versa, thus perpetuating 
a vicious cycle of unresolved conflict. In addition to Galtung, this view has been supported by 
peacebuilders such as Jean-Paul Lederach,362 John Brewer363 and Herbert Kelman,364 who have 
argued that a sustainable and effective response to conflict requires, not only that actions and 
institutions are reformed, but that attention is paid to the software of the society as well.  
 
Having defined the term ‘conflict’, it now becomes necessary to clarify what is meant by 
‘addressing’ or ‘responding’ to such a phenomenon and how this links to the ultimate goal of 
building peace. Over the years, different terms have been used to describe this process, with 
‘conflict management’, ‘conflict resolution’ and ‘conflict transformation’ being among the 
most popular ones. Rather confusingly, each of these terms has been defined in different ways 
by various authors and has generally emphasised distinct aspects of, and responses to, the 
conflict. Bearing in mind the caveat that terminology has evolved with the changing 
understandings of practitioners,365 it is generally agreed that the three terms differ in terms of 
the time-frame within which they operate (with conflict management having the shortest-term 
and conflict transformation the longest-term goals) and the depth of the intervention they 
endorse.366 Thus, conflict management is usually concerned with the limitation or containment 
of violence,367 conflict resolution with addressing underlying incompatibilities and accepting 
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the existence of distinct goals from each party,368 and conflict transformation with the 
reconstruction of the social realities that led to the eruption of violence in the first place.369 
 
Advocating passionately in favour of adopting the term ‘conflict transformation’, Lederach 
contents that the other two labels should be avoided because of negative connotations that each 
is associated with.370 On the one hand, he maintains, conflict resolution impliedly portrays 
conflicts as negative phenomena that must be decisively addressed and left behind, thus 
ignoring the fact that incompatibilities of positions are always present, but merely change in 
terms of how they are manifested and perceived over time. On the other, while the term conflict 
management could reflect a more nuanced understanding of conflict, its focus has historically 
been unacceptably narrow, emphasising only the ceasing of violence and should therefore also 
be rejected. Perhaps most problematically in relation to both however, is what Lederach 
perceives as their undue attention on society’s institutions, rather than the need to address the 
conflict at a much deeper level and attempt to shape – or transform – people’s beliefs so that 
they can sustainably move beyond the incompatibility in question. Nevertheless, while the 
attention it pays to social and psychological changes is indeed an advantage of conflict 
transformation, the term’s all-encompassing focus clouds the fact that even less comprehensive 
responses, such as the adjudication of a dispute or the implementation of a single law, can help 
positively address an ongoing conflict.  
 
Paradoxically, the heated debate about which label should be adopted ignores the observation 
that over time, authors have used different terms to describe the same thing, sometimes even 
rendering them indistinguishable from each other. Thus, Lederach’s definition of conflict 
transformation as ‘centred and rooted in the quality of […] social, political, economic and 
cultural relationships’371 is not materially different from the definition of conflict resolution 
provided by Ramsbotham et al as ‘the deep-rooted sources of conflict [being] addressed and 
transformed. This suggests that behaviour is no longer violent, attitudes are no longer hostile 
and the structure of the conflict has been changed.’372 Similar to these, is Burton’s definition 
of ‘conflict provention’, which refers to the structural changes that must take place and the 
fostering of conditions that create cooperative relationships within a society.373 This 
comparison warns against the caricature of different terms and suggests that what matters is 
the content, rather than the label of each process. In light of this, addressing or responding to 
incompatibilities of positions will be referred to as ‘conflict resolution’, since it is the most 
widely used term.374 This will encompass all the steps needed to respond to conflicts as both 
empirical phenomena and psychological states of affairs.  
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If the process of conflict resolution is successful, its outcome will be the building of a peaceful 
– in other words, secure, just and reconciled – post-violence society. The connection between 
conflict resolution on the one hand, and the building of peace on the other, has been made by 
a number of authors,375 but was most explicitly articulated by Ramsbotham et al when asserting 
that ‘[d]efining what peacebuilding is, what peacebuilders seek to achieve, and how they 
pursue peacebuilding raises fundamental questions about the nature of conflict resolution and 
its relationship to the peace that it wants to build.’376 This connection is further supported when 
one looks at the whole process in reverse. The longer a conflict within a state remains 
unresolved, the more likely are the people to feel disillusioned, frustrated or threatened by the 
existing circumstances.377 Consequently, especially in ethnically or racially divided societies, 
where almost all disagreements are perceived in terms of the whole group’s interests, failure 
to resolve a conflict entails a very apparent and collective loss of legitimacy.378 The more 
divisive the conflict, the higher the stakes and the greater the loss of legitimacy; when this is 
combined with the frustration of the people, it can lead to the eruption of violence and 
undermine security.379 Similarly, if a conflict concerns disagreements as to whether past 
atrocities should be remedied, or differences on the best way to do this, leaving it unresolved 
can have detrimental effects on feelings of justice. Thus, what security and justice require is 
the successful resolution of these conflicts.380 At the same time, successful conflict resolution 
can also promote reconciliation in the post-violence society.381 Even when festering conflicts 
do not result in the eruption of violence, they require the parties to constantly defend their 
positions from the verbal attacks of those who hold an incompatible view.382 This constant 
position of being in defence leaves the parties in limbo and makes it more difficult for them to 
focus on the building of common ground. Conversely, successful conflict resolution makes the 
parties less defensive and eventually encourages them to enter into meaningful relationships of 
cooperation with each other.  
 
In a nutshell therefore, the peacebuilding and conflict resolution processes are synonymous 
terms, with their end objective being the striking of a balance between security, justice and 
reconciliation. The two processes consist of the adoption of a range of peacebuilding strategies, 
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among them the protection of human rights. Different strategies can respond to various 
conflicts to different extents and the more comprehensive this response, the more sustainable 
and better balanced will be the promotion of the three elements. Conversely, a failure to 
successfully resolve a conflict can undermine peace, especially if incompatibilities of positions 
are understood as impacting on the parties’ identities and very survival.383 In cases where the 
incompatibility is a manifest one, with the conflict presenting itself as an empirical 
phenomenon, a failure to resolve it can have an objective and observable detrimental effect on 
peace. In instances where the contradiction is a latent one, a psychological state of affairs that 
affects people’s perceptions and beliefs, unsuccessful conflict resolution will undermine 
subjective feelings of security, justice and reconciliation. 
 
Since in most instances, a conflict is both an empirical phenomenon and a psychological state 
of affairs, a successful peacebuilding strategy is one that resolves a conflict both objectively 
and in the eyes of those that are affected by it. In this sense, successful conflict resolution 
implies action that responds to the dispute as a matter of fact and ensures that the people 
themselves do not perceive it as being ongoing. This observation is important because it 
(partly) departs from assumptions in the mainstream literature that a conflict can be 
successfully resolved merely by establishing the relevant procedures and institutions.384 Such 
strategies, which Brewer calls ‘political peace processes’ are effective in introducing 
institutional and legal reforms that are necessary for the resolution of conflicts as empirical 
phenomena and the building of objective peace. At the same time however, they are, on their 
own, insufficient peacebuilding tools and must be adopted alongside additional ‘social peace 
processes’.385 These processes, which aim to ‘make a difference to the lives of ordinary people 
who are struggling with the aftermath of conflict’, are concerned with social and psychological 
reform and are necessary in order to resolve conflicts as psychological states of affairs and 
promote subjective peace.386 The attention that should be paid to social peace processes as a 
method of conflict resolution is not meant to take away from the importance of institutional 
and legal reform, which remain imperative peacebuilding steps. Rather, as the preceding 
analysis suggests, political and social peace processes are symbiotic, with one being unable to 
develop sufficiently when the other is ignored.387  
 
V. Human Rights as Tools in the Conflict Resolution Process 
A. An Overview of the Different Human Rights Strategies 
The connection between conflict resolution and human rights was recognised in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, which states in its preamble that ‘it is essential if man [sic] is 
not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and 
oppression, that human rights should be protected’. Despite this early acknowledgment, by the 
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early 1990s, it was widely believed that conflict resolution and the protection of human rights 
were antithetical to each other, since the two had different objectives, used distinct conceptual 
tools and were practiced by various actors.388 Over the last decade, both academic writings and 
UN reports have reverted to the traditional understanding of the relationship, with human rights 
being considered an essential tool for the resolution of conflict and building of peace.389 Having 
gone a full circle however, the exact way in which the two connect and the conditions that must 
be in place for the former to lead to the latter, have not been explored in detail. This section 
argues that legal human rights can be used in two different types of forums and in each instance, 
and subject to conditions, they can make specific and distinct contributions to conflict 
resolution.  
 
Divisive conflicts should ideally be resolved during the negotiations of the peace agreement, 
when human rights can provide guidance on the best available option to the parties.390 An added 
advantage of relying on human rights at this preliminary stage is that ‘the language of law 
imbues the new order with legitimacy and authority’ and creates a clear break from the violent 
past.391 However, because of their often intractable nature, negotiators have sometimes 
preferred to sidestep, rather than resolve conflicts, and have resorted to either using vague terms 
that can be interpreted in different ways,392 or avoided altogether any references to particularly 
divisive disagreements.393 Such strategies, while effective in getting the parties to reach an 
agreement, simply push the need to resolve conflicts to a later point in time. When these re-
emerge, or new conflicts appear that had not been originally foreseen by the drafters, human 
rights can contribute to their resolution in two distinct ways: on the one hand, they can be relied 
on by the parties and judiciary during the adjudication of the conflict and on the other, they can 
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be used by the legislature, executive or international peacebuilders when they are drafting and 
implementing peacebuilding policies. In both instances, human rights provide victims of the 
conflict with a vocabulary that allows them to express their grievances and empowers them to 
demand that they are acknowledged and addressed.394 When these claims are communicated 
in human rights terms, they are particularly likely to be heard and responded to because of the 
legitimacy attached to them and stigma that is associated with their violations.395 Depending 
on the subject matter of the conflict, state responses to human rights violations, in the form of 
revised legislation or the establishment of institutions, can address conflicts as empirical 
phenomena and promote one or more of the objective elements of peace. At the same time, the 
successful implementation of these initiatives in a way that has an impact on the lives of the 
people, responds to conflicts as psychological states of affairs and can eventually lead to 
subjective feelings of security, justice and reconciliation.  
 
Take, for example, the conflict that existed in NI about whether the police adequately 
investigated a series of Republican deaths that had taken place between 1968 and 1998, or 
whether they had in fact colluded with the suspected murderers.396 Those complaining of 
inadequate state investigations articulated their grievance in human rights terms, thus obtained 
access to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which in turn found in their favour.397 
This, coupled with the lobbying of policy makers that had been taking place domestically, 
which also relied on human rights argumentation, resulted in the adoption of a ‘package of 
measures’ by the UK government that was designed to respond to this grievance.398 Among 
the measures was the establishment of the Historical Enquiries Team (HET), which was 
responsible for re-examining the deaths, thus potentially leading to arrests (security) and 
assisting ‘in bringing a measure of resolution to those families of victims’ (justice) ‘in a way 
that commands the confidence of the wider community’ (reconciliation).399 Hence, the 
resolution of the conflict through the use of human rights and the consequent establishment of 
the HET contributed to an objective sense of peace. At the same time, to the extent that the 
HET undertook its tasks successfully, it also had a positive impact on subjective feelings of 
security, justice and reconciliation.400  
 
While this and subsequent chapters tend to discuss the two ways in which legal human rights 
can be used (that is, in the courtroom and through the lobbying of policy makers) separately, it 
should be noted from the outset that the two strategies are interconnected to, rather than 
mutually exclusive from, each other. On the one hand, enacting a peacebuilding policy in the 
legislature might have been triggered by the adjudication of a dispute in a court of law. On the 
                                                 
394 James Sweeney, ‘Restorative Justice and Transitional Justice at the ECHR’ (2012) 12 International Criminal 
Law Review 313, 336. 
395 Michael Ignatieff, ‘Human Rights’ in Carla Hesse and Robert Post (eds), Human Rights in Political 
Transitions: Gettysburg to Bosnia (New York, Zone Books, 1999). 
396 Paul Magean and Martin O’Brien, ‘From the Margins to the Mainstream: Human Rights and the Good Friday 
Agreement’ (1998-1999) 22 Fordham International Law Journal 1499, 1509. 
397 McKerr V UK. 
398 HMIC, Inspection of the Police Service of Northern Ireland Historical Enquiries Team (ISBN 978-1-78246-
163-0) (United Kingdom, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, 2013), 7. 
399 These are found in the HET Operational Guide, [2.1], quoted in ibid, 7.  
400 For a greater analysis of the HET’s impact on building subjective peace, see ch 6.IV.  
 60 
other, applicants may take a case to court, if they feel that an existing peacebuilding policy that 
was enacted by the legislature, does not sufficiently comply with human rights standards. The 
joint use of both strategies to address a single issue is illustrated, in addition to the HET 
example above, through the actions of family members of missing persons, who relied on 
existing human rights instruments, such as the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, 
in court, while at the same time, lobbying governments to adopt a new legal instrument that 
was tailored to their specific needs (which eventually resulted in the International Convention 
for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance).401 Thus, drafting and 
implementing human rights-inspired legislation and relying on human rights adjudication  are 
two strategies that often go hand-in-hand.402 Having acknowledged this, the following 
subsections divide, for ease of reference, the contributions of human rights as peacebuilding 
tools in three parts – when they inspire the drafting, and push for the implementation, of 
policies that respond to conflicts as empirical phenomena; when they are being used in the 
adjudication of such phenomena; and when both strategies induce social and psychological 
changes necessary for the promotion of subjective feelings of peace (in other words, when they 
resolve conflicts as psychological states of affairs). In each case, human rights can contribute 
to peacebuilding efforts subject to certain conditions. The overall framework connecting peace 
and human rights, together with a summary of these conditions, is summarised in the figure 
below. 
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Figure 1: An overview of the relationship between peace and human rights 
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worth questioning whether it is desirable, or indeed even possible, to measure their impact in 
terms of building peace in the first place. On the one hand, there are good reasons for 
undertaking such an exercise. As the role of human rights activists has shifted from identifying 
violations to offering solutions for them, it has become necessary to assess whether these 
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solutions achieve what they promised.403 Further, with the development of related disciplines 
and organisations with similar socially responsible agendas, human rights are no longer the 
only game in town.404 This makes it necessary to measure their impact in order to reach 
informed decisions about whether their protection is indeed the most efficient way to achieve 
the desired result. At the same time however, activists have cited concerns that measuring the 
impact of human rights could result in an overemphasis in numbers, thus encouraging 
organisations or states to set the bar too low in order to appear successful.405 Moreover, they 
have justifiably been worried about the reliability of results, since it is often difficult to assess 
causality and prove that it is the adoption of a human rights initiative that led to the positive 
social change attributable to it.406 Finally, an in-principle disagreement with measuring the 
impact of human rights work has also been expressed because some policies should always be 
on actors’ and funders’ agendas, whether or not they actually result in significant social 
changes in the short to medium term. 
 
The framework proposed in this study draws inspiration from both schools of thought. It 
accepts that if human rights are going to be used as tools to achieve a social objective – in this 
case, peace – it becomes necessary to determine whether they are indeed up to the task. This is 
especially so, because they are not the only tools in the peacebuilding toolkit, thus reinforcing 
the need to justify reliance on them, rather than any other strategy. Concurrently, the 
framework seeks to respond to the concerns of human rights activists. It avoids the danger of 
setting the bar of success too low by defining from the outset what peacebuilders should be 
striving to achieve. This definition, which relies on both an objective and a subjective 
understanding of peace, acknowledges that ‘success’ in peacebuilding contexts should not be 
measured exclusively, or even primarily, in terms of the number of human rights cases litigated 
before a court or laws passed by the legislature. Further, recognising that the challenges with 
regards to proving causality are real, the framework does not rely on a rigid assessment of 
whether a single case or legislative provision has had a positive impact. Rather, it is satisfied 
with reaching conclusions about more general trends and broad conditions that must be in place 
for human rights to undertake their task successfully. Finally, the framework avoids the stifling 
of innovation among human rights activists through three caveats: first, what is meant by the 
promotion of each of the three elements of peace differs from context to context. Second, 
whether a human rights initiative has been ‘successful’ in promoting peace also depends on the 
timing of the assessment, making a difference, for example, if the impact of the strategy was 
measured immediately after it was adopted or at a much later point in time.407 And third, the 
definition of success as consisting of a balance between security, justice and reconciliation 
should encourage human rights actors to identify their priorities and choose to focus on 
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different elements during various stages of their work. Thus, while situating itself within a 
literature that does not take the success of human rights as a given,408 this study also accepts 
that a detached and non-context specific audit of the impact of human rights is also problematic. 
 
B. Resolving Conflicts by Lobbying for the Implementation of Human Rights 
Following the conclusion of a peace agreement, lingering conflicts are best resolved by the 
legislature, which is institutionally and democratically best-equipped to undertake this task.409 
Since such conflicts are by their nature divisive and attempts to address them will likely result 
in controversies, any debates relating to them should ideally take place in a forum, whose 
members are accountable to, and representative of the competing interests of, the public.410 
Moreover, the procedures of the legislature, as opposed to the judiciary, encourage more 
successful conflict resolution in five different ways. First, by transparently balancing different 
considerations, the legislature can avoid a winner-takes-all situation, which in turn, alleviates 
some of the conflicts’ zero-sum characteristics and makes them less intractable.411 Second, 
unlike courts, which necessarily decide issues in an ad hoc manner, the legislature can look at 
a conflict in its entirety and situate any proposed solutions within a broader context.412 This is 
important, not only in terms of the outcome that will ultimately emerge from this process, but 
also for determining how much it will cost and ensuring that resources are made available to 
follow it through.413 Third, contrary to courts that tend to rule on cases as these are presented 
to them by the applicants, the legislature can decide whether to prioritise divisive conflicts or 
let them simmer down, thus determining the best timing for its intervention. Fourth, the 
legislature, more so than the judiciary, possesses the mechanisms to ensure the successful 
implementation of the peacebuilding policy. On the one hand, it has the power to establish the 
necessary institutions and processes that will be responsible for the smooth enforcement of the 
law.414 On the other, it can autonomously monitor the implementation of a given policy and 
intervene when it considers necessary, either by changing substantive provisions of the law, or 
tweaking the procedures that relate to it.415 Finally, because legislative decisions are generally 
more visible than those of courts,416 elected bodies are likely to contribute to conflict resolution, 
not only through legal and institutional reforms, but also by challenging personal and social 
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perceptions of the conflict, thus promoting the elements of peace on a more subjective level as 
well. 
 
Since legislative interventions can contribute to conflict resolution, using human rights as part 
of this process is beneficial in several ways. At first instance, they can help set governmental 
agendas and encourage the passing of peace-friendly legislation by enabling victims to identify 
as bearers of rights and demand that these are protected.417 Zemans refers to this contribution 
as ‘the educative role of law’, which has the ability to ‘change the citizenry’s perception of 
their interests.’418 More broadly, human rights can help people reimagine their relationship 
with the state and transform them from disempowered and passive individuals into active 
citizens. Additionally, human rights provide victims with the tools to lobby the legislature by 
increasing the strength, clarity, visibility and legitimacy of their claims.419 In cases where the 
legislature has already decided to respond to the conflict, human rights can provide guidance 
as to the considerations that should be kept in mind during this process. Finally, rights set 
benchmarks against which the performance of the state can be assessed, thus providing further 
incentives for it to improve. This becomes possible because the international legitimacy of 
human rights reassures individuals that their demands are not unreasonable and encourages 
them to mobilise and expect governmental action to address them.420 These considerations 
should not be taken to suggest that human rights guarantee the adoption of peace-friendly 
legislation.421 Human rights ‘alter politics; they do not cause miracles. They supplement, and 
interact with, domestic political and legal institutions; they do not replace them.’422 However, 
the way in which they do this, and the pressures and incentives they create, make it more likely 
that policy makers will be responsive to the demands of those who use them for lobbying and 
who, through their protection, seek to promote security, justice and reconciliation.  
 
Even if successful lobbying results in the passing of human rights-inspired laws, it does not 
necessary follow that these will be implemented or that peace will be built. Rather, for this 
causal relationship to develop, three conditions must be in place in the post-violence society. 
The first, and most widely acknowledged condition, is that there must exist political will to 
implement the law; if this is absent, it is likely that the law will never be implemented, or will 
be enforced in a way that does not contribute to peacebuilding efforts. The second condition is 
that the law must be drafted in such a way that its implementation will, in fact, contribute to 
objective security, justice or reconciliation. Finally, it is necessary that the institution that has 
been tasked with implementing the legislation has the capacity, resources, independence and 
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expertise to achieve this. In the event where the implementation of a human rights-inspired law 
does not have the expected results, it is important that peacebuilders are able to assess which 
of the three conditions is absent, in order to tailor their responses accordingly. Thus, threatening 
the government of a post-violence society with sanctions is understandable in cases where there 
is political unwillingness to implement a law, but is likely be a counterproductive strategy if 
non-enforcement is due to lack of resources or expertise within the body responsible for its 
implementation. The contributions that human rights can make when encouraging the 
implementation of peace-friendly legislation, conditions that must be in place for this to happen 
and steps that should be adopted in the absence of these conditions, are discussed in more detail 
in chapter five. 
 
C. Resolving Conflicts through Human Rights Adjudication 
Despite arguments for favouring the resolution of conflicts by the legislature, increasingly over 
the last 20 years, such processes have also played out in the courtroom.423 One reason for this 
is that post-violence societies are undergoing significant political changes.424 When these give 
rise to divisive disagreements, political elites might be unwilling or unable to reach a 
compromise.425 If, as a result, the political branches of the state are paralysed, the task of 
decision-making falls on the shoulders of other institutions, such as the judiciary.426 For 
instance, the SA Constitutional Court played the role of the tiebreaker in perhaps the most 
divisive conflict in the country’s history, when it was asked to certify under Section 71(2) of 
the SA Interim Constitution, whether the Final Constitution complied with Constitutional 
Principles that the political parties had agreed to, during the negotiations leading to the end of 
apartheid.427 It was the resolution of this conflict that cemented the beginning of democracy 
and, through the certification of the Final Constitution, promoted objective peace in the 
country. Despite the unusually high level of judicial intervention, the Court’s success in 
contributing to peacebuilding efforts has led academics to propose the adoption of the 
certification process in other post-violence societies as well.428 
 
The unwillingness of political elites to resolve conflicts during times of transition is often 
institutionalised in societies that have adopted consociational systems of government.429 
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Consociationalism is a system of power-sharing among political elites that is, in principle, 
intended to ensure cooperation between different ethnic or racial groups.430 However, the 
characteristics of consociational systems, and in particular their tendency to give to 
representatives of different groups the veto power, often result in stagnation of the political 
process and an inability to reach decisions.431 While advocates of consociationalism had 
originally failed to appreciate the significance of a strong judiciary, the need to address and 
avoid these political dead ends, has made courts in societies that have adopted consociational 
structures among the most relied on institutions.432 Thus, Article IV(3)(f) of the Constitution 
of BiH provides that the power to veto legislation can be used by delegates of each of the 
country’s three main ethnic groups when the relevant law has been ‘declared to be destructive 
of a vital interest of the Bosniac, Croat, or Serb people’. If the delegates of each of the other 
two groups disagree with the use of the veto power, the dispute is resolved by the Constitutional 
Court. Such disagreements revolve around the most divisive conflicts in the country – hence 
the reason they attracted the use of the veto in the first place – yet it is the unelected judiciary 
that is expected to resolve them.433 While there has been some criticism of judicial intervention 
in consociational structures,434 other commentators have identified and applauded the potential 
of courts to resolve divisive conflicts.435 
 
An additional explanation for the increase in the resolution of conflicts through adjudication, 
concerns the fact that since the early 1990s, post-violence societies have tended to adopt a 
model of constitutional democracy that yields considerable power to the judiciary.436 The most 
popular method of empowering judges has been the adoption of constitutionally entrenched 
Bills of Rights, which applicants have used, often with the judiciary’s blessing, as a vehicle for 
bringing lingering conflicts to the courtroom and demanding their adjudication.437 To be sure, 
when adjudicating conflicts, courts do not necessarily have to rely on human rights.438 
Nevertheless, they often use this strategy because of their broad and permissive language, 
which allows lawyers and judges to structure their arguments in legal terms, even when these 
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are more directly related to political disagreements.439 Judges, in an attempt to maintain their 
mantle of neutrality and not appear partisan, have generally been less willing to engage directly 
with political arguments made by the parties.440 Conversely, where such arguments are 
presented through the lens of human rights, courts have been more willing to entertain them.441 
This is partly due to the judiciary’s constitutional obligation to uphold human rights, even when 
it might have politically controversial consequences.442 It is also because of the view that while 
judges are ill-suited to deal with political arguments,443 they are particularly well-placed to 
decide on the interpretation of human rights.444 Especially in cases concerning divisive 
conflicts, judges have an interest in presenting their judgments as reflections of deeper political 
values, such as human rights, in order to lend them more legitimacy and acceptance by the 
public and political actors that are affected by them.445 Finally, the increasing reliance on 
human rights arguments when resolving divisive conflicts is not only a characteristic of the 
domestic judiciary, but has (more controversially) also been practiced by international human 
rights courts.446 In turn, the institutional dialogue that takes place between national and 
international actors fuels the tendency to rely on human rights on the domestic level to an even 
greater extent.447  
 
Resolving disputes in an institutionalised setting, like a court, not only promotes justice, but 
also lessens the chance that the different parties will resort to violence and therefore, enhances 
security.448 The main contribution of human rights in this respect is that they can provide 
guidance to the parties and judges on the best ways to address conflicts. On the one hand, the 
broad language of human rights suggests that they will often be unable to pinpoint the one 
‘correct’ answer, or most appropriate response, to a given dilemma.449 On the other, a joint 
agreement by the parties that they will respect human rights, at least excludes as possibilities 
those responses to the conflict that are not compatible with them. This creates a framework for 
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the parties to operate in, limits their choices to a range of more moderate and legitimate options, 
and makes it easier for them to settle on one as their preferred compromise.450 For example, 
although different post-violence societies have remedied victims of forced displacement in 
various ways, all of them started from the premise that the right to property should be respected. 
The right identified a range of acceptable responses to displacement – restitution, monetary or 
in-kind compensation and exchange of properties – while at the same time, excluding the 
possibility of leaving the victims without a remedy altogether.451 Further, and although 
adjudication remains expensive, in ideal circumstances, access to courts gives ‘a flavour of 
equality’ to the conflict resolution process because it allows even those who do not have the 
resources to achieve legislative amendments by mobilising the masses, to make changes to 
rules they consider unjust.452  
 
In addition to providing guidance to the judges and making the conflict resolution process more 
accessible, the use of human rights in the courtroom also has a communicative effect.453 
Ideally, it sends the message that things are changing and signals a new, more legitimate state 
of affairs that deserves the support of the people.454 This was the argument made by the SA 
Constitutional Court in Doctors for Life International, in which a group of citizens complained 
that they had not been consulted before the passing of legislation that directly affected their 
interests.455 The complaint, which was couched in human rights terms, led the Court to 
invalidate the law and order that a consultation procedure takes place before this was redebated. 
In its reasoning, it explicitly contrasted the democratic SA that the applicants were living in to 
the apartheid, human-rights violating regime that they had left behind.456 Finally, as long as 
human rights language is being used accurately and prudently, it can help reign public 
expectations about what can be done to resolve a conflict and therefore, avoid or limit 
disappointments and frustration about the state’s subsequent response.457 By shaping the 
perceptions of the public about what a compromise to a given disagreement will look like, 
human rights can pre-empt or contain conflicts as psychological states of affairs and therefore 
contribute to the subjective aspect of the peacebuilding process.  
 
Like with human rights-inspired legislation, the effectiveness of human rights adjudication as 
a peacebuilding tool depends on a range of conditions. The first is that the conflict that will be 
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adjudicated must somehow relate to, and its resolution must promote, at least one of the 
elements of peace. Thus, in ideal scenarios, when a court decides a case with peacebuilding 
implications, it should expressly acknowledge the effect this is likely to have on security, 
justice and reconciliation. This will not only help structure the court’s reasoning and therefore 
make the judgment more persuasive, but will also enhance its transparency. Illustrative of this 
is the AZAPO case in which the SA Constitutional Court expressly acknowledged that granting 
amnesties to perpetrators of crimes committed during apartheid might undermine feelings of 
justice among the population on the one hand, but it promoted security and reconciliation on 
the other.458 By spelling out the reasons that shaped its decision, the Court sent the message 
that it took into account and balanced, rather than ignored, considerations that were important 
to the parties. A similar approach was adopted by the UK House of Lords when it was called 
to adjudicate the conflict of whether new elections should take place in NI in light of the parties’ 
long delay in choosing the First Minister and Deputy First Minister.459 The majority of the 
Court’s judges expressly relied on the argument that the NI Act 1998 should be interpreted in 
a way that gave effect to the objectives of the Belfast Agreement, particularly the achievement 
of ‘reconciliation, tolerance and mutual trust’ and ‘the protection and vindication of the human 
rights of all’.460 In making this argument, Lord Bingham directly linked these objectives to the 
peacebuilding process and stressed that deciding the case in a different manner ‘would have 
precluded the possibility of negotiation and compromise’.461 
 
Since the main reason for using human rights in the courtroom is that they provide guidance as 
to the best way to resolve conflicts, the remaining conditions for their effective use as 
peacebuilding tools centre around this idea. Thus, whether courts are able to offer such 
guidance depends on the type of conflict that is being adjudicated, the type of court that hears 
the case and the timing of the whole process. Chapter four, which discusses these conditions 
in greater detail, argues that a distinction should be made between fundamental and minor 
conflicts in a post-violence society, with the former being more intractable and harder to 
resolve that the latter. While festering fundamental conflicts are more likely to have detrimental 
consequences for peace, the heightened levels of controversy that surround them, make it less 
likely that the courts will be able, or willing, to contribute to their successful resolution. Even 
when the judiciary becomes involved in the adjudication of fundamental conflicts, the guidance 
it can provide to the parties is such, that it will most probably not be conductive the promotion 
of security, justice and reconciliation. Additionally, for a human rights case to offer guidance 
for the resolution of a conflict, it must be delivered by a body that has the legitimacy to do 
so.462 The important differences between domestic and international courts, relating to the 
perceived neutrality and expertise of their members, affect the extent of the intervention, and 
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consequent peacebuilding potential, that each can make. This is not to argue that domestic 
courts are better suited than international ones to become involved in the adjudication of 
divisive conflicts, or vice-versa. Rather, the strengths and weaknesses of each body suggest 
that these should be considered carefully and parties should choose strategically, to the extent 
they can, which court they will resort to in each instance. The final factor affecting the 
judiciary’s ability to provide guidance for conflict resolution concerns the timing of the case 
and in particular, the passage of time since the ending of the violence and the signing of the 
peace agreement. Specifically, the passage of time makes courts more willing to intervene in 
cases where a comprehensive peace agreement has been reached, but can have the opposite 
effect where this is absent.  
 
D. Resolving Conflicts as Psychological States of Affairs 
The Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice confidently 
declares that 
the consolidation of peace in the immediate post-conflict period, as well as the maintenance of 
peace in the long term, cannot be achieved unless the population is confident that redress for 
grievances can be obtained through legitimate structures for the peaceful settlement of disputes 
and the fair administration of justice.463 
 
This statement, which reflects a common belief among peacebuilders, assumes that there is a 
positive causal connection between the establishment of ‘legitimate structures’ (including 
human rights institutions), and the resolution of conflicts as psychological states of affairs. Yet, 
the belief, which Scheingold has aptly called the ‘myth of rights’, is misguided because it is 
not the case that reliance on (human rights) structures automatically translates into social and 
psychological changes that are necessary for the building of subjective peace.464 While the two 
might be connected, their relationship is more complex than this, as suggested by the fact that 
legal change on its own has often failed to translate into the social objectives of 
peacebuilders.465 Exactly the opposite view to the UN’s is expressed by Brewer, who argues 
that liberal instruments, chiefly among them human rights, exclusively affect ‘political peace 
processes’.466 Their use, he maintains, distracts peacebuilders from the task of promoting social 
and psychological changes that can only be induced through the empowerment of civil society 
organisations. With respect, this also lacks persuasiveness since it confuses the (legal) nature 
of human rights with the possible effect they might have, assuming that their only contribution 
can be in the form of amending the law, reforming procedures and strengthening government 
institutions. While clearly civil society actors, such as churches, trade unions, universities, 
businesses, charities, journalists and educators have a massively important role to play in 
‘social peace processes’, it is not clear why courts and other state institutions that rely on legal 
human rights should be excluded from this effort.  
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This section argues that, under the right conditions, human rights can help resolve conflicts as 
psychological states of affairs and therefore, promote subjective feelings of peace. On the one 
hand, as explained above, human rights provide the vocabulary to parties to express their 
grievances and push for the resolution of a conflict. In addition to mobilising state institutions 
into action, the very act of empowering victims by giving them a voice, and the public 
acknowledgment of their grievance by an official body when this voice is heard, can contribute 
to psychological and social changes.467 Moreover, human rights can assist in the conflict 
resolution process by challenging perceptions and dominant narratives that portray one group’s 
identity as diametrically opposed to the other’s.468 Reliance on human rights by different 
groups within a society can highlight the common concerns and fears of their members and 
consequently, counter ideas of unavoidably conflicting interests between them. An example of 
this was the foundation of the NI’s Women Coalition, the members of which, Protestant and 
Catholic alike, worked towards ensuring the protection of human rights in the Belfast 
Agreement.469 Similarly, their common experiences following the disappearance of their 
family members has challenged perceptions of conflicting interests among Greek and Turkish 
Cypriot victims.470 Thus, while human rights cannot construct new identities, they can soften 
the edges of existing ones and start making space for peacebuilding measures that more 
explicitly focus on reconciliation.471 Finally, human rights can contribute to peacebuilding 
efforts by providing remedies that have a social or economic impact on the living conditions 
of the population. If administered correctly, such remedies can affect the public’s beliefs and 
perceptions of the conflict and its aftermath, and ultimately promote subjective feelings of 
peace. 
 
In order for human rights to contribute to peacebuilding efforts in this way, two conditions, 
which are discussed in more detail in chapter six, must be present. First, it is necessary that 
they actually deliver on their promises by making real improvements to people’s lives, rather 
than appearing as successes only on paper. If this does not happen, the frustration and 
disillusionment of the public will compound feelings of insecurity, injustice and lack of 
reconciliation. This suggests that peacebuilders must acknowledge both the strengths and 
limitations of human rights in inducing social and psychological change, and where necessary, 
supplement them with additional conflict resolution mechanisms. Second, people must 
perceive human rights-inspired initiatives as, in fact, contributing to the promotion of peace. 
As Brewer aptly put it, ‘[g]ood governance has to work and be seen to work.’472 It is little use 
deciding human rights cases or enacting human rights policies intended to promote peace with 
the best intentions, if the public does not see them in this light. Such responses might be 
commendable, particularly by outsiders, for taking steps to resolve the conflict as an empirical 
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phenomenon, but are unlikely to successfully address the conflict as a psychological state of 
affairs.473 Although these conditions are rather vague, when they are taken seriously, they give 
rise to two specific recommendations that can enhance the subjective peacebuilding potential 
of human rights. First, they propose that the composition of peacebuilding teams be 
reconsidered and shifted along two axes: from international to domestic actors on the one hand, 
and from lawyers to other types of professionals on the other. Second, human rights initiatives 
must be accompanied by a communication strategy with the direct objective of encouraging 
social and psychological change among the victims and the population at large. This strategy 
should be comprehensive in that it will be concerned, not only with the content of the message 
that peacebuilders want to convey, but also with the way this is disseminated. Additionally, it 
should result in a two-way communication, which sends messages to the target audience and 
also transmits information in the opposite direction, from the public back to the peacebuilders. 
 
These conditions are not only important because they help induce subjective feelings of peace, 
but also because they are likely to encourage human rights mobilisation (whether through 
lobbying or the courtroom) and contribute to the resolution of conflicts as empirical phenomena 
as well. Being aware of the peacebuilding effects of human rights can push even more 
applicants to turn to the courts and demand that a conflict is resolved.474 Moreover, this 
potentially contributes to the more effective mobilisation of the masses, and the creation of 
additional incentives on the legislature to adopt peacebuilding policies that address the 
applicants’ grievances more holistically.475 Thus, the use of human rights as a conflict 
resolution strategy results in a virtuous cycle, whereby subjective feelings of peace make it 
more likely that both objective and subjective security, justice and reconciliation are further 
promoted. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined a framework that explains the reasons and ways in which the 
protection of human rights can contribute to the building of peaceful relationships. It argued 
that the balancing of security, justice and reconciliation takes place through the continuous 
successful resolution of conflicts that divide the post-violence society. Human rights, as one of 
many peacebuilding tools, provide mechanisms that assist in this process. On the one hand, 
their adjudication can provide guidance on how best to resolve such conflicts, while on the 
other, they can mobilise policy makers into action and push for the drafting and implementation 
of human rights-inspired laws that will address such incompatibilities of positions. The 
resolution of conflicts through this dual strategy can contribute in different ways to both an 
objective and a subjective sense of each of the three elements of peace.  
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While however, this framework confirms that there is a positive relationship between peace 
and human rights, it also makes it contingent on several factors. Human rights adjudication is 
most likely to provide the necessary guidance to resolve conflicts when courts are called to 
respond to relatively minor, rather than fundamental disagreements; when the strengths and 
weaknesses of domestic and international courts have been weighted against each other and 
peacebuilders have targeted the best-suited institution in each case; and when the timing of 
adjudicating this conflict is right. Equally, the effective adoption and implementation of 
peacebuilding policies does not follow automatically from reliance on human rights. Rather, it 
depends on the drafting quality of the law in question, the existence of political willingness 
among policy makers to promote the law’s peacebuilding objectives and the independence, 
power, expertise and resources of the implementing body. If these conditions are present, 
human rights are likely to result in legal and institutional reforms that are necessary to promote 
objective peace. At the same time, and subject to a different set of conditions, they can help 
induce social and psychological changes that are imperative for the promotion of subjective 
feelings of security, justice and reconciliation. Specifically, human rights can have this effect 
when they make a real and meaningful impact on the lives of the people within the post-
violence society and are also perceived by the target audience as having this effect.  
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Chapter 4 – Promoting Objective Peace 
Through Human Rights Adjudication 
 
I. Introduction 
If resolving conflicts is necessary for the promotion of security, justice and reconciliation, one 
way in which human rights can contribute to the building of peace is by offering guidance to 
the judiciary as to the best way of doing this. The chapter is concerned with how using human 
rights in the courtroom can contribute to the resolution of conflicts as empirical phenomena 
and the promotion of objective peace. It argues that the extent and quality of the guidance 
provided by the courts and therefore, the effectiveness of human rights as peacebuilding tools, 
depend on three factors. The first relates to the nature and intractability of the conflict in 
question, and in particular, whether it is a fundamental or minor one. On the one hand, courts 
are more reluctant to decide disputes concerning fundamental conflicts and on the other, even 
in cases where they do get involved, the reasoning and guidance they provide are not always 
persuasive or conductive to peace. As a result, human rights adjudication can contribute to 
conflict resolution, but mostly in cases that have to do with minor disagreements, as opposed 
to more fundamental ones.  
 
The second factor affecting the peacebuilding potential of human rights has to do with the type 
of court that adjudicates the dispute, with domestic and international bodies differing in terms 
of the sources of their legitimacy, likelihood that their judgments will be enforced, and types 
of documents that each can interpret. An assessment of these differences suggests that the best 
peacebuilding strategy is not to favour one type of court over the other, but to be aware of the 
strengths and limitations of each, and use them accordingly. More specifically, international 
courts often pave the way for conflict resolution, with their domestic counterparts utilising that 
first judgment to make the provision of a remedy, and the promotion of each of the elements 
of peace, more accessible to the masses within the post-violence society. The final factor that 
affects the extent to which human rights adjudication can contribute to conflict resolution, is 
the amount of time that has passed since the stopping of the violence and whether this ceasefire 
has also been followed by the signing of a comprehensive peace settlement. While in the 
absence of a peace agreement, the passage of time makes the judiciary more reluctant to 
adjudicate a conflict, the longer the time since the reaching of a comprehensive settlement 
between the parties, the more likely are the courts to intervene. Identifying these factors is 
important because they can provide practical guidance to peacebuilders on the strategies they 
should adopt in order to ensure that conflicts are resolved as effectively as possible.  
 
II. The Nature of the Conflict Being Adjudicated 
This section argues that the extent to which human rights adjudication can provide adequate 
guidance for conflict resolution and the building of peace, depends on the nature of the conflict 
at hand. In particular, it makes a distinction between fundamental and minor conflicts and 
argues that human rights can act as effective peacebuilding tools in the adjudication of the 
latter, but not the former. Since courts are well suited to address minor conflicts, such as 
disagreements about the interpretation of a statutory provision, they regularly undertake this 
task, and do so successfully. Conversely, the intractable nature of fundamental conflicts results 
either in an unwillingness on behalf of the judiciary to adjudicate them, or in the provision of 
guidance that is somehow deficient. Thus, even in cases where courts find cases concerning 
fundamental conflicts to be admissible, their judgments might be contradictory, fail to address 
the key issue at the heart of the disagreement or give guidance that is too broad or vague to be 
meaningful. This observation is significant because it is the mishandling and festering of 
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fundamental conflicts, rather than of more minor disagreements, that most negatively impacts 
peacebuilding efforts.  
 
A. Distinguishing Between Fundamental and Minor Conflicts 
A fundamental conflict is one where the parties disagree over issues of value, while a minor 
one is concerned with disagreements over competing interests.476 In the former case, the parties 
experience an incompatibility of positions in terms of what they want to achieve, while in the 
latter, an in-principle agreement is in place, with the conflict focusing on the means through 
which the end will materialise.477 Thus, in post-violence societies, fundamental conflicts tend 
to arise because the parties have competing visions of the state or how best to deal with the 
past, which are often completely at odds with each other.478 More minor conflicts on the other 
hand, emerge when the groups have settled on the basic characteristics and structure of a state, 
or on the most suitable ways of addressing past injustices, but are in disagreement on how best 
to implement their common vision. Fundamental conflicts have been described as ‘either/or’ 
or zero-sum, with a ‘win’ by one party, necessarily being perceived as a ‘loss’ by the other.479 
This is in contrast to minor conflicts, which can more readily result in a compromise solution, 
since they are perceived as having less serious implications for the parties’ identity survival.480 
Thus, Scheingold is right that 
when the stakes are high, conflict is likely to be the most intense and the loser’s will to resist 
likely to be at its strongest. The stakes are probably highest when the rights at issue are inelastic 
– that is, when victory is directly and totally at the expense of the loser.481 
 
Often, fundamental conflicts are so intractable, precisely because the parties disagree on how 
a balance between the different elements of peace will be struck. For instance, the major 
disagreement between Greek and Turkish Cypriots as to how best to remedy persons who were 
displaced during the periods of violence on the island, stems from the fact that the former 
prioritise justice considerations, while the latter are more concerned with security.482 Whether 
a conflict is fundamental or minor is often a matter of degree, and depends not on the attention 
it has received in the society in question, the willingness of the different parties to negotiate 
and any other external factors that might hinder or encourage the reaching of a compromise 
solution. Generally however, the more fundamental the conflict, the more likely it is that its 
lingering presence or mishandling will detrimentally affect peacebuilding efforts. Specifically, 
if major disagreements remain unresolved, especially for long periods of time, this signifies a 
significant gap between the views of the parties, which in turn, makes the promotion of 
reconciliation more difficult. In extreme cases, where the parties feel that this gap cannot be 
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overcome, security might also be undermined, either because of the resumption of violence 
(which results in a lack of objective security), or due to fears among the population that this 
might happen (thus, affecting feelings of subjective security). 
 
While lingering fundamental conflicts are more detrimental to peace, they are also more 
difficult to resolve through human rights adjudication due to three reasons. The first concerns 
the institutional limitations of the courts when becoming involved in these kinds of disputes. 
Since major conflicts are complex, controversial and divisive, it is better that they are resolved 
by the democratically elected and legitimate bodies of the country, rather than judges.483 While 
a conflict might involve three or four parties, the judiciary can only resolve disputes between 
two sides and, especially in adversarial systems, exclusively depends on the information each 
party provides to it.484 Conversely, the legislature has access to more sources of information 
and is institutionally and procedurally better-equipped to balance the competing interests of 
many different stakeholders. Second, as the ensuing examples suggest, fundamental conflicts 
often concern the very nature of the state or affect the interests of communities and collectives; 
human rights, with their focus on the individual, cannot adequately capture these considerations 
and offer guidance for their resolution.485 The final reason why human rights adjudication best 
(or only) addresses some types of conflicts, concerns the remedies that courts can deliver.486 
Although minor conflicts are usually resolved through a statutory re-interpretation, a 
suggestion for a legislative amendment or change in procedures, addressing fundamental 
conflicts might require the overhaul of a policy, a complete departure from current operations 
or even the redefinition of the character of the state. Courts are simply unable to deliver 
decisions with such wide-ranging implications. 
 
B. Outlining the Disparate Approach to Conflict Adjudication 
As a result of the factors outlined above, courts have adopted very different approaches when 
adjudicating minor and fundamental conflicts. In particular, while the adjudication of the 
former is considered routine, the judiciary often tries to avoid giving any guidance relating to 
the resolution of the latter, most notably by finding the case inadmissible. Evidence of the 
judiciary’s disparate approach is offered by contrasting two Cypriot right to vote cases heard 
by the ECtHR, namely Aziz v Cyprus487 and its follow-up case, Erel and Damdelen v Cyprus.488 
To understand the claims of the parties in the two cases, some background into the complex 
development of the Cypriot electoral provisions is necessary. The 1960 Republic of Cyprus 
(RoC or Republic) Constitution provided for executive and legislative elections through two 
electoral registers – one for GC and the other for TC. The GC would vote for 70 per cent of the 
legislature and the President, while the TC would decide on the composition of 30 per cent of 
the legislature and the Vice-President.489 When the TC withdrew from government in 1963, all 
their positions remained vacant, thus making the Republic’s operation according to the 
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Constitution, impossible.490 In response to this situation, the Supreme Court of Cyprus decided 
that the doctrine of necessity could be used to interpret the Constitution in such a way, so as to 
allow for the State’s continued existence.491 As a result, the Republic has, since then, been 
operating with decision-making bodies consisting only of GC, who are, according to the 
Constitution, only elected through the GC electoral register. This, coupled with the continuing 
requirement that TC voters should be registered in their own electoral catalogue, wholly 
prevented them from exercising their right to vote. In practical terms, since the Turkish 
invasion of 1974, this has been a problem for a few hundred TC who have chosen to continue 
residing in the areas under the control of the RoC and have not moved to the unrecognised 
‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (‘TRNC’).492  
 
Over the years, the GC electoral register came to include those foreigners who had become 
naturalised, but not TC. Mr. Aziz challenged this situation arguing that since the Republic had 
for all intents and purposes a single electoral register, TC permanently residing in RoC-
controlled areas should be included in it as well. The Supreme Court rejected the argument, 
finding that what prevented TC from voting was not the law, but the TC community’s unilateral 
decision to abandon their positions in the Republic.493 The case reached the ECtHR where this 
argument was, unsurprisingly, dismissed: the 40-year disenfranchisement of TC permanently 
living in the RoC-controlled areas was a violation of Articles 3 of Protocol No. 1 (Art 3-1, right 
to vote) and 14 (freedom from discrimination) of the Convention.494 Thus, reliance on human 
rights forced the parties to transform their political positions into legal arguments and paved 
the way for the resolution of the conflict. The question was no longer about which community 
was to blame for what happened in 1963, but about whether any individual should remain 
disenfranchised solely on the grounds of their ethnicity. In turn, this change in the terms of 
reference allowed the Court to resolve the conflict by adopting a reasoning that was politically 
neutral, objectively persuasive and conductive to a sense of justice.495 The judgment was 
swiftly implemented: the applicant and other TC in a similar position are now included in the 
Republic’s single electoral register, are allowed to vote in all elections and be voted in all 
elections except the Presidential one.496 Encouraged by the applicant’s success in Aziz, a group 
of TC challenged the electoral law again, arguing that Article 3-1 required not only that they 
are allowed to vote in the RoC, but also that they are entitled to a separate electoral register 
through which they could vote for 30 per cent of the legislature and the Vice-President in 
accordance with the Constitution.497 This time, referring to Cyprus’ wide margin of 
appreciation, the ECtHR declared the case inadmissible.  
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The ECtHR adopted radically different approaches in the two cases: the challenge in Aziz was 
not only found to be admissible but also successful, while that in Erel was swiftly dismissed 
as manifestly ill-founded. An explanation of this is that while the two cases seemingly dealt 
with a same issue, the demands of the applicants were much more at odds with the position of 
the RoC in Erel than in Aziz. While, in other words, the conflict in Aziz was a relatively minor 
one, the one in Erel was of a more fundamental nature. The challenge of the state’s structures 
in Erel was based on the belief that Cypriots should not vote as individual citizens, but rather 
as members of ethnic groups (hence the need for separate electoral registers). This 
fundamentally contrasted with the GC understanding of the purpose of the state, thus giving 
rise to a zero-sum, intractable conflict.498 Conversely, the applicants in Aziz agreed with the 
RoC that individuals should enjoy voting rights because of their status as citizens, rather than 
due to their ethnic group membership. They were merely asking that their ethnic background 
did not cloud this agreement and affect the rights they should enjoy.  
 
It is therefore not surprising that the ECtHR adopted varying approaches in the two cases. The 
applicants in Erel essentially asked an international court to compel the RoC to fundamentally 
change its democratic structures: increase the number of Members of Parliament, re-introduce 
the position of the Vice-President and create another electoral register.499 However, a country’s 
democratic structures are deeply affected by a ‘wealth of differences, inter alia, in historical 
development, cultural diversity and political thought’.500 It is not the place of an international 
court to set uniform standards on this issue, something acknowledged by the ECtHR in Erel 
when it referred to each State’s ‘considerable latitude in establishing constitutional rules’.501 
Ultimately, resolving such divisive conflicts requires considerably more intervention and 
guidance than an international court can legitimately engage in.502 Nevertheless, even a 
domestic court is likely to have exercised similar judicial restraint. The issue at hand goes to 
the heart of a state’s relationship with its citizens and concerns a question that should be 
publicly debated and decided, not by judges, but by democratically elected and accountable 
politicians, or even the public itself through a referendum.503 In any case, the judiciary – 
domestic or international – can only interpret human rights within a given matrix. It can protect 
an individual’s interests in a specific context, not build the structure of a society from scratch, 
which is what the applicants in Erel sought to achieve.504 As Scheingold aptly put it, 
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[c]ourts can be of some use in [adjudicating conflicts] that apply principally to government 
agencies and which turn mainly on procedural matters and issues of due process. However, the 
deeper that it is necessary to penetrate into society, the more undependable courts become.505 
 
This disparate approach to the handling of fundamental and minor conflicts is not only a 
characteristic of the European Court. Rather, it has been manifested in the case law of domestic 
courts as well, with the SA Constitutional Court acting as a peacebuilding agent when 
adjudicating minor conflicts, and the judiciary of BiH failing to do so when asked to resolve 
fundamental ones. Arguably, the distinction in the types of conflicts the courts in the two 
countries were asked to adjudicate, and the response of the judiciary in each, is not accidental. 
The SA judiciary was able to contribute to peacebuilding efforts because the conflicts it was 
faced with were minor ones, and it was therefore well-equipped to resolve them. In turn, this 
had become possible because most fundamental disagreements had already been addressed 
during the negotiations leading to the adoption of the Interim and Final Constitutions.506 
Conversely, the Dayton negotiations for BiH had been less effective in resolving such 
disagreements, which were then left to be handled by domestic institutions, including the 
judiciary.507 An example of a fundamental conflict in BiH arose when the Human Rights 
Chamber, a hybrid court that had temporarily been established by the Dayton Agreement, was 
asked to address the systemic and country-wide problem of discrimination in the workplace.508 
During the war in BiH, people of the ‘wrong’ ethnic group509 were either fired or provisionally 
put on waiting lists for employment, with the promise that they would return to their jobs after 
the war.510 When this promise did not materialise, thus resulting in ethnically homogenous 
workplaces, applicants sought to challenge the state of affairs as discriminatory. On many 
occasions, judges found cases relating to this fundamental conflict inadmissible, by reasoning 
that that they did not have jurisdiction since the dismissal or placing of the applicant on the 
waiting list had taken place during the war and before the establishment of the judicial body 
that was hearing the dispute.511 
 
Conversely, the SA Constitutional Court has been both more willing to adjudicate and more 
successful in resolving the (minor) conflicts it has been faced with. One example of this is New 
National Party v Government of South Africa, a case concerning a minor disagreement as to 
what documents could be used for identification purposes during the country’s second 
democratic elections.512 According to the Electoral Act [73 of 1998], acceptable IDs only 
included documents published under the Identification Acts [72 of 1986] and [68 of 1997] or 
the Electoral Act itself. This left about 10 per cent of the population unable to vote and resulted 
in a challenge of the legislation as being incompatible with the right to political participation, 
protected under Section 19 of the Constitution. Essentially, the case was about determining the 
rationale of the law in question and assessing whether its provisions reasonably limited Section 
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19. No other body was better suited to carry out this task than the judiciary, which explains the 
Constitutional Court’s success in resolving the conflict. Delivering a well-reasoned judgment, 
the majority held that practically speaking, the new identification documents were necessary 
because the 10 per cent of the population who had older IDs could have been in possession of 
one of seven different documents, thus considerably confusing the situation at the poll.513 
Moreover, the 1997 Electoral Act had been passed long enough before the elections, leaving 
those who wanted to vote six months within which to apply for the necessary document.514 
Finally, the Court considered the symbolic value of the older documents, which had been issued 
during apartheid and reflected the race of the person in possession of them. They were a 
reminder of SA’s shameful past, personally offensive to many people and inappropriate for 
signalling the beginning of democracy in the country.515 Thus, by relying on the right to 
political participation, the Court decisively resolved the conflict and offered a clear set of 
arguments as to why the use of specific IDs was necessary in the post-apartheid era. In doing 
that, it stressed that it was no longer acceptable to rely on racially discriminatory documents 
and contributed to a sense of justice and reconciliation in the country.516 
 
The SA Constitutional Court further promoted peacebuilding efforts when it addressed minor 
conflicts concerning forced displacement by relying on the right to property.517 The right under 
Section 25 of the SA Constitution, prima facie protects, not the original owner, but the 
secondary occupier of the property (that is, the person who acquired the property under 
apartheid law). While starting from the premise that the current occupant is protected from the 
arbitrary deprivation of his property,518 the right also allows its expropriation for public interest 
purposes.519 ‘[T]he nation’s commitment to land reform’, which was considered necessary due 
to the forced displacement practices carried out during apartheid, is explicitly mentioned as 
such an interest.520 Section 25(7) makes specific reference to the remedying of apartheid 
injustices, when it states that  
A person or community dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913 as a result of past racially 
discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, 
either to restitution of that property or to equitable redress. (My emphasis)  
 
It is the interpretation of this subsection that has resulted in several minor conflicts, which the 
Constitutional Court has been called to adjudicate. In particular, there have been disagreements 
about what is the exact meaning of the phrases ‘community’, ‘as a result of’ and ‘racially 
discriminatory laws or practices’, all of which affect the number of people labelled as victims 
and who are entitled to a remedy. In turn, the provision of a remedy, especially in light of the 
vast socio-economic differences in the country521 and the psychological significance of this 
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issue for black SA,522 is likely to influence the promotion of justice and reconciliation.523 
Finally, arguments have been made that unless forced displacement in SA is effectively 
remedied, ‘the tinderbox of historical land injustice may, with the right spark, ignite in a critical 
political conflagration engulfing the entire country’, thus undermining security.524 The 
resolution of these conflicts therefore, has a direct impact on each of the elements of peace. 
 
In relation to the first disagreement, the Court adopted a broad interpretation of the term 
‘community’ as ‘a sufficiently cohesive group of persons’, with ‘some element of commonality 
between the claiming community and the community as it was at the point of dispossession.’525 
It acknowledged that this definition is relatively easy to satisfy, but justified its decision by 
pointing to the fact that the displacement, and the consequent scattering of the people, did not 
only have adverse economic consequences for them, but also weakened the bonds holding the 
community together in the first place.526 A similarly broad interpretation was given to the 
phrase ‘as a result of’: the Court pointed out that apartheid laws allowing land dispossession 
were a labyrinth of different statutes preventing non-whites from owning land, and that ‘often 
the cause of historical dispossession of land rights will not lie in an isolated moment in time or 
a single act’.527 Consequently, the phrase ‘as a result of’ was held to mean ‘as a consequence 
of’, rather than ‘solely as a consequence of’.528 White landowners might have terminated the 
tenancy rights of the displaced community for commercial reasons, but this only became 
possible due to, and was therefore a result of, the matrix of racially discriminatory laws that 
existed in the country at the time. The judiciary adopted a broad interpretation of these phrases 
by considering the declared purpose of the law, namely to offer redress to as many victims of 
the right’s violation as possible.529  
 
Finally, the right to property provided guidance on, and helped the Court resolve the conflict 
about, the meaning of the phrase ‘racially discriminatory laws and practices’. This became an 
issue in Alexkor v Richtersveld Community in which the appellant, Alexkor, argued that the 
Richtersveld Community should not be entitled to a remedy because it was removed from its 
land, not by one of the statutes directly forcing black displacement, but by the Precious Stones 
Act [44 of 1927].530 The Court, rejecting the argument, started its analysis by referring to the 
need ‘to provide redress to those individuals and communities who were dispossessed of their 
land rights’.531 It pointed out that, while the motive of the Precious Stones Act might not have 
been racially discriminatory, its consequences were, because it made a distinction between 
registered owners of the land and those who had indigenous law ownership. Registered owners 
were allowed to continue having access to the land and share its mineral wealth with the 
government; conversely, indigenous law owners were simply excluded from the land when the 
government exploited their resources without compensating them in any way.532 Bearing in 
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mind that indigenous law ownership was the main way in which black communities held land 
in SA and that these rights were not recognised or protected by the law, the legislation was 
inherently racially discriminatory through its consequences, even though it did not seek to 
achieve ‘the (then) ideal of spatial apartheid’.533 Like in the other cases addressing minor 
conflicts, the Court was both willing and able to resolve the disagreement by adopting familiar 
strategies of statutory interpretation. Its reliance on human rights arguments supported and 
further legitimised the reasoning and outcome of the decision, and made positive contributions 
towards peacebuilding efforts in the country.  
 
C. The Dangers of Resolving Fundamental Conflicts in the Courtroom 
The examples discussed so far have been concerned with situations where the judiciary’s lack 
of guidance stemmed from its unwillingness to become involved in the resolution of the 
fundamental conflict in the first place. Nevertheless, even on those rare occasions that a court 
addresses a fundamental conflict directly, the guidance it provides for its resolution is still 
likely to be deficient. Donald and Mottershaw are right in arguing that ‘[t]he impact of a legal 
decision may depend upon the extent to which it clearly articulates a discrete principle with 
broad potential application.’534 Simply put, in cases of fundamental conflicts, courts find it very 
difficult to articulate such discrete principles in a way that balances considerations of security, 
justice and reconciliation. Perhaps the clearest illustration of this stems from an analysis of the 
Cypriot right to property cases, in which the ECtHR dealt with the divisive question of how 
best to remedy forced displacement. The right to property is protected under Article 23 and 
Section 36 of the RoC and ‘TRNC’ Constitutions respectively and is also safeguarded by 
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (Article 1-1) of the European Convention. Rather exceptionally, 
GC applications relating to this issue had, until recently, been decided by the ECtHR directly, 
without being subject to the requirement of exhausting domestic remedies, because the ‘TRNC’ 
law offered no remedy at all for the violation of the GC’s right to property.535  
 
The first right to property case concerning the Cypriot conflict to reach the ECtHR was 
Loizidou v Turkey, where the Court found a violation of Article 1-1.536 The (GC) applicant 
owned a house in the occupied part of Cyprus and argued that the presence of Turkish troops, 
and the fact that they prevented her from accessing and enjoying it, violated her right to 
property.537 The majority of the Court agreed, finding that Turkey was in effective control of 
the northern part of Cyprus, and therefore responsible for any violations that were taking place 
there.538 Conversely, the minority in Loizidou expressed serious reservations about whether the 
ECtHR should become involved in the adjudication of such a zero-sum conflict. Judge Jambreg 
for example, pointed out that  
The ‘political nature’ of the present case is in my view rather related to the place of the courts in 
general, and of the Strasbourg mechanism in particular, in the scheme of the division and separation 
of powers. There, the courts have a different role to play, than, e.g. the legislative and executive 
bodies. Courts are adjudicating in individual and concrete cases according to prescribed legal 
standards. They are ill-equipped to deal with large-scale and complex issues which as a rule call for 
normative action and legal reform.539  
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Echoing these concerns, Judge Pettiti noted that 
the whole problem of the two communities […] has more to do with politics and diplomacy than 
with European judicial scrutiny based on the isolated case of Mrs Loizidou and her rights under 
Protocol No. 1.540 
 
Confirming the minority’s concerns, over the years approximately 1,400 cases with similar 
facts flooded the European Court, which kept reaffirming the majority’s decision in 
Loizidou.541 This state of affairs, with the Court almost mechanically finding a violation of 
Article 1-1, changed in Demopoulos v Turkey, a case with identical facts to Loizidou. In 
Demopoulos, Turkey accepted responsibility for the violation of property rights of GC and 
sought to offer a remedy by establishing the Immovable Property Commission (IPC). The 
Court examined the IPC’s power to offer restitution, compensation or exchange of properties 
to the applicants and declared that it provided effective legal remedies, which barred further 
legal action from GC applicants to the ECtHR.542 As a result, applicants that are currently 
seeking a remedy for the violation of their property rights, must apply to the IPC and only after 
exhausting all legal remedies within the ‘TRNC’ can they apply to the ECtHR.543 Thus, 
Demopoulos brings the Cyprus cases in line with other decisions of the ECtHR on forced 
displacement, in which the Court has altogether avoided the adjudication of such zero-sum 
conflicts.544  
 
Loizidou is one of the rare instances in which the ECtHR allowed itself to become involved in 
the resolution of a fundamental disagreement. It is also an illustration of the dangers, in terms 
of undermining peace, that can materialise when this has not been done successfully. Arguably, 
despite the ECtHR’s assessment that the Cyprus problem ‘should have been resolved by all 
parties assuming full responsibility for finding a solution on a political level’, its case law on 
the right to property has in fact hindered the successful outcome of the negotiations.545 One of 
the major hurdles to reaching a comprehensive peace settlement is the dispute between the two 
sides as to what the right to property requires. On the one hand, GC consider the 1974 Turkish 
invasion of the island to be the root of the displacement problem. Their preferred remedy is 
restitution since that will take them back to the pre-1974 situation as much as possible and 
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promote justice.546 On the other, most TC see the events of 1974 not as an illegal invasion, but 
as a necessary intervention for the protection of their endangered ethnic identity from the GC 
majority.547 They consider the current state of affairs, with the two populations largely 
segregated and therefore unable to undermine each other’s sense of security, as the best 
alternative. They argue that GC should recognise the realities on the ground and accept that the 
only realistic remedies to the displacement problem are compensation and exchange of 
properties.548 These different remedies envisioned by the two communities are not the result of 
different interpretations of the law; rather they stem from diametrically opposed visions of what 
a peaceful Cyprus should look like, thus explaining the unwillingness of the two sides to 
compromise their positions.  
 
The ECtHR’s involvement in the adjudication of this fundamental conflict has done little to 
bridge these positions and promote a successful outcome in the negotiations. To the contrary, 
it has hardened the respective positions of the parties since each has selectively read the Court’s 
case law as only confirming its own point of view. For instance, after Loizidou had been 
decided in the applicant’s favour, many GC assumed that the ECtHR had confirmed their long-
standing position that all displaced persons should return to their homes and that nothing short 
of restitution of all properties could satisfy the European Court’s standards.549 The Court had 
insisted that it ‘does not consider it necessary, let alone desirable […] to elaborate a general 
theory concerning the lawfulness of legislative and administrative acts of the “TRNC”’.550 
Despite this, most GC have understood Loizidou to mean that the property issue is a matter of 
rectifying an illegal situation, a task that can only be achieved through full compliance with 
international law.551 This has, in turn, resulted in an unwillingness among the majority of GC 
to approve of a solution that does not allow restitution in the majority of cases.552 On the other 
hand, the Demopoulos line of cases has also created very few incentives for TC to resolve the 
conflict. In Xenides-Arestis v Turkey, a case that preceded Demopoulos and held for the first 
time that the IPC could in principle be an effective domestic remedy, the Court pointed out that 
the possibility of restitution should exist for the applicants.553 Nevertheless, it was subsequently 
stated in Demopoulos that it is within the discretion of each state what remedy it will provide 
since ‘property is a material commodity which can be valued and compensated for in monetary 
terms.’554 As a result of Demopoulos, almost all the cases that have been decided by the IPC 
so far, have been settled through compensation.555 However, if the IPC provides the 
opportunity to the ‘TRNC’ to resolve the overwhelming majority of claims through its 
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preferred remedy, this removes any incentive from the TC side to negotiate an agreement, 
which is likely to require the return of considerable areas of land back to the GC.556  
 
Thus, the ECtHR’s handling of this fundamental conflict has undermined the possibility of 
reaching a comprehensive peace settlement.557 In turn, this has had detrimental consequences 
on each of the elements of peace: while there has been no serious violence in Cyprus since the 
1974 Turkish invasion, there are still thousands of Turkish troops stationed there, which Turkey 
uses as a threat against the RoC in order to influence its decisions on issues of national 
importance.558 In addition to undermining security, the ongoing, unsuccessful negotiations 
keep reminding Cypriots of both communities that the injustices of the 1960s and 1970s 
continue until today and that a solution to the problem will be a compromise where their 
preferred form of justice will not be fully protected. Finally, the current status quo also 
undermines reconciliation since each side portrays the other as making maximalist demands 
and being solely to blame for the lack of a peace agreement.559 The unsuccessful resolution of 
this conflict has also had indirect negative consequences for peace: it has created conditions 
for nationalist rhetoric to flourish, demonised the idea of inter-ethnic cooperation and 
contributed to electoral disillusionment, none of which helps promote the three elements.560  
 
The judiciary’s inability to provide guidance that meaningfully contributes to the resolution of 
fundamental conflicts, even when it does become involved in their adjudication, is also evident 
from the handling of the BiH workplace discrimination cases briefly mentioned in the previous 
section. While the BiH Human Rights Chamber has found many such cases to be inadmissible, 
on other occasions it has overcome the rationae temporis argument561 by referring to the 
existence of a continuous violation, since the applicants have remained unremedied until after 
the conclusion of the war and the establishment of the new Dayton institutions.562 However, 
the lack of a consistent approach and the resulting contradictory case law, has done little to 
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encourage a universal strategy of non-discrimination in the workplace and promote a sense of 
justice among the victims.563  
 
Moreover, the Human Rights Chamber’s failure to offer guidance for the resolution of the 
conflict has also been compounded by its unwillingness to address what is at the heart of this 
fundamental disagreement, by refusing to find a violation of the right to non-discrimination in 
cases where it had already found the violation of another right.564 Illustrative of this is the case 
of Zahirović v BiH and Federation of BiH in which a Bosniac bus conductor had been put on 
the employment waiting list during the war.565 By the end of the war, a number of Croats had 
been hired by the state company, with the applicant remaining, without good reasons, still 
without a job. Evidence was presented in Court that this was just one example of a pattern of 
discrimination against Bosniacs, which the Croat-controlled authorities – including the local 
judiciary – in the area in question, had left largely unchallenged.566 This state of affairs, the 
applicant contended, constituted discrimination in his enjoyment of his right to work, and since 
he had been unable to challenge it in court, a violation of the right to fair trial and of a separate 
count of freedom from discrimination. The Human Rights Chamber, finding a violation of 
freedom from discrimination in the workplace and the right to fair trial,567 held that it was 
unnecessary to examine the question of discrimination by the judiciary separately.568 Yet, this 
unwillingness to find an additional violation is regrettable because the judiciary’s 
discriminatory practices were part of a well-thought-out strategy to continue pursuing the 
ethnic cleansing objectives of the war through other means.569 By stopping itself from 
identifying the root of the problem and acknowledging that the violation of the right to fair trial 
was itself a consequence of discrimination, the Court indirectly endorsed the continuation of 
this practice and undermined each of the elements of peace.  
 
The discriminatory practices that the Human Rights Chamber failed to condemn are but one 
example of the continuing ethnic cleansing policies that exist in BiH. Bosnians are being 
treated differently on grounds of religion and ethnicity in almost all areas of life, including the 
provision of housing,570 social services571 and education.572 Such discriminatory policies have 
significant detrimental effects on peacebuilding efforts, and the judges’ inability to fully 
challenge them has further compromised attempts to promote justice and reconciliation.573 At 
the same time, and especially in the short term, it has undermined feelings of security among 
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members of the ‘wrong’ ethnic group in different parts of the country. For instance, making 
reference to discriminatory practices, such as racist crimes against minority returnees and the 
use of hate speech that go unpunished by the authorities, the European Commission Against 
Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) argued that these have resulted in feelings of insecurity among 
minority returnees.574 While a finding of discrimination by the judiciary would not have 
automatically addressed these problems, it would have sent the message that such practices are 
no longer acceptable. 
 
D. The Lessons to Draw 
The mixed performance of human rights adjudication as a conflict resolution strategy points to 
three practical recommendations for peacebuilders. First, since it is an ill-suited mechanism for 
resolving fundamental conflicts, efforts should be made to ensure that these are addressed 
during the political negotiations leading to the peace agreement.575 Adopting strategies such as 
constructive ambiguity, which gloss over disagreements during the negotiating stages and leave 
them to be handled later on, might indeed assist in the conclusion of the agreement.576 They 
should nevertheless be avoided, because they achieve this by shifting the task of addressing 
fundamental conflicts to a later point in time, when political momentum for their resolution 
might have been lost. In turn, this often pushes peacebuilders to turn to the judiciary, a 
temptation, which as the preceding analysis suggests, should be avoided.  
 
Related, is the second practical recommendation, namely that when faced with fundamental 
conflicts, peacebuilders should always push so that they are resolved by the legislature, rather 
than adjudicated in courts. The judiciary may have the advantage of being more insulated from 
the political process and the power relations that push or hinder change, but it is also less well-
equipped to introduce institutional changes, reallocate resources or ensure effective 
implementation of its decisions.577 In cases concerning fundamental conflicts therefore, courts 
might be able to confer the applicant a temporary advantage, but they are usually unable to 
decisively resolve the disagreement and promote peace. As a result, a more effective use of 
peacebuilding resources in such cases would be to focus on lobbying for legislative action, 
rather than rallying behind lawyers. Often, of course, the adjudication of a fundamental conflict 
is beyond the control of peacebuilders, since the case may be brought to court by an individual 
applicant. Even in such cases however, peacebuilders may be able to influence individual cases 
by deciding whether to make submissions as third parties. For example, while GC property 
cases to the ECtHR were initiated by individuals, in many of them, the applicants received 
support from the RoC government, which acted as an intervening party in their favour.578 If the 
conclusions of this section are taken seriously, the RoC should rethink this strategy and focus 
its efforts on reaching a political compromise instead. 
 
The final recommendation stemming from this analysis is that, since courts can help resolve 
minor conflicts, they should be strengthened in order to achieve this more effectively. Efforts 
to empower the institutions that are likely to adjudicate such disputes have started being made 
in BiH, where, since 2012, authorities estimate that around 50 per cent of relevant prosecutors 
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and judges have received training on hate crimes and discrimination.579 While this is a step in 
the right direction, ideally, similar schemes should have been initiated much earlier during the 
peacebuilding process. Moreover, increased knowledge of the law is ultimately unhelpful, if 
the judiciary that applies it, remains relatively inaccessible to individual applicants. Factors 
that affect the accessibility of legal institutions include, inter alia, their geographic location,580 
the financial cost involved in the application,581 any personal risk that the applicant is adopting 
by resorting to them,582 and the extent to which an individual can navigate the process on his 
own, instead of relying on a lawyer.583 Thus, especially when being repeatedly faced with the 
manifestation of the same minor conflict, peacebuilders should consider changes in the 
structures and rules of procedures of courts that are likely to hear such disputes. These changes 
should take into account the fact that, as a general rule, minor conflicts are likely to be brought 
to court by ‘one-shooters’ – people with little or no experience of the judicial process – against 
more experienced ‘repeat players’.584 As a result, proposals could envision the establishment 
of specialised courts, or even alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, such as 
Ombudspersons.585 These tend to operate using simpler procedures and evidentiary rules, 
which make them more readily available to the applicants and result in quicker access to 
justice.586 Furthermore, they are likely to encourage the accumulation of knowledge and 
expertise among their judges or members, which will in turn, produce better reasoned and more 
consistent decisions.  
 
Equally important as the establishment of these institutions is that they operate within an 
applicant-friendly framework, which encourages the swift resolution of minor conflicts. The 
detrimental consequences to peacebuilding efforts when this consideration is ignored are 
illustrated through an assessment of the mechanics of the Employment Equity Act [55 of 1998], 
which prohibits direct or indirect discrimination against an employee in SA.587 Responsible for 
implementing its provisions are the Commission of Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration 
and the Labour Courts. The Act provides that for a complaint to be heard by a Labour Court, 
the alleged victim must first make an attempt to resolve the dispute within the company that 
employs him/her and be able to provide proof that s/he has taken such steps.588 This is in itself 
a barrier to adjudication since applicants are likely to be hesitant to raise their complaints 
internally, if they have already faced indifference or hostility by the very employers they are 
complaining against. If the dispute is not resolved through this initial step, the applicant has six 
months from the time the alleged discrimination has taken place to submit his/her complaint to 
the Commission589 and only after conciliation has failed, can the dispute be referred to a Labour 
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Court.590 This long process, which remains the same irrespective of how serious the alleged 
discrimination, or urgent its response, is, arguably discourages potential victims from voicing 
their grievances and undermines feelings of justice.591  
 
Even when individual applicants have reached the Labour Court, they can face additional 
challenges since hiring a lawyer and going through a cumbersome legal process might be too 
onerous for them, both economically and psychologically.592 One method of addressing this 
would be to allow for class action law suits, which are also more effective than individual 
applications in dealing with entrenched systems of discrimination, but this is not a possibility 
allowed by the Act.593 Alternative responses include making legal aid available, and therefore 
empowering applicants to hire a lawyer, or allowing representation or other forms of assistance 
by an institutional player, such as an Equality Commission. These strategies can contribute to 
the more effective adjudication of disputes, since both lawyers and mandated institutions are 
‘repeat players’, who can guide the applicants around the pitfalls of the process. Finally, the 
remedy that a specialised body can award is important because it signals to potential applicants 
whether it is worth trying to adjudicate a minor conflict in the first place. Problematically in 
this regard, the Employment Equity Act creates a complete exemption from liability in cases 
where employers did what was ‘reasonably practicable to eliminate’ the discrimination in 
question.594 In the majority of cases, instead of disciplining the discriminatory conduct, 
employers respond to victims’ complaints merely by compensating them, a practice that the 
Labour Court has considered adequate.595 This is irrespective of the fact that monetary awards 
are arguably insufficient ways of remedying the loss of a person’s dignity and esteem, and 
especially when these are very small, it is also questionable whether they deter future 
discriminatory practices.596 Thus, for human rights adjudication to become an effective 
peacebuilding strategy, consideration must be paid to the structure and powers given to Courts, 
as well as the institutions that can supplement their work. 
 
III. The Type of Court Adjudicating the Conflict 
A. Exploring the Differences Between Domestic and International Courts 
Peacebuilding reports refer to the need to protect human rights in post-violence societies, but 
they do not often clarify whether by that they mean domestic or international protection.597 
Practice on the ground is also mixed: peace agreements are usually accompanied by accession 
to an array of international human rights treaties, while at the same time, there is an increased 
focus on the strengthening and professionalisation of the domestic judiciary.598 Yet, a 
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comparison of the different characteristics of domestic and international (human rights) courts 
suggests that each can make distinct peacebuilding contributions and be utilised in different 
ways.599 This section argues that in addition to the nature of the conflict, what also affects its 
successful resolution are the relevant actors, the interests they (are perceived to) serve and the 
characteristics each possesses. In light of this, the analysis focuses on three features of domestic 
and international courts: first, the fact that they derive their legitimacy from different sources; 
second, the varying likelihood that the decisions of each will be enforced; and third, that they 
are tasked with interpreting different documents. These differences should not be taken to mean 
that domestic courts are somehow better peacebuilding institutions than their international 
counterparts, or vice-versa. Rather, they point to the conclusion that the combined use of both 
types of courts is the most effective peacebuilding strategy.  
 
The first difference between the two types of courts concerns the legitimacy that each enjoys.600 
While arguments have been made that ‘legitimacy talk’ mainly serves attempts to mask state 
power and its abuse,601 it should be taken seriously because it can impact courts’ ability to 
provide guidance that parties will pay attention to when resolving divisive disputes. Both 
domestic and international courts struggle with the adjudication of fundamental conflicts 
because of their democratic deficit, which renders them less legitimate and well-suited to 
respond to intractable disagreements. However, in addition to this common feature, the two 
types of courts also have different characteristics, which further impact on the legitimacy that 
each enjoys. On the one hand, when international courts interpret human rights provisions, they 
derive their legitimacy from the notion that they are detached from the conflicts dividing the 
post-violence society and are therefore, more likely to act as neutral decision-makers.602 On 
the other, the legitimacy of domestic judges stems from their familiarity with the context of the 
society in question and ability to appreciate nuances that might be missed by international 
observers.603 As a result, and unlike international human rights judgments that might operate 
as more blunt peacebuilding tools, decisions of domestic courts are expected to be more in tune 
with the sensitivities of the people who will be affected by them.604 
 
Notably, neither of these two sources of legitimacy is without its drawbacks. In the case of 
domestic judges, their insiders’ detailed knowledge might be compromised by biases, 
                                                 
Accession Assistance (IPA II) 2014-2020 – Bosnia and Herzegovina: Enhanced Justice Sector and Cooperation 
in Rule of Law (Brussels, European Commission, 2014).) 
599 On the argument that a clear distinction should be made between domestic and international human rights, see 
Charles R. Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009); Cole M. Wade, ‘Mind the 
Gap: State Capacity and Implementation of Human Rights Treaties’ (2015) 69 International Organization 405. 
600 For a discussion of the ‘multi-dimensional’ and complex character of notions of legitimacy, see David 
Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (London, MacMillan, 1991). 
601 Marti Koskenniemi, ‘Legitimacy, Rights and Ideology: Notes Towards a Critique of the New Moral 
Internationalism’ (2003) 7 Associations 349. 
602 Philip Leach and Alice Donald, Parliaments and the European Court of Human Rights (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2016) 132; Severine Autesserre, Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of 
International Intervention (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014) 65; Lorna McGregor, ‘International 
Law as a “Tiered Process”: Transitional Justice at the Local, National and International Level’ in Kieran McEvoy 
and Lorna McGregor (eds), Transitional Justice from Below: Grassroots Activism and the Struggle for Change 
(Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2008), 53. 
603 Andreas Follesdal, ‘The Legitimacy Deficits of the Human Rights Judiciary: Elements and Implications of a 
Normative Theory’ (2013) 14 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 339; Christopher McCrudden and Brendan O’Leary, 
Courts and Consociations: Human Rights Versus Power-Sharing (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013) 42.  
604 James Sweeney, ‘Restorative Justice and Transitional Justice at the ECHR’ (2012) 12 International Criminal 
Law Review 313, 337; Chandra Lekha Sriram, ‘Post-Conflict Justice and Hybridity in Peacebuilding: Resistance 
or Cooptation?’ in Oliver P. Richmond and Audra Mitchell (eds), Hybrid Forms of Peace: From Everyday Agency 
to Post-Liberalism (Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 62-3. 
 91 
preventing them from deciding a case in an impartial manner. Of course, in theory, both 
domestic and international courts are expected to be neutral arbiters,605 but the danger that they 
will be influenced by non-legal considerations, especially when adjudicating fundamental 
conflicts, remains.606 It is presumably because of this risk that peace agreements often include 
ethnic quotas in the composition of apex courts;607 had domestic judges always managed to 
detach themselves from their own unconscious biases, such a safeguard would simply not be 
necessary. An illustration of the detrimental peacebuilding effects of this danger is provided 
by contrasting two missing persons cases heard by the RoC judiciary, with one concerning a 
GC and the other a TC victim. On the facts of the first case, Vasiliou, the applicants’ (GC) 
relative had not returned from the war in 1974 and since there was no evidence of his death, he 
was included by the RoC in the list of missing persons.608 Following private investigations that 
took place in 1999, it transpired that the applicants’ relative had been buried in 1974 in an 
unidentified grave in the area under the control of the RoC by state officials. The first instance 
Court held that since the RoC had access to information and witnesses concerning this case, it 
had an obligation to investigate the death, which it had not fulfilled. While the case was 
dismissed on appeal, finding in favour of the government, the appellate court found the case 
admissible and reasoned that the RoC had an obligation towards the applicant, which it had 
discharged sufficiently, in light of the chaotic conditions that existed at the time.609 
 
In the second case, the applicants, this time of TC origin, also argued that the RoC had a 
responsibility to investigate the disappearance of their family members, which had taken place 
in 1963 in an area that was at the time, and remains today, under the control of the Republic.610 
Adopting a completely different reasoning to Vasiliou, the Supreme Court accepted as a 
defence to the alleged violation of the procedural right to life, the doctrine of an ‘act of 
government’. According to this novel defence, the question of missing persons constitutes one 
of the many aspects of the ‘Cyprus problem’, an issue of political nature which falls within the 
exclusive competence of the executive. Since the RoC President was already involved in 
political negotiations concerning the Cyprus issue, which also related to the fate of missing 
persons, the Court held that it should not become involved in the resolution of the conflict. A 
combined reading of the two cases suggests that the only distinguishing factor between them 
was the ethnicity of the victims. In every other respect, the cases were manifestations of the 
same conflict, namely whether a government has the responsibility to investigate 
disappearances of missing persons that have taken place within its territory. The most likely 
explanation for the conflicting reasoning of the domestic judiciary – finding in one case that 
the Republic was under a duty to comply with its human rights obligations and in the other that 
it was not – is the unconscious bias of the (exclusively GC) bench.611 Through their position 
of power, the domestic judges, whether strategically or inadvertently, adopted diametrically 
different approaches in the two cases, thus undermining all three elements of peace in the 
process. 
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Conversely, the more detached position of international court judges avoids the danger of 
unconscious bias on their behalf, but gives rise to other ‘lack of legitimacy’ concerns. Key 
among them is that this very detachment makes them even more distant from the citizens whose 
rights they are adjudicating and therefore, more likely to misunderstand the domestic context 
when delivering their judgments.612 Such detachment also means that international courts 
might be speaking to the respondent state, while also being aware that other interested parties 
are paying attention to their deliberations. Because of this, they might be less willing to defer 
to the particularities of one post-violence society, lest they encourage the loosening of human 
rights standards elsewhere in the future.613 Such incentives for delivering ambitious human 
rights judgments notwithstanding, it is worth remembering that international courts derive their 
legitimacy from the fact that they apply treaties, which states have signed and are member 
parties to. Yet, a creative interpretation of these treaties can be criticised as an intervention into 
the state’s sovereignty that has not been consented to.614 This makes international courts easy 
targets of attacks by local opinion leaders, which further compromise their legitimacy. Such 
attacks usually present international judgments as outside interference with national matters, 
which as the UN Security Council recognised, makes them ‘frequently politicised’ and likely 
to be ‘used for propaganda purposes’ by spoilers.615  
 
The second difference between domestic and international courts relates to the enforceability 
of their judgments, with those of the former being more likely to result in implementation than 
the latter.616 The reason for this stems from the truism that domestic institutions generally 
operate within much better developed structures than international ones.617 Moreover, although 
sanctions are in principle available to international bodies as a way of inducing enforcement, 
political and diplomatic considerations often make them unavailable or ineffective in 
practice.618 To the extent that human rights cases are implemented because of popular pressure 
within the post-violence society, international judgments are again likely to be at a 
disadvantage because they may be less well known to the public and therefore not as likely to 
generate sufficient interest and traction to push politicians into action.619 Finally, since the 
legitimacy of a court affects the extent to which the parties are likely to comply with its rulings, 
international courts, especially when delivering ‘creative’ judgments, might suffer from lower 
compliance rates than their domestic counterparts.620 An alternative view is that these factors 
are more likely to result in partial compliance with international human rights judgments, rather 
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than no implementation at all.621 Thus, the state might unduly delay the enforcement of the 
decision; comply with the individual, but not general measures required by the judgment; or 
offer a response that only partly addresses the human rights violation.622 Yet, as the next chapter 
explores in more detail, even if not outright ignoring the Court’s decision, partial compliance 
can still have detrimental peacebuilding effects.  
 
The final difference between domestic and international courts explored here, concerns the 
documents that each is interpreting. While domestic courts interpret national legislation and 
their respective constitution, international human rights bodies are limited to their constituent 
documents623. Differences in the wording of similar provisions among these, might result in 
diverse interpretations and a varied ability among courts to resolve the conflicts they are called 
to adjudicate. Illustrative of this is the differentiation between the right to vote protected under 
Article 3-1 of the European Convention, which only safeguards the exercise of the right ‘in the 
choice of the legislature’, and Section 19 of the SA Constitution, which is more broadly 
worded. In addition to protecting the right to vote and stand for public office (Sections 19(2) 
and 19(3)), it also refers to every citizen’s freedom ‘to make political choices’, which extend 
beyond the electoral period. Thus, Section 19(1) includes three non-exhaustive examples of 
protected political choices, namely the rights to form a political party, participate in the 
activities of a political party, and campaign for a political party or cause. This difference in 
wording suggests that the ECtHR can deal with a narrower range of arguments than the SA 
judiciary, which can affect the reasoning of each court and its consequent ability to resolve 
related disagreements.  
 
Further to potentially applying to a wider range of cases, constitutions are more likely to 
provide greater inspiration to the judiciary for the resolution of conflicts than international 
human rights treaties. This is because, in addition to Bills of Rights, constitutions also often 
include references to other principles that judges can rely on in order to inform their 
reasoning.624 This was, for instance, the approach adopted by the BiH Constitutional Court 
when it was asked to resolve a conflict about whether the Croatian caucus in the Parliamentary 
Assembly was right to block a contentious law through use of the veto power.625 In answering 
this question, the Court bolstered its analysis by relying on Article I.2 of the Constitution, 
which provides that BiH shall be a ‘democratic state’. This use of a constitutional principle, 
which relates to, but is broader than the right to vote, allowed the Court to define the term and 
offer more meaningful guidance as to when parties were entitled to make use of the veto power. 
Thus, the Court reasoned that a ‘democratic state’ should protect group rights, but should also 
be a functional one, hence urging the parties to be frugal in the use of the veto power, a nuanced 
conclusion that an international court would have been less capable of reaching.  
 
Combined, these reasons suggest that international courts will be less likely to provide detailed 
guidelines for conflict resolution, compared to domestic ones. This is supported by doctrines 
adopted by the ECtHR, such as the margin of appreciation, which is used when the 
circumstances of the case are somehow unique or the right in question has varying 
                                                 
621 Darren Hawkins and Wade Jacoby, ‘Partial Compliance: A Comparison of the European and Inter-American 
Courts of Human Rights’ (2010) 6 Journal of International Law and International Relations 35. 
622 Ibid. 
623 Tom Gerard Daly, ‘The Alchemists: Courts as Democracy-Builders in Contemporary Thought’ (2017) 6 
Global Constitutionalism 101; Daly, The Alchemists 162-163. 
624 For a detailed argument of how this is happening, see Nasia Hadjigeorgiou, ‘Conflict Resolution in Post-
Violence Societies: Some Guidance for the Judiciary’ (ICON·S 2017 Conference on ‘Courts, Powers, Public 
Law’, Copenhagen, July 2017).  
625 U-8/04 (BiH Constitutional Court, 25 June 2004); U-10/05 (BiH Constitutional Court, 22 July 2005). 
 94 
interpretations in different member states.626 Thus, the European Court has ruled that a wide 
margin will be afforded when ‘there is no consensus within the member states of the Council 
of Europe, either as to the relative importance of the interest at stake or as to the best means of 
protecting it’.627 Moreover, acknowledging the importance of being sensitive to the context of 
each society, the Court has held that ‘[b]y reason of their direct and continuous contact with 
the vital forces of their countries, state authorities are in principle in a better position than the 
international judge to give an opinion’ on certain controversial issues.628 Despite such 
declarations however, the Court has, in fact, stepped in and adjudicated conflicts that domestic 
courts have refused to address. Perhaps the most striking example of this is the case of Sejdić 
and Finci v BiH, discussed in Section IV.B below, which dealt with the fundamental conflict 
of ethnically discriminatory electoral provisions in the BiH Constitution.629 Similar complaints 
to the ones in Sejdić had been made in two previous cases that the BiH Constitutional Court 
had found inadmissible.630 In a third case, the Constitutional Court ruled the case admissible, 
but refused to find a violation, with one judge explicitly requesting from the ECtHR to 
intervene.631  
 
Thus, in principle domestic courts seem to be better equipped to resolve divisive conflicts than 
international ones: they are less likely to be criticised as illegitimate when delivering a 
controversial decision, their judgments generally enjoy higher implementation rates and they 
have more tools at their disposal that will help them imaginatively address the conflict. In 
practice however, their susceptibility to political pressures at home, whether these are explicit 
or exerted in less direct ways, might undermine both their willingness to adjudicate such 
disagreements and the quality of the guidance they provide when they undertake the task. This 
results in the following paradox: while domestic courts could offer guidance for the resolution 
of conflicts, in fact the road is often paved by international judgments. This is not to argue that 
the domestic judiciary is not a useful peacebuilding actor, since it often continues the conflict 
resolution process by engaging in strategic citation of the international judgment and therefore, 
legitimising, and garnering support for, its own case law.632 In turn, through their follow-up 
decisions, domestic judges can make remedies more accessible to the parties and provide more 
sustained guidance for the resolution of the conflict. This suggests that it is the combined use 
of both types of courts, rather than the favouring of one over the other, that is likely to promote 
security, justice and reconciliation to the greatest possible extent.633  
 
B. Assessing the Combined Use of Domestic and International Human Rights Courts 
Perhaps the best illustration of the success of combining the strengths of both domestic and 
international courts can be observed through a series of right to life cases relating to the NI 
conflict. Of the 3,600 people who had died during the Troubles, approximately 10 per cent 
were killed by the police or the army, yet only 33 members of the security forces have been 
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prosecuted in relation to these deaths and just four have been convicted.634 As the numbers 
suggest, attempts by the victims’ families to find justice through domestic institutions have 
been largely ineffective and, at times, counterproductive. For instance, in a 1982 incident, three 
police officers of a specially trained mobile support unit of the Royal Ulster Constabulary fired 
109 rounds at a car ridden by Gervaise McKerr, Eugene Toman and Sean Burns, all three of 
whom were unarmed, and killed them. At the conclusion of the murder trial, Lord Justice 
Gibson, who was sitting without a jury, found the defendants not guilty and noted the 
following:  
I want to make clear that having heard the entire Crown case exposed in open court I regard 
each of the accused as absolutely blameless in this matter. I consider that in fairness to them, 
that finding also ought to be recorded together with my commendation for their courage and 
determination in bringing the three deceased men to justice, in this case to the final court of 
justice.635 
 
This deferential approach of the domestic judiciary to the executive in issues that were 
concerned with the NI conflict was in no way exceptional. Stephen Livingstone, examining 13 
House of Lords cases decided between 1969 and 1993, concluded that the Law Lords had 
consistently failed to consider human rights arguments in their reasoning and had therefore 
ruled themselves out of playing a constructive role in the resolution of conflicts relating to 
NI.636 In light of this, victims turned to the ECtHR and argued that the deficient responses to 
conflict-related deaths by the UK authorities constituted violations of the procedural obligation 
under the right to life (Article 2 of the Convention). Upholding the applicants’ complaints, the 
European Court held in Jordan,637 McKerr,638 Kelly,639 and Shanaghan v UK640 that the 
domestic authorities’ practices were indeed problematic because, among others, the police 
officers investigating the incidents were not sufficiently independent from the officers 
implicated in them; there was a lack of public scrutiny and provision of information to the 
victims’ families concerning the investigation; the inquest procedure did not allow for any 
verdict or findings which might have helped secure a criminal prosecution; and there were 
undue delays in the completion of the investigations.641 These findings by the ECtHR were 
symbolically important because they confirmed allegations in an international and highly 
visible forum that agents of the UK government were not always acting as neutral parties to 
the conflict.642 At the same time, the cases had practical significance because they provided 
clear guidance on what the UK needed to do in order to improve its investigative practices. 
Thus, by acknowledging the grievances of the victims and providing direction on how these 
should be addressed, the Court promoted feelings of justice and began the reconciliation-
building process.  
 
Nonetheless, had the adjudication of the conflict stopped when the ECtHR delivered its 
judgment, its peacebuilding impact would have been relatively limited since most victims lack 
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the time and resources to go through this procedure.643 What made the Court’s 
recommendations applicable to a broader range of interested parties, and pushed for the 
implementation of changes that would result in the effective investigation of these deaths, was 
the fact that its rulings were utilised by the domestic judiciary.644 Although the adoption of 
ECtHR case law by domestic courts has not been conductive to the promotion of justice at 
every step of the way, over time, British judges have moved in the right direction. For instance, 
the Coroners Act (NI) 1959 provides that the purpose of an inquest is to set forth the identity 
of the deceased and ascertain ‘how, when and where he [sic] came to his death’.645 
Problematically, this had been interpreted to mean ‘by what means’ the death took place, rather 
than ‘in what broad circumstances’, which left family members with very little information 
about what had caused their loved one’s death.646 After the ECtHR decisions, the House of 
Lords dubiously held in (a domestic case also called) McKerr that although there was a right 
to an effective investigation of deaths that had occurred before 2000 under the European 
Convention, this right did not exist under the Human Rights Act 1998.647 The decision meant 
that the restrictive interpretation of the Coroners Act was maintained and those who wanted to 
complain about ineffective investigations of deaths that had taken place during the Troubles, 
could only do so by resorting to the European Court.  
 
Despite this originally restrictive interpretation of the law, which perpetuated a lack of 
information and undermined feelings of justice, as time passed, judges started laying the 
foundations for developing a more peace-friendly jurisprudence. Thus, the House of Lords 
ruled in Middleton, a (non-conflict related) case concerned with the investigation of a suicide 
in prison that had taken place before 2000, that an inquest verdict which only focused on the 
means through which someone died was not compatible with Article 2.648 Problematically, the 
two domestic cases – McKerr and Middleton – resulted in an unsustainable state of affairs: 
both were delivered on the same day and were concerned with the State’s procedural 
obligations under Article 2. Yet, one held that there was a duty to investigate a death under the 
Human Rights Act and the other, that no such obligation existed. In practice, this meant that 
family members could be given information about their loved ones’ death, except when the 
death was somehow connected to the NI conflict. Recognising the problems this created, three 
years later in Jordan, the House of Lords relaxed the strict McKerr approach and held that 
although juries in inquests had to deliver a verdict of ‘lawful’ or ‘unlawful death’, nothing 
prevented them from interpreting their mandate more broadly. 649 Finally, in 2011, the UK 
Supreme Court completely abandoned the originally restrictive approach and held that the 
procedural obligations under Article 2 of the Human Rights Act should directly apply to 
conflict-related deaths as well.650 
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A negative reading of this line of cases would see the domestic courts as simply following – 
with much delay and in a very roundabout way – the European Court’s guidance and would 
suggest that the former have not been effective peacebuilding actors. In fact, domestic judges 
have arguably done a lot more than that. Although the House of Lords was initially reluctant 
to adopt a human rights friendly approach, over time, it developed the ECtHR’s jurisprudence 
by applying it in less controversial cases (such as those relating to deaths in custody) and 
gradually expanded its interpretation to cover conflict-related deaths.651 Moreover, as years 
passed, domestic courts addressed with renewed vigour the problematic practices that had been 
identified by the ECtHR and pushed for the reform of the investigation process in novel ways 
that had not been flagged up by the European Court. For instance, domestic case law has held 
that inquests should be prompt,652 secured the granting of legal aid to families653 and ensured 
that adequate document disclosure takes place during the investigations.654 Additionally, in 
cases where the inquest had been concluded before the domestic judiciary revised its position, 
applicants have instigated proceedings to compel the Secretary of State to initiate a new 
investigation655 and challenged decisions of the Director of Public Prosecutions to not 
prosecute suspects and/or refuse to give reasons for this decision.656 Most of these are not issues 
that were directly addressed by the ECtHR, but are nevertheless important in ensuring that the 
conflicts concerning deaths during the Troubles are resolved in a way that promotes justice to 
the greatest possible extent.  
 
Therefore, it was the combined use of domestic and international courts that led to the 
development of this jurisprudence, which in turn, pushed for greater transparency and 
accountability of the State’s actions. On the one hand, had it not been for the ECtHR, the first 
difficult step of finding the original violation would arguably not have been taken. This is 
supported by the fact that when the House of Lords had been asked in another conflict-related 
case whether there was a right to have a solicitor present when someone was being interviewed 
by the police, it held that no such right existed.657 Part of the Law Lords’ reasoning was based 
on the argument that the ECtHR had not yet held that Article 6 of the Convention , relating to 
the right to fair trial, encompasses such an obligation. Similarly in the right to life cases, it is 
unlikely that the domestic courts would have adopted a progressive attitude towards 
investigating past injustices, had the European Court not taken the first step in this direction. 
On the other hand, the gradual adoption of the ECtHR’s case law by the domestic judiciary had 
its own distinct advantages, such as the fact that it developed this guidance further, helped build 
momentum for its implementation by the relevant authorities and brought the provision of 
remedies closer to home. However, calling for better teamwork between the two levels of 
courts, which is what is being proposed here, is a strategy that requires peacebuilders to focus 
not only on judges, but other actors as well. Thus, secondments, exchanges, meetings, 
conferences and joint associations for the staff of domestic and international courts are likely 
to assist in this process.658  
 
IV. The Impact of Timing on the Successful Adjudication of the Conflict 
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While academics have identified courts as potential peacebuilding actors, and therefore 
appreciated their abilities to resolve conflicts,659 little, if anything has been written on when 
judicial intervention should take place in order to be most effective.660 This section argues that 
it makes a difference if the conflict is being adjudicated before or after the signing of a 
comprehensive peace agreement and how much time has passed since the stopping of the 
violence. In instances where a comprehensive peace agreement has been signed, the passage 
of time encourages judicial involvement in the resolution of a dispute. Conversely, where time 
passes in the absence of a peace settlement, judges are less likely to become involved.  
 
A. The Passage of Time in the Absence of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
It is not a coincidence that in the analysis of this chapter, Cyprus offers examples where conflict 
adjudication had the most disappointing results in the promotion of each of the elements of 
peace. Greek and Turkish Cypriots are still divided over fundamental conflicts, which as 
Section II explained, are more difficult to resolve than minor disagreements. This section 
argues that the passage of time since the outbreak of the violence on the island, coupled with 
the failure of the parties to negotiate a comprehensive peace settlement in the meantime, offers 
an additional reason why the adjudication of conflicts has not had positive peacebuilding 
effects. Thus, while courts are anyway ill-suited to resolve zero-sum disagreements, the 
phenomenon is even more heightened when these linger and remain unaddressed for years in 
the absence of a comprehensive peace settlement. 
 
Illustrative of this is the ECtHR decision of Varnava v Turkey, a 2009 case, in which a group 
of GC applicants complained about the lack of an effective investigation following the 
disappearance of their family members during the 1974 Turkish invasion.661 They argued that 
since the missing persons had been last seen either in the custody of Turkish troops or in areas 
under the effective control of the Turkish army, it was the respondent state’s obligation to 
provide information on what happened to them, or if it did not have it, carry out investigations 
to this end.662 Endorsing the applicants’ argument, the ECtHR held that Turkey’s inaction 
resulted in a violation of the procedural aspect of the right to life of the missing persons and a 
separate violation of their families’ freedom from inhuman treatment.663 However, while the 
Court ultimately found in favour of the applicants, confirming its earlier decision in Cyprus v 
Turkey,664 it adopted a reasoning that prevented any other relatives of Cypriot missing persons 
from launching their complaints, thus signalling its clear reluctance to become further involved 
in the adjudication of this conflict. Starting from the controversial premise that even cases of 
continuous violations have a time limit after which they are not admissible, it reasoned that 
applicants cannot wait indefinitely before applying to Strasbourg.665 In such cases, it continued, 
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the burden of proof shifts to the applicants, who have to show that they undertook efforts to 
receive information about their relatives’ whereabouts, and if this was not forthcoming, 
introduced their application to the ECtHR without undue delay.666 Applying these principles 
to the Cypriot context, the Court held that family members should have realised by the end of 
1990 that attempts to investigate their relatives’ disappearances were not underway and brought 
their cases to the Court. The applications of those who did not meet this retrospective deadline, 
who in practice were all potential applicants except the ones in Varnava itself, were rejected 
as inadmissible on grounds of ratione temporis.667  
 
The lack of investigations concerning the fate of missing persons has given rise to fundamental 
conflicts that go to the heart of the Cyprus problem.668 The parties disagree as to whether investigations 
should take place, who should be responsible for these, and who should be considered a victim for the purposes of this 
exercise.
669
 While the ECtHR’s unwillingness to adjudicate this zero-sum dispute is therefore 
understandable, its reasoning in reaching this conclusion is less than persuasive and ultimately 
detrimental to peacebuilding efforts. The main justification for the Court’s 1990 time limit, 
was that the UN Committee on Missing Persons (CMP), a bicommunal body tasked with 
locating the remains of these individuals, had been established in, and remained largely inactive 
since, 1981.670 By 1990 therefore, it should have been obvious that the CMP had not resulted 
in effective investigations and the applicants should have already launched their complaints to 
the ECtHR. Yet, when the Strasbourg Court had previously referred to the CMP in Cyprus v 
Turkey, it had explicitly stated that the Committee could not in itself provide an effective 
investigation.671 While the obligation to investigate the disappearances rested with Turkey, the 
CMP had been established by the UN, was staffed by Greek and Turkish Cypriots and was 
primarily funded by the European Union.672 Moreover, the Committee’s role was to locate and 
identify anonymous graves and return the remains of those who had been exhumed to their 
families.673 Although this was an important task, it did not exhaust Turkey’s obligation to 
investigate the disappearances more generally and could not be used to exonerate it from its 
obligations.  
 
Yet, by relying so heavily on the CMP’s (lack of) performance, and finding future cases 
inadmissible on this basis, this is precisely what the Court did in Varnava.674 When it adopted 
this reasoning, the Court sent a rather confused message as to what actions should be taken, 
and by whom, in order to resolve the conflict of missing persons. As a result, the case is likely 
to have undermined a sense of justice among their relatives since it denied them the opportunity 
to be remedied by the respondent state, simply on the ground that some steps had already been 
taken in this direction by third parties. Finally, contrary to the Court’s assessment that by 1990 
it should have become obvious to the applicants that no additional steps would be taken towards 
their relatives’ recovery, in 1997 the leaders of the two communities adopted a common 
statement in which they agreed to share information about the burial sites of missing persons 
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and in 2004, the Committee resumed its long-delayed work.675 Since then, the CMP has 
located, identified and returned to the families the remains of 569 out of 1508 GC and 184 out 
of 493 missing TC.676 These concrete results that are currently being produced by the 
Committee, confirm the arbitrariness of the Court’s 1990 deadline and further highlight the 
unpersuasiveness of its decision. Most importantly in terms of assessing the case’s 
peacebuilding potential, these positive results in terms of locating the missing, appear to have 
materialised despite, rather than because of, the Court’s decision in Varnava. Assuming that 
the ECtHR’s decision ‘transformed the normative framework within which Turkey acted’,677 
simply because the Court found a violation, oversimplifies and misleads as to the effect of the 
case. 
 
One could make the argument that Varnava simply provides evidence of the fact that the 
ECtHR was reluctant to adjudicate a fundamental conflict, rather than illustrates the Court’s 
unwillingness to become involved because of the passage of time. However, a more in-depth 
reading of this confirms that as time passes, the judiciary does, in fact, become less likely to 
adjudicate such disputes. The importance of the passage of time in Varnava was expressly 
acknowledged by the Court, when it noted that 
In a complex disappearance situation such as the present, arising in a situation of international 
conflict, where it is alleged that there is a complete absence of any investigation or meaningful 
contact with the authorities, it may be expected that the relatives bring the case within, at most, 
several years of the incident.678 
 
The increasing reluctance of the Court to adjudicate long-running fundamental conflicts also 
becomes apparent through its right to property case law in relation to Cyprus. The majority of 
the judges in Loizidou found in 1995 that the applicant’s displacement from her property more 
than 20 years prior did not stop the finding of a violation. Conversely, when the issue was 
revisited in 2010, the Court unanimously declared that the secondary occupiers eventually form 
their own bonds with the properties in question, thus making it ‘arbitrary and injudicious’679 if 
it did not take into account ‘the attenuation over time between the holding of title and the 
possession and use of the property’.680 The Court’s reasoning, while deeply unpopular among 
GC,681 is not completely unreasonable: some TC secondary occupiers have been living in the 
GC properties in question for 45 years and they, many of them not having been born during 
the war, consider these properties their own homes.682 The decision is nevertheless problematic 
because, like Varnava, it sends the message to Turkey that all it has to do in order to legitimise 
past injustices, is wait.683  
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The passage of time does not diminish the need to respond to an injustice that has taken place. 
Providing an adequate remedy helps the victims be reintroduced to the social, political and 
economic life of the country, a necessary condition for each of the elements of peace.684 At the 
same time, a decisive response by the state addresses, not only the harm that has been done to 
the victims, but also to the legal system itself, and makes a break from the oppressive past.685 
Despite these good reasons for resolving lingering conflicts however, the judiciary’s 
unwillingness to become involved in them, which increases when time passes and no peace 
agreement has been signed, is not surprising. When being asked to adjudicate these 
disagreements, the ECtHR finds itself in an impossible situation. It has to do justice to the 
individual applicant, while acknowledging that the case before it is only a small part of a 
political puzzle that is constantly changing as the negotiations progress.686 The best strategy it 
can adopt is decide the case in a way that will benefit the applicant, while also pushing the 
political players to take action and resolve the conflict in a more comprehensive manner. In 
fact, the Court expressly outlined this strategy in Loizidou687 and expressed its disappointment 
that the parties had not found a solution on the political level in Demopoulos.688 As even more 
time passes, yet its proposed strategy continues to be ignored, the judges are left between a 
rock and a hard place: they will either find new cases inadmissible, as the ECtHR did in 
Varnava, thus distancing themselves from the adjudication of the conflict, or they will settle 
for a largely unsatisfactory remedy provided by the respondent state, as it did in 
Demopoulos.689 Both responses are likely to undermine feelings of justice and suggest that the 
passage of time in societies that have not signed a comprehensive peace agreement will bring 
even more clearly to the fore, the limitations of the judiciary in resolving fundamental conflicts.  
 
B. The Passage of Time Since the Signing of the Peace Agreement 
Conversely, where a comprehensive peace settlement has already been signed, the more time 
passes, the more willing the judiciary becomes to adopt an activist stance when asked to resolve 
a conflict. This is firstly, because the passage of time helps transform the agreement from a 
political document that cannot be interfered with, into a legal source that should be interpreted, 
often creatively by judges.690 Secondly, as time passes, conflicts appear that had not been 
foreseen during the negotiating stage; if politicians are unwilling to address these, it often falls 
to the judiciary to take action. And finally, the repetitive adjudication of a conflict can lead to 
the development of judicial reasoning and the consequent adoption of a gradually more activist 
approach by judges. This is particularly so with newly-established domestic courts, which, with 
the passage of time, become more likely to find their footing and deliver more confident 
judgments. However, the greater judicial willingness to adjudicate conflicts does not 
necessarily translate in more successful peacebuilding outcomes. Rather, whether this will also 
result in better guidance towards conflict resolution, and in turn, help promote security, justice 
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or reconciliation, at least partly depends on the two previously discussed factors, namely the 
nature of the conflicts and the types of courts that adjudicate them.  
  
A comprehensive peace agreement requires fine balancing between the demands and interests 
of the different sides to the conflict and is the result of delicate negotiations by politicians, 
members of civil society and the international community.691 As a result, the judiciary is likely 
to hesitate to intervene in such arrangements, and risk upsetting this balance,692 especially if 
these have been approved directly by the public in a referendum.693 The fresher the memory of 
the political process that gave rise to the peace agreement, the less likely judges are to want to 
interfere with its outcome. Conversely, the longer the interval between the original agreement 
and the Court’s action, the greater the legitimacy in its intervention and adjudication of the 
conflict.694 Simply put, the more time has passed, the more willing the judges become to see 
the settlement as a legal document (rather than a fragile political compromise) and therefore 
interpret it accordingly. This dilemma of whether to construe the peace agreement as a political 
or a legal act went to the heart of a divided House of Lords judgment in Re Northern Ireland 
Human Rights Commission.695 Here, the judges had to decide whether the Commission had the 
power to intervene as a third party in judicial proceedings concerning human rights, even 
though it was not expressly allowed to do so by the NI Act 1998, which had set it up. The 
essence of the disagreement therefore, concerned the question of whether the judiciary could 
interpret the NI Act, and the Belfast Agreement that this gave effect to, and potentially create 
in the process, powers, rights or duties that their drafters had not intended or foreseen. The 
lower courts that had heard the case, and the minority of the House of Lords, argued that the 
‘Belfast Agreement was an intensely political act’, which called for a restrictive interpretation 
because  
[m]atters which might easily be thought to be reasonable for inclusion in the Belfast Agreement 
may well not have been included for some political reason not apparent subsequently to lawyers 
who have not been privy to what occurred.696  
 
Conversely, and with ‘almost a whiff of exasperation’, the majority held that although the Act 
did not expressly give the Commission this power, it created an implied one.697 Since it was 
the work of the courts to interpret human rights legislation, any guidance by the Commission 
in the exercise of this duty would be valuable.698 Thus, several years after the signing of the 
Belfast Agreement, the majority of the House of Lords adopted a reasoning that viewed the NI 
Act as a statute that required interpretation, in a way that may not have been possible a few 
years before. 
 
The second factor explaining the increased willingness of courts to resolve conflicts concerns 
the fact that with the passage of time, new disagreements might arise that the drafters of the 
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peace agreement, either had not foreseen or had not realised the full magnitude of.699 Especially 
if the political leaders are unwilling or unable to address these new disputes through the 
political process, it might be that the judiciary, with its ‘relative insulation’ from politics,700 
finds that it has a responsibility to intervene.701 Illustrative of this phenomenon is Sejdić and 
Finci v BiH, Zornić v BiH702 and Pilav v BiH703 in which the ECtHR explicitly cited the passage 
of time as a reason that contributed to its finding of a violation.704 To understand the claims of 
the parties and controversy of the disputes in each of these cases, some knowledge of the 
complex BiH Constitution is necessary. The Constitution establishes a federal government and 
two entities – the Federation of BiH and the Republika Srpska – and divides all political power 
equally between the three Constituent Peoples (the Bosniacs, Serbs and Croats). The House of 
Peoples (the upper chamber of the Legislative Assembly) consists of 5 Serbs from the 
Republika and 5 Bosniacs and 5 Croats from the Federation, while two-thirds of the members 
of the House of Representatives (the lower chamber) come from the Federation and a third 
from the Republika.705 Similarly, the Presidency is made up of 3 members, one from each 
constituent people, with the proviso that the Serb representative comes from the Republika and 
the Bosniac and Croat ones from the Federation.706  
 
Necessary as this protection of the ethnic groups was deemed to be for the ending of the war 
and the promotion of security, it has resulted in two major problems in terms of human rights 
protection. The first is that it purposively excludes the citizens of BiH who do not identify as 
members of one of the three constituent groups, referred to in the Constitution as ‘Others’, 
from exercising their right to be elected in one of these positions. This was the complaint in 
both Sejdić and Zornić, with the applicants in the former being excluded because of their Jewish 
and Roma identities and the applicant in the latter being unable to run for office because she 
did not wish to declare an affiliation with one of the constituent people. The second problem 
is that the Constitution prevents members of constituent peoples living in the ‘wrong’ entity – 
that is, Bosniacs and Croats living in the Republika and Serbs living in the Federation – from 
running for elections.707 This was the complaint of the applicant in Pilav, a Bosniac who was 
excluded from running for office, as long as he continued residing in the Republika Srpska. 
This state of affairs, the ECtHR held in Sejdić and confirmed in the other two cases, results in 
violations of the right to vote and freedom from discrimination.708  
 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected the argument that ethnic group protections and 
the consequent disenfranchisement of the applicants were necessary to maintain peace and 
security in the country. It held, in particular, that while this was a legitimate aim, one that was 
especially important considering BiH’s history, it could not justify the restriction of human 
rights indefinitely. While in the early stages following the signing of the Dayton Agreement, 
the Court might have been willing to accept that the limitation of certain rights was necessary, 
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this argument became harder to accept as more time passed. The Court’s explanation in Zornić 
is worth quoting in full:  
when the impugned constitutional provisions were put in place a very fragile ceasefire was in 
effect on the ground […with its] provisions [being] designed to end a brutal conflict marked by 
genocide and “ethnic cleansing” […] However, now, more than eighteen years after the end of 
the tragic conflict, there could no longer be any reason for the maintenance of the contested 
constitutional provisions. The Court expects that democratic arrangements will be made 
without further delay. In view of the need to ensure effective political democracy, the Court 
considers that the time has come for a political system which will provide every citizen of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina with the right to stand for elections.709 
 
Support for the Court’s position that the passage of time made judicial intervention even more 
pressing was provided by the fact that the decision had been preceded by three failed attempts 
to negotiate the amendment of the Constitution.710 This can be perceived as evidence of 
unwillingness on behalf of the politicians to resolve the fundamental conflict, which in turn 
legitimised the ECtHR’s decision to intervene and provide additional incentives for action 
through the finding of a violation. Further, during the period between the signing of the Dayton 
Agreement and the Court’s decisions, several international bodies, such as the Venice 
Commission, had examined the Constitution’s provisions, deemed them to be problematic and 
suggested alternatives that were in line with human rights.711 This preparatory work that took 
place over two decades, and on which the Court relied heavily in all three cases, increased the 
judges’ confidence, both in adjudicating the conflict and finding that the BiH Constitution was 
in violation of the European Convention. 
 
The analysis here should not be taken to suggest that the passage of time made the Court’s 
decisions ‘good’ ones or that the guidance it provided when delivering its judgments 
necessarily contributed to peacebuilding efforts. It merely proposes that as time passes, the 
judiciary becomes more likely to adjudicate the conflict in question; whether this will also 
promote peace depends on the ability of the judiciary to address the conflict at hand.712 In this 
case, since the conflict was a fundamental one, the Court’s interventions have arguably not 
been very constructive. In fact, the rulings in Sejdić, Zornić and Pilav, which essentially ask 
the parties to return to the negotiating table and amend the BiH Constitution, risk undermining 
the fragile settlement that prevents the eruption of violence in the country.713 In all three cases, 
the respondent government had argued that the ethnic quotas in the Constitution were necessary 
to end ‘one of the most destructive conflicts in recent European history’ and therefore 
paramount to ‘the establishment of peace and dialogue between the three main ethnic 
groups’.714 Implying that the passage of time since the end of the hostilities made the 
maintenance of peace and dialogue a less pressing aim, the ECtHR rejected this argument.715 
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However, what is missing from the judgments is an explanation as to why the ethnic protections 
were necessary in the first place.716 Since this was not clear, the Court’s subsequent argument 
– namely that the passage of time made this protection less essential – became even more 
difficult to support. The absence of a persuasive reasoning could send the message that BiH 
elites should amend the Constitution simply because the ECtHR said so, rather than because 
there are good reasons for it, and reduces the possibility that its adjudication will contribute to 
the resolution of this fundamental conflict.717 
 
The final factor that explains the judiciary’s willingness to adjudicate conflicts when some time 
has passed since the signing of the peace agreement, concerns the phenomenon of repetitive 
litigation. It is not unlikely that over a period of a few years, usually domestic courts, will be 
asked to adjudicate the same, or a similar dispute, more than once. In such instances, when 
courts are given several opportunities to respond to the conflict, they tend to take into account 
the effects of their first decision, develop their reasoning and provide more constructive 
guidance in subsequent ones. Domestic judges, who are after all members of the society that is 
being affected by the conflict, are particularly likely to adopt this approach if their original 
decision has not been received favourably by academics, members of civil society or the public 
at large.718 This analysis rejects the characterisation of the judge as a ‘social eunuch’, someone 
who is completely detached from the consequences of the judgments s/he delivers.719 It also 
makes room for the possibility that newly established courts, which are often set up as part of 
the peacebuilding process, might need some time to determine their relationship with the other 
branches of government, deliver judgments that potentially go against the preferences of 
political elites, and develop case law that empowers them to provide guidance for the resolution 
of divisive conflicts.720 This is especially so in contexts where domestic judges need, and 
receive, additional human rights training, or when they start engaging in an institutional 
dialogue with international human rights bodies, such as the ECtHR.721 
 
The peacebuilding effects of the continuous litigation of a single dispute over several years are 
illustrated through the developing jurisprudence of the UK House of Lords with regards to the 
obligation to investigate deaths that had taken place in NI during the Troubles. As the analysis 
in the preceding section suggests, while the Court originally adopted a restrictive interpretation 
of the applicability of the Human Rights Act, it completely reversed its approach over a seven-
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year period, when it delivered four judgments on this issue. During this time, academics 
questioned the persuasiveness of the first decision, applauded the judicial change of direction 
in the second, and urged for further clarity following the third.722 As a result of this evolving 
case law, today, UK authorities have a clear guidance about the steps they must take in order 
to ensure that a conflict-related death has been duly investigated. In turn, compliance with the 
Court’s decisions, promotes accountability and is a step towards ensuring that the injustices of 
the past will be addressed.  
 
Another example of the peacebuilding effects of continuously litigating a conflict over time 
arises through the case law of the BiH Constitutional Court, when it was asked to judicially 
review the decisions of the High Representative, who is responsible for overseeing the 
implementation of the Dayton Agreement.723 Despite being staffed by unelected international 
officials, the Office of the High Representative has been given a wide range of powers, 
including the power to pass legislation and fire civil servants.724 Problematically, especially in 
light of the fact that the international community’s objective was to build a democratic BiH, 
the High Representative remains completely unaccountable for any of his decisions or 
actions.725 The BiH Constitutional Court had originally developed a wholly deferential 
approach that found any challenges to the High Representative’s decisions as inadmissible, 
thus perpetuating this unacceptable state of affairs.726 Over time however, it revised its 
approach and held that the inability to judicially review the decisions of the High 
Representative, constituted a violation of the right to an effective remedy under Article 13 of 
the European Convention.727 In turn, this pronouncement of the Court sent the message that 
BiH was slowly and gradually moving away from the extra-ordinary state of affairs of being 
ruled by an unaccountable international official and increased a sense of justice among those 
who were directly affected by his decisions.  
 
The three factors that have been outlined above suggest that the passage of time in cases where 
a comprehensive peace settlement has already been reached, is likely to encourage the judiciary 
to adopt an activist approach. Whether the Court’s reasoning can also provide useful guidance 
for the resolution of the conflict, depends not only on the passage of time itself, but on other 
factors as well, such as whether the disagreement is a fundamental or a minor one and if the 
body hearing the dispute is a domestic or an international court. Thus, the ECtHR’s reasoning 
in the BiH voting cases, has been unable to promote peace for the simple reason that the Court 
attempted to resolve a (fundamental) conflict that it was ill-suited to deal with. Conversely, the 
House of Lords’ judgment in Re Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission was both 
persuasive and relatively uncontroversial because the case was concerned with a minor conflict 
that merely required the interpretation of a statute, rather than the taking of a political stance 
on a divisive issue. This is also the case with the BiH Constitutional Court decisions on the 
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High Representative; they might have been ill-received by the High Representative himself,728 
but they were open-and-shut-cases in terms of applying established ECtHR case law to the 
uncontested facts on the ground.  
 
V. Conclusion 
This chapter has been concerned with the question of whether the adjudication of human rights 
can contribute to conflict resolution and consequently, to peacebuilding efforts. It has argued 
that the success, or otherwise, of the judiciary to resolve conflicts depends on three factors: the 
type of conflict that is being adjudicated; whether the court reaching the decision is a domestic 
or an international one; and the signing of, and amount of time that has passed since, the 
comprehensive peace agreement. When these factors are taken seriously, they point to practical 
lessons that peacebuilders can adopt so that human rights adjudication can more effectively 
lead to the building of peace. In particular, since fundamental conflicts are best resolved 
through a political process, peacebuilders should focus their efforts and resources on lobbying 
and encouraging politicians to reach a mutually agreed compromise. This lesson becomes even 
more pressing in cases where a fundamental conflict remains unresolved for a long period of 
time. If there is a comprehensive peace agreement in place, the court will be more willing to 
intervene, which in cases of fundamental conflicts like the ones adjudicated in Sejdić, Zornić 
and Pilav, risks destabilising the post-violence society. At the same time, in the absence of a 
peace agreement, even a refusal to become further involved, as was the case in Demopoulos 
and Varnava, can result in confusing guidance for the resolution of the conflict and undermine 
a sense of justice among the applicants and others in a similar position.  
 
Conversely, since courts are well-suited in adjudicating and successfully resolving minor 
disagreements, peacebuilders should adopt steps that strengthen domestic bodies, which are 
likely to hear the bulk of these cases. For instance, training should be provided to judges and 
lawyers, with emphasis on lower instance courts; class action suits should be allowed and 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms should be considered; legal aid must be made 
available to applicants; and domestic institutions should adopt procedures and evidentiary rules 
that make them as accessible as possible to individuals in post-violence societies. Finally, while 
domestic courts are likely to decide most cases that are concerned with minor conflicts, 
international courts generally lead the way in adjudicating test cases relating to more 
controversial or divisive disputes. Thus, if peacebuilders have decided that the best way to 
resolve a conflict is through human rights adjudication, they are advised to continue pursuing 
this strategy all the way to the ECtHR, or potentially another international human rights body 
available to them, rather than give up after a negative response to their complaint from the 
domestic courts.  
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Chapter 5 – Promoting Objective Peace  
Through Human Rights Implementation 
 
I. Introduction 
Implementing human rights – whether these are in the form of judicial decisions or laws – can 
help resolve conflicts and promote peacebuilding efforts in post-violence societies.729 For 
example, protecting the rights to property and life can have a real and positive impact on 
building objective peace by remedying war victims and promoting justice and reconciliation,730 
or by investigating past crimes and enhancing security.731 In addition to the specific 
contributions that the protection of each right can make, depending on the conflict it responds 
to, a post-violence society that regularly complies with its human rights obligations is likely to 
have a more promising peacebuilding trajectory for a number of other reasons. First, the strict 
implementation of human rights leaves less discretion to nationalist politicians or civil servants 
and makes it more difficult for them to act as spoilers.732 Second, following the signing of a 
peace agreement, which often refers to human rights, people expect to see a real change in their 
lives.733 The enforcement of human rights promises sends a clear message that such a change 
will materialise, increases the public’s confidence in, and legitimises, the new state of affairs.734 
Third, the continuous implementation of human rights decisions and policies is likely to result 
in a virtuous cycle, whereby the introduction of one peacebuilding strategy can make it easier 
to introduce additional ones.735 Finally, respecting human rights promotes a sense of security 
among the population by showing that the executive’s power is not exercised arbitrarily and is 
less likely to be abused in the future.736  
 
At the same time however, the best known limitation of human rights is that they often remain 
unenforced and therefore, effective only on paper.737 This general critique also affects the 
extent to which they can contribute to conflict resolution efforts in post-violence societies, with 
Putnam, for instance, arguing that peacebuilders should avoid ‘human rights cheerleading’ and 
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start working towards their enforcement on the ground.738 The most frequently cited 
explanation for this limitation of human rights is the fact that ‘the vast majority of states lack 
the requisite political will to effect transformative transitions.’739 This chapter argues that 
peacebuilders are right in considering political willingness to implement human rights as an 
important condition for the success of peacebuilding operations.740 Yet, overly focusing on this 
conclusion can result in crude peacebuilding strategies, like giving excessive legislative and 
enforcement powers to international officials in an attempt to circumvent the challenges posed 
by local spoilers. Instead, peacebuilders should nuance their understanding of the relationship 
between human rights implementation and the building of peace, which will contribute to the 
adoption of more effective responses when the former is not forthcoming. One way of doing 
this is by appreciating that political willingness is a matter of degree and that peacebuilding 
efforts might be undermined even if there is some, but not a sufficient amount, to induce 
comprehensive reforms. Another, is by acknowledging that political willingness to implement 
human rights is only one of the factors that leads to the promotion of peace. Equally important 
is the specific way in which the human rights-inspired laws have been drafted and the extent 
to which their provisions can effectively address the conflicts in question. A third consideration 
is that the public bodies that oversee the enforcement of human rights laws have the 
independence, power, resources and expertise to undertake this task successfully.  
 
Peacebuilders have already started identifying these considerations as important. 
Consequently, over the years, they have shifted their attention from vague human rights 
pronouncements to robust mechanisms that ensure their enforcement in practice.741 However, 
in addition to pinpointing to the factors that affect the peacebuilding potential of human rights, 
it is also essential to understand how the absence of each, specifically affects conflict resolution 
efforts. Undertaking this exercise is necessary because the lack of political willingness, 
problematic legislative drafting and the establishment of an ill-equipped implementing body 
are distinct challenges, with each calling for a different peacebuilding response. The chapter 
concludes by examining two such responses, namely the involvement of the international 
community and the strengthening of civil society. The two responses can address the problem 
of political unwillingness to induce positive change by exerting international or grassroots 
pressure for the enforcement of human rights in a way that will promote peacebuilding 
objectives. Concurrently, they can help tackle some of the more technical difficulties by 
offering expertise and through the sharing of good practices, both in terms of drafting new 
laws, and creating the appropriate institutions for their successful implementation. Yet, while 
the two responses can encourage human rights enforcement and contribute to successful 
conflict resolution, they should be used with caution because they also risk having detrimental 
effects on peacebuilding efforts. 
 
II. The Importance of Political Willingness to Implement Human Rights  
                                                 
738 Ibid, 255. 
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Initiative, From Rights to Remedies, 16. 
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The most commonly cited reason for why states do not comply with their human rights 
obligations is that they do not want to. Assertions that ‘political will remains the most important 
factor for the successful implementation of human rights judgments’,742 that human rights 
abuse ‘is almost always caused by purposeful disobedience by actors who choose defection 
from the rules’,743 or that human rights implementation takes place because of the 
‘government’s willingness to respect the human rights of citizens’ are commonplace in the 
literature.744 These arguments are largely persuasive and examples abound where non-
implementation of a human rights decision or law was due to the lack of political willingness 
to act, which, in turn, resulted in negative peacebuilding effects.745 Thus, Bar-Tav is right that 
political elites play an important role in this respect, both because they can get things done and 
because their endorsement of human rights initiatives can encourage in-group members’ 
support for the peacebuilding process.746 At the same time however, the relationship between 
willingness to implement human rights and their ability to promote peace is not a binary one. 
Rather, it is a matter of degree and in instances where there is some willingness to enforce 
human rights, but only to a limited extent, partial compliance with the post-violence society’s 
legal obligations might result in no, or even negative, peacebuilding effects.  
 
Illustrative of the simple observation that political will to implement human rights can have 
positive peacebuilding effects, while its absence might result in negative outcomes, are two 
ECtHR cases, one against the RoC and the other against BiH, concerning violations of the right 
to vote and freedom from discrimination. In the first case, Aziz v Cyprus, a TC applicant 
complained that he was prevented from participating in the 2001 RoC parliamentary election 
on the grounds of his ethnicity.747 Finding a violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 3 (Article 3-
1) of the European Convention, the ECtHR ordered the RoC authorities ‘to implement such 
measures as they consider appropriate to fulfil their obligations to secure the right to vote in 
compliance with this judgment’.748 Since Article 3-1 only safeguards ‘the free expression of 
the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature’, the RoC could have complied with 
its human rights obligations under the Convention by merely amending the law concerning 
parliamentary elections. Yet, despite the existence of internal nationalist voices, the Republic 
went further than the strict requirements of the right and passed legislation that allowed TC 
residing in the RoC-controlled areas to vote in the presidential, parliamentary and municipal 
elections. 749 The electoral law also allows TC to run as candidates in the parliamentary and 
municipal elections, but not the presidential one.750 These developments were further bolstered 
in 2014 when a new legislative amendment allowed all TC with a RoC identity card – whether 
residing in the Republic-controlled areas or not – to participate in the elections of the European 
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Parliament.751 The 2019 elections marked the first time ever when a TC was elected to the 
European Parliament and the first time since 1963 that a TC was elected into an official post 
of the Republic.752 
 
In best case scenarios, the implementation of human rights is likely to result in amendments to 
laws, practices and institutions, all of which are necessary to promote objective peace in the 
post-violence society. Additionally, these can be the first step towards changing the living 
conditions and perceptions of the people and therefore, also developing feelings of subjective 
peace. For example, Aziz led to the amendment of the electoral law, which allowed TC residing 
in the RoC-controlled areas to become involved in the democratic process for the first time in 
decades and sent the message that they are equal citizens of the Republic. In practical terms, 
this was significant because it enfranchised TC, who by voting in RoC elections, impliedly 
rejected Turkey’s rhetoric that only an independent ‘TRNC’ can protect their interests, and 
promoted feelings of reconciliation.753 Moreover, as a result of the amendment, TC who are 
politically active in the RoC have an incentive to, and are given the opportunity to communicate 
with, the GC public directly and explain their community’s concerns. It is only through 
discussions such as these that each side can understand the other’s point of view and 
reconciliation can start being promoted on the island. TC who decide to run for elections in the 
RoC, do so because they imagine and work towards a united Cyprus. They are among the most 
vocal supporters of peace between the two communities and their empowerment can show to 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots alike that there is an alternative to the more dominant nationalist 
views expressed within both communities.754  
 
Contrasting the positive peacebuilding effects of Aziz’s implementation in Cyprus, is the 
inaction of the BiH government following Sejdić and Finci v BiH,755 which more than 10 years 
after the ECtHR’s decision, remains unenforced.756 The international community’s response to 
Sejdić has been momentous: reports and suggestions for its implementation have been 
published by the UN Human Rights Council,757 the Venice Commission,758 the Parliamentary 
                                                 
751 The Election of Members of the European Parliament Law of 2014 (10(I)/2004), as Amended by 35(I)2014. 
752 Euronews, ‘EU Elections 2019: Country-by-country Full Results’ 28 May 2009. 
753 Ibrahim Aziz, Ibrahim Aziz v Republic of Cyprus, Series of Lectures ‘The People Behind Judicial Decisions’ 
(Nicosia, University of Cyprus, 26 November 2016). 
754 Yiannis Papadakis, ‘Nation, Narrative and Commemoration: Political Ritual in Divided Cyprus’ (2003) 13 
History and Anthropology 253. 
755 Sejdić and Finci v Bosnia and Herzegovina App no 27996/06 (ECtHR, 22 December 2009). For a detailed 
discussion of this case, see ch 4.IV.B. 
756 Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees, Communication from Bosnia and Herzegovina Concerning the Case 
of Sejdic and Finci v Bosnia and Herzegovina (Application No. 27996/06) for the 1288th Meeting of the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, DH-DD(2017)380 (Sarajevo, BiH Ministry of Human Rights 
and Refugees, 2017). 
757 UN Human Rights Council, National Report Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of the Annex to 
Human Rights Council Resolution 16/21: Bosnia and Herzegovina, A/HRC/WG6/20/BIH/1 (New York, UN 
General Assembly, 8 August 2014).  
758 Venice Commission, Opinion on the Constitutional Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Powers of 
the High Representative, CDL-AD(2005)004 (Strasbourg, Council of Europe, 2005); Venice Commission, 
Opinion on Different Proposals for the Election of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, CDL-AD(2006)004 
(Strasbourg, Council of Europe, 2006). 
 112 
Assembly of the Council of Europe,759 non-governmental organisations760 and academics.761 
Additionally, its implementation has been made a condition for BiH’s EU accession process, 
something repeated frequently by European officials.762 They sometimes cajole the BiH elite 
by promising that implementing the decision and joining the EU will have concrete positive 
economic consequences for the country.763 On other occasions, they have issued warnings that 
non-enforcement can ‘potentially undermine the legitimacy and credibility of the country’s 
future elected bodies’764 and that continued non-compliance with the ECtHR judgment will be 
financially detrimental to BiH.765  
 
As a result of this international pressure, BiH elites have been involved in a series of 
negotiations with the ultimate objective of amending the Constitution. In fact, since the 
discriminatory effects of the electoral provisions were identified by the Venice Commission in 
2005, these negotiations had been underway even before Sejdić was decided.766 So far, three 
sets of suggestions – the April Package in 2006, the Prud Process in 2008 and the Butmir 
Process in 2009 – have been debated by BiH politicians, without however resulting in any 
concrete results.767 While Bosniacs, who make up the largest of the three ethnic groups, are 
pushing for the reduction of minority protections and the creation of liberal institutions,768 
Serbs and Croats are keen to preserve, and even increase, their ethnic group representation in 
federal structures.769 These diametrically opposed positions have not changed since Sejdić’s 
delivery. Thus, in 2013, BiH politicians agreed on the ‘principles for finding an agreement’ to 
this constitutional conundrum, but subsequent negotiations fizzled out due to the inability of 
the parties to compromise.770 In 2016, political parties sought to postpone the local elections 
until an agreement could be reached on Sejdić’s implementation and the relevant laws could 
be amended, but with no consensus among them, these were ultimately held on schedule.771  
 
The prolonged non-compliance with the ECtHR’s decision, despite the international 
community’s pressure for implementation, reflects the ‘absence of political will among the key 
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761 Edin Hodzic and Nenad Stojanović, New/Old Constitutional Engineering? Challenges and Implications of the 
European Court of Human Rights Decision in the Case of Sejdić and Finci v BiH (Sarajevo, Analitika Centre for 
Social Research, 2011). 
762 European Commission, Bosnia and Herzegovina 2013 Progress Report, SWD(2013) 415 final (Brussels, 
European Commission, 16 October 2013). 
763 European Commission, Bosnia-Herzegovina – EU: Deep Disappointment on Sejdić-Finci Implementation 
(Brussels, Council of Europe, 18 February 2014). 
764 Committee of Ministers, Interim Resolution, CM/ResDH(2013)259 (Strasbourg, Council of Europe, 22 
December 2009). 
765 In 2013, and as a result of Sejdić’s non-implementation, the EU launched a procedure that would reduce the 
funding received by BiH through the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance by 54% (i.e. €47 million). 
(European Commission, Bosnia and Herzegovina 2013 Progress Report.)  
766 Venice Commission, Opinion on the Constitutional Situation in Bosnia, [80].  
767 Parliamentary Assembly, The Functioning of Democratic Institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
768 Christopher McCrudden and Brendan O’Leary, Courts and Consociations: Human Rights Versus Power-
Sharing (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013) 132.  
769 International Crisis Group, Bosnia’s Gordian Knot, 7.  
770 European Stability Initiative, Lost in the Bosnian Labyrinth: Why the Sejdić-Finci Case Should Not Block an 
EU Application (Berlin/Brussels/Instanbul, European Stability Initiative, 2013), 2.  
771 Freedom House, ‘Nations in Transit – Bosnia and Herzegovina Country Profile’, available at 
freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2017/bosnia-and-herzegovina. 
 113 
actors to seriously address the issue’.772 Problematically, this lack of political will for reform 
extends far beyond the electoral system. The international community was faced with similarly 
uncooperative actors, when, for instance, political elites demoted local officers who worked 
towards the reform of the police, and replaced them with others who were more willing to serve 
their own agendas.773 Highlighting the importance of political willingness in this respect, the 
US Department of Justice noted that ‘the success of foreign assistance in promoting democratic 
policing is directly proportional to the country’s enthusiasm for it.’774 Undoubtedly, the lack 
of enthusiasm to implement human rights and reform problematic institutions has undermined 
peacebuilding efforts in the country. The parties’ inability to reach a commonly agreed-upon 
compromise confirms (and further cements) the chasm between them and the sense of 
insecurity that one creates towards the other.775 Moreover, the nationalist rhetoric that 
accompanies every failed attempt to negotiate constitutional amendments or implement police 
reform, damages efforts to promote reconciliation. At the same time, and more specifically in 
relation to Sejdić’s non-enforcement, the ongoing disenfranchisement of a portion of the BiH 
population undermines justice. Finally, the maintenance of the current electoral provisions, 
which guarantee reserved seats to specific ethnic groups at the expense of others, and the 
insistence among political elites that this ‘pluralisation of ethnocracy’776 is necessary for ‘the 
establishment of peace and dialogue’,777 has an additional negative impact on reconciliation. It 
sends the divisive message that a constructive and safe political debate can only take place 
when people are represented by members of their ethnic group and ignores the detrimental 
effects that separating a population into pre-determined categories can have on efforts to 
develop a common national identity.778 
 
The Cypriot and Bosnian voting cases confirm expectations that political willingness to 
implement human rights can promote peace, while its absence can have the opposite effect. 
Yet, the relationship between the two is more complex than this binary schema suggests, since 
it is not the case that the implementation of every human rights policy or decision leads to the 
promotion of peace. At times, human rights might be implemented, without this resulting in 
successful conflict resolution, while on other occasions, their enforcement can even impact 
peacebuilding efforts in a negative way. These instances are usually characterised by some 
political willingness to implement human rights that is not however, sufficient to induce a sense 
of security, justice and reconciliation. Ultimately therefore, political willingness is a matter of 
degree and if there is some, but not enough of it, this can hamper, rather than promote conflict 
resolution. 
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An example of this, where enforcement of human rights did not promote justice and 
reconciliation, concerns the half-hearted efforts to protect the TC’s right to property in the 
RoC-controlled part of Cyprus.779 Greek and Turkish Cypriots had been living scattered around 
the island of Cyprus until the outbreak of the 1974 Turkish invasion, which resulted in a 
forcible population transfer and the geographic segregation of the two communities.780 While 
under the ‘TRNC’ Constitution, GC displaced persons abandoned their properties in the north 
and therefore have no legal title to them,781 the RoC claims that TC who left their properties in 
the south of the island remain the rightful owners.782 However, the claim continues, it is 
necessary for the ‘Custodian’, who is the RoC Minister of the Interior, to manage and protect 
these properties on behalf of TC until ‘the end of the abnormal situation in Cyprus’.783 Despite 
the seemingly altruistic motives of the RoC legislation, the legal impossibility of opting out of 
this system of protection meant that, in practice, TC were prevented from accessing and 
controlling their properties, which resulted in possibly rights-violating situations. Thus, in 2010 
the RoC introduced a series of amendments to the law that made it possible for TC to apply for 
the return of their properties and opt out of the Custodianship regime.784 These amendments 
were the result of a case, Sofi v Cyprus, that had been submitted to the ECtHR by a TC 
complaining about a violation of her right to property.785 Recognising the vulnerability of its 
own legislation and presumably afraid that Sofi would be detrimental to its international 
reputation, the Republic settled and committed to amend the Custodianship provisions.786 
Kazali v Cyprus, a TC attempt to challenge this amended state of affairs as still being in 
violation of the right to property, was found to be inadmissible by the Court.787  
 
Despite the ECtHR refusing to find that the amended Custodianship regime violates human 
rights, the current legal framework is unlikely to promote feelings of peace among the TC 
population. Since 2010, all TC can technically apply to acquire control of their properties, but 
in fact, very few have been successful.788 When the Custodian considers lifting his powers from 
a specific property, he takes a number of factors into account that, in practice, restrict access 
to justice for TC. For instance, it is extremely unlikely that a TC who permanently lives in the 
non-RoC controlled area of the island, will be successful in his/her application.789 Moreover, 
in most situations where the Custodianship has been lifted, this was done on the condition that 
the property would be immediately sold, either to a GC buyer or to the RoC itself, thus 
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preventing TC from using their properties as they see fit and feeling truly remedied.790 A sense 
of injustice is further heightened by the fact that even in situations where the property has been 
returned, no applicant has so far received any compensation for loss of use of his property from 
1974 until today.791 However, a remedy that only applies to a small minority of potential 
applicants and is provided under such strict conditions, even if it has in principle been approved 
by the ECtHR, cannot contribute to successful conflict resolution. These limitations of the 
Custodianship legislation, and its consequent failure to promote peace, are not accidental. 
Rather, they stem from the fact that the RoC government is unwilling to allow TC to return to 
their houses, while the properties of GC in the occupied areas are still unavailable to them.792 
Thus, despite some willingness on behalf of the RoC to comply with human rights in order to 
safeguard its international reputation, this was not present to a sufficient degree to make a real 
difference to feelings of justice among TC.  
 
An additional way in which human rights may negatively affect conflict resolution efforts is 
when states comply with them only partially, a phenomenon that has not received the attention 
it deserves among peacebuilders. States partially comply with a human rights decision, if they 
unduly delay its implementation, adopt measures that do not address the essence of the 
violation, or respond to some part, rather than the whole, of the Court’s judgment.793 One 
explanation for this is that they might be prepared to take some action in redressing human 
rights violations, such as pay the financial award required by the judgment, but lack sufficient 
political willingness to engage in comprehensive reform,794 like adopt any general measures.795 
Since the payment of compensation to a single applicant is less politically controversial than 
adopting far-reaching legislative or institutional changes, political willingness for the former 
is likely to be greater than for the latter. Yet, if comprehensive reform does not accompany the 
payment of compensation, this is unlikely to be an effective conflict resolution strategy.796 
Thus, although partial compliance is usually seen as a positive development since the 
respondent state has taken at least some steps in the correct direction,797 it does not always 
follow that this also promotes peacebuilding efforts.  
 
An example of a state’s partial compliance with a human rights decision, and the detrimental 
peacebuilding effects that followed, is Turkey’s response to Loizidou, in which the ECtHR held 
that the presence of Turkish troops and the legislative framework in the occupied part of 
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Cyprus, prevented the applicant from using her property and constituted a violation of Article 
1 of Protocol No. 1 (the right to property).798 While the ECtHR ordered in 1998, the payment 
of compensation amounting to approximately 450,000 Cypriot pounds within three months,799 
Turkey refused to comply with the judgment for years, until this was finally paid at the end of 
2003.800 Equally problematic was the fact that Turkey compensated Ms. Loizidou at the same 
time as maintaining that the Court’s decision was mistaken.801 Considering that the payment 
of compensation generally signifies an apology on behalf of the respondent state,802 the delay 
and Turkey’s public statements possibly undermined feelings of justice, both of the applicant 
herself and the thousands of GC who identified with her plight. Moreover, this has been 
worsened by the fact that although Loizidou is the first of a number of identical cases where 
the Court found a violation of the right to property, Turkey explicitly stated that the payment 
of compensation in this case did not set a precedent for all subsequent ones.803 As a result, most 
victims whose case was heard, and a violation was found by the ECtHR, after Loizidou remain 
unremedied to this day.804  
 
Finally, Turkey complied with the specific measures ordered by the Court in Loizidou, but is 
still ignoring its obligations in relation to more comprehensive reforms. This point has been 
made by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which noted that ‘payment of 
just satisfaction, although it is a great step forward in the implementation of the judgment of 
1998, still does not, in fact, implement the basic context of the decision’.805 Ms. Loizidou’s 
complaint was that the presence of Turkish troops in the non-RoC controlled areas of Cyprus 
prevented her from using and enjoying her property. Since this state of affairs continues, 
despite the payment of compensation, partially complying with the decision has not promoted 
security, justice or reconciliation within the GC community.806 Turkey’s political willingness 
to implement at least part of the judgment related to its efforts to push its EU accession process 
forward,807 and had little to do with building peace in Cyprus. Thus, while there was some 
                                                 
798 Loizidou v Turkey (Merits) App no 15318/89 (ECtHR, 18 December 1996), [63] and [64]. 
799 Loizidou v Turkey (Article 50) App no 15318/89 (ECtHR, 28 July 1998). 
800 Committee of Ministers, Resolution Concerning the Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 28 
July 1998 in the Loizidou Case against Turkey ResDH(2003)190 (Strasbourg, Council of Europe, 2 December 
2003). 
801 BBC News, ‘Turkey Compensates Cyprus Refugee’ 2 December 2003. 
802 Dinah Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law (2 edn, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006) 
16-17. 
803 BBC News, ‘Turkey Compensates Cyprus Refugee’.  
804 See, eg, Strati v Turkey App no 16082/90 (ECtHR, 22 September 2009) and Committee of Ministers, Interim 
Resolution: Execution of the Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in the Cases Varnava, Xenides-
Arestis and 32 Other Cases against Turkey, CM/ResDH (2014)185 (Strasbourg, Council of Europe, 25 September 
2014).  
805 Parliamentary Assembly, Implementation of Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights by Turkey, 
Resolution 1381 (Strasbourg, Council of Europe, 22 June 2004), [5]. The Court also implicitly acknowledged the 
fact that Turkey implemented only part of the judgment when it stated in a subsequent case that ‘individuals 
claiming to own property in the north may, in theory, come to the Court periodically and indefinitely to claim loss 
of rents until a political solution to the Cyprus problem is reached.’ (Demopoulos and Others v Turkey App no 
46113/99 (ECtHR, 1 March 2010), [111].) 
806 Supportive of this are the Pinheiro Principles, which expressly provide that ‘States shall demonstrably prioritize 
the right to restitution as the preferred remedy for displacement and as a key element of restorative justice.’ (UN 
Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Housing and Property Restitution in the 
Context of the Return of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons, E/CN4/Sub2/2005/17 (Geneva, United 
Nations, 28 June 2005), Principle 2.2.) 
807 Ioannis Grigoriades, The Trials of Europeanization: Turkish Political Cutlure and the European Union 
(Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2009) 80. 
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willingness to protect human rights, this was not present to a sufficient degree to also lead to 
conflict resolution within the post-violence society.  
 
Partial compliance with human rights does not only take place when decisions are delivered by 
international courts. Delays, for instance, have also been observed when BiH authorities were 
expected to implement domestic legislation and remedy victims for harm they suffered during 
the war.808 The BiH legislature has passed a series of laws in this respect, such as the 2004 Law 
on Missing Persons, which establishes a Fund for support of the families of missing persons,809 
and the 1999 Law on Principles on Social Protection, which includes provisions that seek to 
remedy ‘civilian war victims’ and those who were made disabled during, and by, the war.810 
Despite the existence of these legal provisions however, few of them have been implemented 
so far, which has resulted in a ‘dismaying contrast between the advancements that have been 
achieved on paper […] and what has actually changed for war victims on the ground.’811 The 
ECtHR made note of these delays in a 2014 judgment, when it referred to the Missing Persons 
Fund and the Central Record of Missing Persons, which had still not been established, some 
10 years after the passing of the relevant Law.812 Yet, ignoring the demands of such a 
symbolically powerful category of stakeholders for a long period of time and delaying the 
remedying of past injustices, has undoubtedly had detrimental effects on peacebuilding efforts 
in that it has prevented the intended beneficiaries from leaving the conflict behind them.813 
 
III. The Devil is in the Detail: The Importance of Careful Drafting 
Since political willingness to implement human rights and political willingness to promote 
peace often coexist, but are not identical, it is best that when peacebuilders draft human rights 
legislation, they connect its provisions to the specific objectives of security, justice or 
reconciliation they are trying to achieve. This strategy of ensuring that human rights contribute 
to the building of peace by explicitly linking the two is so obvious that is almost tautological, 
yet it has often been ignored by peacebuilders, with detrimental effects for the post-violence 
society. Two examples, one from BiH and the other from SA, serve to illustrate this point. In 
the first example, the drafters of the BiH legislation did not articulate its objectives clearly, 
which sent confused messages to intended beneficiaries about the promotion of justice. 
Conversely, the objectives of the SA law were well-defined, but the specific legislative 
provisions intended to give effect to them, were such that they could not achieve the intended 
goals, even if these were perfectly implemented. Both examples contrast to Section 75 of the 
NI Act 1998, which is more likely to contribute to conflict resolution, since it both clearly 
articulates its intended peacebuilding objectives, and creates specific duties on public 
authorities that can make them a reality. These examples suggest that for a human-rights 
inspired law to become an effective peacebuilding tool, it cannot only consist of vague 
                                                 
808 There is no well-accepted definition of war victims in BiH. They include, inter alia, victims of international 
crimes and their families, relatives of missing persons and victims of sexual violence, with their numbers 
calculated to be in the tens of thousands. (Kate Clark, War Reparations and Litigations: The Case of Bosnia, 
International Litigation Series No 1 (Amsterdam, Nuhanovic Foundation Center for War Reparations, 2014), 11.)  
809 Law on Missing Persons (Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina Law No. 50/2004), Art. 15.  
810 Law on Principles of Social Protection, Protection of Civil Victims of War and Protection of Families with 
Children (Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina Law No. 36/1999), Art. 54.  
811 Clark, War Reparations and Litigations, 53.  
812 Mujkanović et al v Bosnia and Herzegovina App. no 47063/08 (ECtHR, 3 June 2014), [41]. Notably in this 
case the ECtHR refused to find a violation because although the state authorities had delayed setting up the 
relevant institutions, they had not been completely inactive. 
813 Peter Van der Auweraert, Reparations for Wartime Victims in the Former Yugoslavia: In Search of the Way 
Forward (Geneva, International Organization for Migration, 2013), 13.  
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standards and principles; rather, its provisions should be precise and tailored to achieve the 
peacebuilding goals that shaped it in the first place.814 
 
Reference has already been made to the BiH legislature’s attempts to remedy war victims 
through the establishment of the Missing Persons Fund. The previous section argued that the 
Fund has not contributed to peacebuilding efforts because of delays in its establishment. Yet, 
even if the Fund had been set up on time, it might still have been ineffective in promoting a 
sense of justice because of the legal requirements that war victims would have to satisfy in 
order to benefit from it. For instance, the 1999 Law on Principles of Social Protection that 
makes war victims entitled to social benefits, applies not only to them, but also to other 
categories of recipients, such as the elderly, the unemployed, orphans and disabled people who 
are unable to work.815 In addition to applying to a wide range of beneficiaries, a series of 
provisions limit the right of war victims to claim compensation by making its payment 
conditional on factors that are not related to their victim status per se. So, the compensation 
received by the spouse of a person who died as a result of the war is conditional on her not 
marrying again,816 and the payment made to a family member caring for someone who was 
made disabled by the war is stopped whenever the person is temporarily placed in institutional 
care.817 
 
These provisions send the message that the objective of the 1999 Law is not really to remedy 
war victims and therefore, undo as much as possible the injustices of the past. Rather, its 
objective seems to be the establishment of a social safety net for all categories of vulnerable 
people in the country, irrespective of whether their vulnerability is causally linked to the war. 
However, while both are valuable causes, the two should not be conflated. If post-violence 
justice is to be promoted, the response of the state must directly connect to, and address, those 
injustices that were caused by the violence itself, and not consider the victim’s circumstances 
since then.818 A widow, whose husband was killed during the war, and who remarried at a later 
stage, is no less of a victim than someone who has decided not to do so. Likewise, a war victim 
should be entitled to a remedy for the harm s/he has suffered, regardless of whether that person 
has prospered financially since the said injustices took place. It might be the case that a poor 
war victim, or a single parent, is in need of greater assistance from the state, and this should 
indeed be provided, but not by stripping a more affluent beneficiary from his or her victim 
status. A remedy, in the form of compensation or otherwise, is not just a way of providing 
material assistance from the state, but has symbolic significance since it acknowledges the 
harm suffered by the recipient.819 Precisely because that harm is distinct from the difficulties 
faced by other vulnerable groups in the society, if the objective of the state is to promote post-
violence justice, the provisions of the law should reflect this.820 Thus, by merging its different 
responsibilities – remedying war victims on the one hand, and protecting members of 
vulnerable groups, on the other – the state failed to send a clear message that the necessary 
                                                 
814 Urban Jonsson, ‘A Human Rights-Based Approach to Programming’ in Paul Gready and Jonathan Ensor (eds), 
Reinventing Development? Translating Rights-Based Approaches from Theory into Practice (London, Zed 
Books, 2005), 52. 
815 Clark, War Reparations and Litigations, 27. 
816 Law No. 36/1999, Art. 76.  
817 Ibid, Art. 74. 
818 Linda Popić and Belma Panjeta, Compensation, Transitional Justice and Conditional Credit in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina: Attempts to Reform Government Payments to Victims and Veterans of the 1992-1995 War 
(Amsterdam, Nuhanovic Foundation, 2010). 
819 Brandon Hamber and Richard A. Wilson, ‘Symbolic Closure through Memory, Reparation and Revenge in 
Post-Conflict Societies’ (2002) 1 Journal of Human Rights 35, 44.  
820 Clark, War Reparations and Litigations, 29. 
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steps have been taken to promote post-violence justice, rather than social justice in a more 
general sense.  
 
Equally important to being clear about the peacebuilding objectives of human rights legislation, 
is ensuring that the content of specific legislative provisions is such that their implementation 
will lead to the achievement of these goals. It is necessary in other words, that the aims of the 
Act that are often expressed in its preamble or policy papers that preceded it, accurately 
translate into, and are reflected by, the nitty-gritty of the law itself. If this does not happen, 
even the perfect implementation of the law will not contribute to the resolution of the conflict, 
which it claims to address. This has been the case with the Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment (B-BBEE) programme in SA, whose stated objective is to empower those 
whose race had prevented them from accessing the country’s productive resources and 
developing their skills during apartheid.821 The scheme was implemented ‘in order to promote 
the achievement of the constitutional right to equality’,822 an objective which was expected to 
contribute to the development of all three elements of peace. Such a programme was necessary 
for the promotion of security, the Department of Trade and Industry argued when launching B-
BBEE, because wealth disparities, especially when coupled with a history of racism, resulted 
in socially and politically unstable societies and could pose a threat to democracy.823 B-BBEE 
was also associated with the promotion of justice, since its adoption was a direct response to 
the injustices stemming from apartheid policies,824 and reconciliation, which would be 
enhanced by empowering those who had been marginalised in the past.825  
 
B-BBEE was first introduced with the passing of the B-BBEE Act [53 of 2003], which requires 
that all public bodies comply with Codes of Good Practice issued by the Minister of Trade and 
Industry.826 The Codes have to be followed when public bodies issue licenses, are involved in 
the sale of state-owned enterprises or enter into partnerships with the private sector,827 and 
essentially provide that ‘black enterprises’ and ‘black empowered enterprises’ are given 
preferential treatment.828 ‘Black enterprises’ are those that are 50,1 per cent owned by black 
individuals, while ‘black-empowered enterprises’ are 25,1 per cent-owned by blacks.829 A 
‘black person’, according to the Act, ‘is a generic term which means Africans, Coloureds and 
Indians.’830 The objective of these provisions is to create government-supported incentives for 
the empowerment of black individuals in a country, where all positions of power had 
                                                 
821 President Mbeki declared that the B-BBEE Act would ‘promote the interests of the disadvantaged black 
community through job creation and skills development.’ (Quoted in Roger Tangri and Roger Southall, ‘The 
Politics of Black Economic Empowerment in South Africa’ (2008) 34 Journal of Southern African Studies 699, 
713-4.) 
822 B-BBEE Act [53 of 2003], Preamble. 
823 Department of Trade and Industry, South Africa’s Economic Transformation: A Strategy for Broad-Based 
Black Economic Empowerment (Pretoria, Department of Trade and Industry, 2003), [1.6]-[1.7]. 
824 Department of Trade and Industry, The National Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Summit: A 
Decade of Economic Empowerment, 2003-2013 Summit Report (Pretoria, Department of Trade and Industry, 
2013), 7.  
825 B-BBEE Commission, Strategy of the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Commission, 2017-2021 
(Pretoria, Department of Trade and Industry, 2017). 
826 B-BBEE Act, Section 10. (The 2003 Act has since then been amended by the B-BBEE Amendement Act [46 
of 2013], which has retained the basic provisions and processes of its predecessor.) 
827 Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act [53 of 2003], Section 10.  
828 Elizabeth A. Hoffman, ‘A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: Discrimination against the Majority Undermines 
Equality, While Continuing to Benefit Few under the Guise of Black Economic Empowerment’ (2008-2009) 36 
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce 87, 94. 
829 Department of Trade and Industry, South Africa’s Economic Transformation, Appendix B – Definitions of 
Black Empowerment Entities, para. 1 and 2 respectively.  
830 B-BBEE Act, Section 1.  
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historically been held by whites. Thus, the B-BBEE Act theoretically promotes equality among 
racial groups and contributes to each of the elements of peace by ensuring that a sizable 
proportion of managerial positions in companies that comply with the scheme is held by 
blacks.831 In turn, this racialised understanding of trickle-down economics, is expected to 
accommodate ‘the needs of the masses’ by involving blacks in the wealth generation process.832 
 
This scheme has, by and large, been a failure. While in principle, its objective is to promote 
equality, which, in turn, will help build peace in the country, more than 15 years since the 
passing of the B-BBEE Act, and despite the country’s considerable wealth, SA has a gini 
coefficient of 0,69, one of the highest in the world.833 This failure is not because the Act has 
not been properly implemented; rather, it is because despite pronouncements to the contrary, 
its legislative provisions are not, in fact, concerned with the promotion of security, justice or 
reconciliation. The rhetoric of B-BBEE might claim that all SA are equal, but the detail of the 
law suggests that those select few who have the skills and connections to be appointed to the 
management boards of large corporations, are more equal than others. In a country with more 
than 27 per cent unemployment,834 what would have empowered the masses and allowed them 
to overcome the economic injustices of apartheid, is the creation of new jobs and the provision 
of proper training to the unemployed.835 Yet, B-BBEE did not create – and was not designed 
to create – any new jobs. Instead, it produced a tiny group of ‘black diamonds’, mega-rich 
black people sitting as directors or holding shares in multiple black or black-empowered 
companies, while doing nothing to address the injustices faced by the general public.836 As 
Tangri and Southall put it, it is difficult to see ‘how deals involving extremely wealthy and 
well-connected persons can possibly be called empowerment deals.’837 No matter how 
successfully the provisions of the Act are implemented therefore, their content will always 
make them unable to promote any of the elements of peace.  
 
The BiH and SA statutes contrast with the equality legislation in NI, which both clearly 
articulates its peacebuilding objectives and includes provisions that when implemented, can 
successfully promote these. This is partly because the relevant provisions of the NI Act are the 
development of previous equality laws, the rationale and drafting of which, politicians have 
revisited over the years, in order to make more effective. The first attempt to promote equality 
was the passing of the NI Constitution Act 1973, which made it unlawful for public authorities 
to discriminate, or aid someone to discriminate, against another person on the grounds of 
religious belief or political opinion.838 This Act had done little to enhance security, justice or 
reconciliation among the population, as evidenced by the continuation of the violence until the 
                                                 
831 The scheme is not legally binding and as a result, companies that are not relying on government contracts, such 
as those in the tourism and retail industries, have not complied with it. (Tangri and Southall, ‘The Politics of Black 
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Act of 2003, No 36928 (Pretoria, Department of Trade and Industry, 2013), [4.1] and [4.2]). 
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end of the 1990s. Among its deficiencies was the fact that it was largely confined to direct 
discrimination in the religio-political context and therefore, only applied to a very limited 
number of cases.839  
 
Since then, there has been a growing appreciation that what is needed to build peace in NI is 
the adoption of broader policies of equality.840 Thus, although the provisions of the 1973 Act 
have been included, almost unchanged, in the NI Act 1998,841 they have also been substantially 
reinforced through the addition of legal duties that seek to mainstream equality. In particular, 
Section 75 of the 1998 Act has two broad objectives, both of which are clearly articulated and 
directly connect to peacebuilding efforts. Section 75(1) seeks to promote justice by creating an 
obligation on public authorities ‘to have due regard to the need to promote equality of 
opportunity’, and Section 75(2) enhances reconciliation through the duty to promote ‘good 
relations between persons of different religious belief, political opinion or racial group’. It is 
encouraging that over the years, there has been an increasingly nuanced understanding of how 
these duties connect to each other and to peacebuilding efforts more generally. While originally 
there existed an assumption that the promotion of equality of opportunity was almost 
synonymous to the promotion of good relations,842 it has now been appreciated that the two 
might also contradict with each other.843 This insight, which suggests that sometimes, distinct 
measures will have to be adopted for the promotion of each objective, directly mirrors the 
mechanics of the proposed definition of peace. 
 
Also important is the fact that the law has been drafted in such a way that, when implemented, 
its provisions can indeed contribute to these articulated objectives. Schedule 9, which includes 
detailed guidelines for the enforcement of Section 75, requires that all public bodies adopt 
equality schemes that explain, using timelines and numerical goals, how they will promote 
equality through their operations.844 The consultation procedure that should precede the 
drafting of each equality scheme, requires input from non-governmental organisations, such as 
community groups, pressure groups, and unions.845 It is, of course, not the case that the mere 
existence of the objectives under Section 75 and the clearly drafted procedure in Schedule 9, 
will in themselves help build peace. As the following section suggests, for that to happen, it is 
also necessary that the Equality Commission for Northern Ireland (ECNI or Commission), that 
has been tasked with reviewing the public bodies’ actions under Section 75, has, among others, 
the power to properly respond to cases of non-compliance with the Act.846 In this respect, the 
drafting of the 1998 Act can be improved further, since although Schedule 9 creates an 
obligation on public authorities to review their equality schemes within five years of their first 
                                                 
839 Christopher McCrudden, ‘Mainstreaming Equality in the Governance of Northern Ireland’ (1998-1999) 22 
Fordham International Law Journal 1696, 1705. 
840 Colin Harvey, ‘Contextualised Equality and the Politics of Legal Mobilisation: Affirmative Action in Northern 
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841 NI Act 1998, Section 76. 
842 The inter-dependence of equality and good relations was articulated in the NI Programme of Government, 
quoted in Joanne Hughes and Caitlin Donnelly, ‘Community Relations in Northern Ireland: A Shift in Attitudes?’ 
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844 NI Act, Schedule 9, Section 2.  
845 Ibid, Schedule 9, Section 9(2); McCrudden, ‘Mainstreaming Equality’, 1771.  
846 NI Act, Schedule 9, Section 1(a).  
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submission and inform ECNI of the outcome of this review,847 it is not clear what, if anything, 
the Commission must do with this information.848 By and large however, Section 75 has been 
drafted in such a way that when enforced, its peacebuilding contribution is likely to be a 
positive one.  
 
IV. Looking Beyond the Wording of the Statute: Human Rights Bodies and their 
Powers 
Additional factors that influence the implementation and peacebuilding potential of human 
rights are the independence, powers, expertise and resources of the institutions responsible for 
their enforcement.849 The importance of human rights institutions in the peacebuilding process 
has already been acknowledged both in the theoretical literature and seminal UN reports. Bell, 
for instance, explains the failure of the Dayton Agreement to promote peace in BiH by 
highlighting the fact that negotiators ‘gave little thought to institutional questions of 
implementation’ of human rights.850 Even more explicit is Parlevliet, who concludes that ‘if 
human rights are to have meaning beyond the paper they are written on, conflict transformation 
must involve the development of legitimate, independent and capable institutions’.851 
Similarly, the UN notes that ‘[e]ffective strategies for building domestic justice systems will 
give due attention to laws, processes (both formal and informal) and institutions (both official 
and non-official).’852 This section confirms these findings, suggesting that two post-violence 
societies may adopt laws with similar objectives and wording, but the different characteristics 
of human rights institutions in each, will affect the level of compliance with these provisions. 
It moreover, makes the point that the inability of an institution to comply with its mandate can 
result in non-compliance, but more often, tends to manifest as partial compliance. After all, 
‘[l]ow capacity state bureaucracies struggling to understand and comply with international 
rules are unlikely to be utterly incompetent and devoid of resources.’853 This conclusion 
deserves attention because, as it has been argued in Section II, partial compliance can be as 
detrimental to peacebuilding efforts as the complete lack of implementation. 
 
Supporting the argument that the characteristics of human rights institutions play an important 
role in conflict resolution, is the contrast between the implementation of similar policies, 
adopted in SA and NI. In both instances, past injustices had resulted in inequalities in the 
workplace among different religious and racial groups, with the two policies being attempts by 
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the respective governments to respond to these.854 Both laws impose positive duties on 
employers to promote equality in the workplace and task a specific institution to ensure that 
these duties are properly enforced. In SA, the Employment Equity Act [55 of 1998] applies to 
designated employers, who are defined as those who employ more than 50 people or are a 
public authority.855 It creates an obligation on them to implement affirmative action 
measures,856 ensuring that suitably qualified members of the designated groups857 have equal 
opportunities and are equitably represented in high-ranking occupational categories in the 
workforce.858 Employers must describe these affirmative action measures in Employment 
Equity Plans,859 which are reported to the Department of Labour, either on an annual or bi-
annual basis, depending on the employer’s size.860 Similarly, in NI, the Fair Employment and 
Treatment Order (FETO or Order) 1998 creates an obligation on entities employing more than 
10 individuals861 to report to ECNI the ‘community’ of their employees862 and, in cases where 
the numbers suggest that members of one community are not enjoying ‘fair participation’ in 
employment, suggest the adoption of affirmative action as a response to this problem.863 In 
both societies, the enforcement bodies – the SA Department of Labour and ECNI – have powers 
to ensure that employers comply with their obligations and impose penalties, if they do not. 
The main substantive difference between the two schemes is that, while the SA law allows for 
the adoption of quotas in order to encourage the employment of those who fall within the 
designated groups,864 the NI Order explicitly prohibits the use of this method and relies on 
softer measures.865  
 
Despite similarities in the two pieces of legislation, they have in fact, resulted in very different 
outcomes. On the one hand, the (SA) Employment Equity Act has mostly been unsuccessful in 
achieving its objective to ‘promote the constitutional right to equality’.866 Between 1997, the 
year before the Act came into operation, and 2006, the only designated race group whose 
employment rate increased was African,867 yet this was also the only group that had a negative 
growth rate in its salary during the same period.868 By 2016, the percentages of whites in 
                                                 
854 The preamble of the SA Act makes explicit reference to apartheid and to the need to address the inequalities 
that were created because of past discriminatory practices. Moreover, the ANC expressly linked the promotion of 
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managerial and skilled positions continued decreasing slightly compared to previous years,869 
but the labour market remained segmented, with the majority of blacks and coloureds being 
employed by the government, and most private company skilled positions being retained for 
whites and Indians.870 Conversely, the (NI) FETO has had positive results, with the gap 
between Catholics in monitored employment and those available for work, consistently 
dropping year after year.871 Employment equity has been promoted in all industries, with cases 
of near total segregation becoming much rarer.872 Most impressively, while in 2000 the 
majority of firms in the services sector were highly segregated, by the end of the decade a near 
majority had mixed workforces.873 It appears therefore, that the NI Order has promoted an 
objective sense of justice to a greater extent than the SA Act. These differences are arguably 
not the result of disparities in political willingness to protect human rights and cannot be 
explained by differences in the drafting of the two pieces of legislation. Rather, they have to 
do with the independence, powers and strategies adopted by the enforcement body in each 
society.  
 
Both the SA Department of Labour and ECNI have been tasked with ensuring that employers 
adopt measures that encourage the occupation of underrepresented groups, and in both 
instances, ‘employers’ include not only larger private companies, but also governmental 
departments as well. In order for a body to monitor whether this is, in fact, happening and take 
action against those who are not complying with their statutory duties, it is necessary that it is 
itself independent from those it supervises.874 The UN has argued that such ‘institutional 
independence’ requires legal and operational autonomy from other governmental bodies,875 
independence in terms of the institution’s funding876 and appointment and dismissal of its 
members.877 On the one hand, ECNI enjoys such independence, since it is itself a ‘non-
departmental public body’,878 its funding is regulated by the statute that established it,879 and 
its members, who are directly appointed by the Secretary of State, have tenure.880  
 
Conversely, while an independent Commission for Employment Equity has been established 
by the (SA) Employment Equity Act,881 this has a more limited role that ECNI, since its 
functions are restricted to advising the Minister of Labour on the drafting of Codes, regulations 
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and policies on matters concerning the Act.882 The more day-to-day implementation of the 
equality legislation is left to labour inspectors,883 who are employees of the Ministry of Labour, 
and do not therefore enjoy any of the independence that is necessary for them to fulfil their 
functions.884 In this regard, it may be unsurprising that in 2005, it was reported that 25 
municipalities, 13 provincial government departments, nine national government departments, 
the SA Parliament and the Director of Public Prosecutions did not submit their Employment 
Equity reports to the Department of Labour.885 This failure to comply with reporting obligations 
does not necessarily provide evidence of high-level political unwillingness to implement the 
law. Rather, it could stem from underfunding of these institutions, which prevents them from 
carrying out all their statutory duties, or alternatively, from resistance to comply with the Act 
by individual (mid-level) spoilers. The fact remains however, that the lack of independence of 
the Department of Labour from some of the very institutions it is tasked to review, as they are 
all parts of the executive, results in possible conflicts of interest. In turn, this makes it less 
likely that the Department will push for the protection of the right to equality and contribute to 
the promotion of justice in the process.  
 
The second factor that affects an institution’s ability to successfully implement human rights 
is whether it has been given sufficient powers to undertake its task – and understands itself as 
being in possession of these. ‘Power’, according to the UN’s guidance, ‘refers to the ability of 
a national institution to perform a certain act or to compel such performance by an individual 
or other entity’ and includes ‘the imposition of legal and administrative sanctions when the free 
exercise of a national institution’s powers is obstructed.’886 Whether such power is adequate 
depends on the functions that the institution has to perform,887 which in this case are quite 
comparable between the two jurisdictions. In SA, the Department of Labour has to ensure that 
employers are ‘implementing affirmative action measures to redress the disadvantages in 
employment experienced by designated groups, in order to ensure their equitable representation 
in all occupational categories and levels in the workforce.’888 Similarly, ECRI is responsible 
for ‘eliminating discrimination based on religion or political opinion, and promoting greater 
equality [in the workplace] between all sections of the population in Northern Ireland’.889 
Arguably however, neither the powers given to the SA Ministry of Labour, nor the way it has 
interpreted these, are sufficient to meet the Act’s objectives and ‘promote equality in the 
workplace’.890 Since the duties listed in the Employment Equity Act only apply to public bodies 
and private companies that employ more than 50 people,891 the vast majority of employers – 
88 per cent of companies, which contribute 33 per cent to the gross domestic product – do not 
have to report to the Department of Labour at all, or adopt any affirmative action measures.892 
As a result, both the Department’s powers of obtaining an accurate picture of the levels of 
employment equity in the country and the impact of the Act, through seemingly far-reaching 
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positive obligations, are curtailed. This is in contrast to the powers of ECNI, which can monitor 
the employment practices of all companies that employ 10 people or more, and has even 
encouraged smaller entities that do not officially have to comply with FETO, to follow its 
recommendations.893 
 
Also problematic in this respect, is the fact that the SA Ministry of Labour has interpreted its 
powers narrowly to include just the collection of information about the measures adopted by 
the designated companies, rather than also engaging with this information in a productive 
manner. As a result, it has failed to offer guidance to individual designated employers on the 
best way to promote equality in the workplace, missed the opportunity to facilitate the sharing 
of good practices and left employers guessing what steps they should be adopting in order to 
comply with their statutory obligations. Thus, companies have received no help from the 
authorities when being called to draft and implement their Employment Equity Plans,894 which 
has arguably resulted in the adoption of inadequate or inappropriate affirmative action 
measures.895 Similarly lacking, is the guidance from Ministry officials to designated employers 
on a one-to-one basis. Although Ministry officials are empowered under the Act to carry out 
inspections of designated employers,896 very few of these have actually taken place in 
practice.897 Even in one case where such an inspection had taken place, the Labour Court held 
that the Department’s recommendation with regards to the filling of the Equality Employment 
Plan was ‘cryptic’ and did not offer the employer in question any meaningful guidance.898 
 
An equally narrow interpretation of its powers has been adopted by the (SA) Commission for 
Employment Equity. While the 1998 Act created a responsibility on the Commission to draft 
Codes of Good Practice that would provide guidance to employers,899 the first ‘Draft Code of 
Good Practice on the Preparation and Implementation of Employment Equity Plan’ was only 
published in 2016.900 This provides broad recommendations that could be useful to employers 
when drafting their Plans,901 but many of these had already been included in the Act itself,902 
other parts are excessively general,903 and no mention is made of affirmative action examples 
that have already proven effective and could be adopted by employers. Finally, there seems to 
exist little guidance as to the specific goals that employers should be working towards. The 
Commission has the power to report to the Minister of Labour ‘well-researched norms and 
benchmarks for the setting of numerical goals in various sectors’, yet, no such benchmarks or 
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goals are included in the Code of Good Practice.904 Instead, the Commission’s Annual Reports 
rely on statistics, divided by gender and race, of the economically active population of SA and 
merely state that employers should use these as guides of what to strive towards.905 No 
acknowledgement is made of the fact that because of past injustices, members of certain groups 
may be better trained for highly skilled positions than others, which shifts the responsibility to 
the employers to attract and retain those few, sought-after individuals who have both the 
expertise to do the job and the racial profile to meet the Act’s demands.906 However, the 
authorities’ neglect to provide any practical guidance on how best to comply with the Act, 
makes it more likely that employers will either ignore their obligations altogether, or adopt 
little thought-out affirmative action measures in order to get this exercise over and done with. 
 
In contrast, ECNI interpreted its powers very differently and has, as a result, produced detailed 
recommendations on the best ways of promoting equality in the workplace. In turn, this has 
made it easier for employers to meet their obligations and promote greater employment equity, 
and therefore justice, in the country. Thus, the Commission encourages employers to consult 
with it, if they have any questions about the monitoring process or the types of affirmative 
action measures they can adopt.907 This one-to-one consultation is additional to the already 
detailed guidance that is provided in ECNI’s Code of Practice, which includes information both 
about the employer’s monitoring obligations and the adoption of affirmative action measures, 
if these are deemed necessary. For instance, the Code explains who is to be considered an 
employee of a company,908 how employers are to collect information about their employees’ 
‘community background’ and what they should be careful about when undertaking this task,909 
while also offering examples of affirmative action measures that employers can consider.910 
Finally, compared to the methodology adopted in the SA Annual Reports, the NI Code of 
Practice relies on a more nuanced understanding of what employers should be striving towards. 
It notes that 
[w]hat is not required is that the proportionate distribution of Protestants and Roman Catholics in 
the population as a whole should be automatically reflected in every job category, occupation or 
position in each undertaking throughout the province. That is quite unrealistic; and obviously it is 
accepted that the realities of each specific location need to be addressed in framing appropriate 
affirmative action measures.911 
 
In addition to guiding employers, attention should be paid to the powers of enforcement bodies 
to ensure that their decisions are complied with. In both countries, the respective institutions 
can impose fines on those that do not respect their statutory obligations912 and also resort to 
courts when employers ignore their recommendations.913 In NI, an employer’s failure to respect 
his reporting obligations or follow ECNI’s guidance are criminal offences, which carry heavy 
fines that increase every day the non-compliance continues.914 Moreover, in case a public 
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authority does not follow the law, ECNI has the power to send a report to the Minister the 
authority reports to, who in turn must ensure that it fulfills its statutory obligations.915 At the 
same time, ECNI can enter into voluntary, but legally binding agreements concerning the 
affirmative action measures that will be adopted by individual employers.916 These agreements, 
which avoid the inconvenience, cost and delay of formal investigations and the need to apply 
to the Employment Tribunal in case of non-compliance,917 have been taken seriously by 
employers and resulted in the adoption of effective strategies promoting fair participation in 
the workplace.918 Conversely, the Ministry of Labour in SA, which until recently, had 
exclusively relied on fines in order to encourage implementation, commands more limited 
enforcement powers. Before the adoption of a 2013 amendment, these fines were insubstantial, 
and unlike those imposed by the Competition Commission in the country, did not reflect the 
employer’s turnover and could not be gradually increased.919 As a result, especially large 
companies were not deterred by the threat of a fine and some even budgeted for such a 
possibility,920 which reflected the lack of seriousness with which they viewed their statutory 
obligations. It remains to be seen whether the 2013 amendments (that increased the maximum 
fine for an offence and altered the method of calculation to take into account the employer’s 
turnover) will contribute to the effective implementation of the Act and the promotion of justice 
in the country.921  
 
The final factor that affects human rights enforcement is the overall strategy that the relevant 
institution adopts. For instance, affirmative action, particularly where this includes the use of 
quotas, as in the case of SA, is controversial and likely to result in pushback from middle-
management employees, who are usually both the ones asked to implement such policies and 
those who have the most to lose by empowering the competition.922 Thus, especially when 
strong enforcement powers are absent, it makes more sense to convince, rather than coerce, 
employers and employees to comply with their statutory obligations. This was the approach 
adopted from the outset by ECNI, which argued that ‘[e]quality of opportunity in employment 
makes good business sense. It broadens the recruitment base and widens the choice of 
personnel; it also enhances the probity of a company’s personnel practices and improves 
corporate image.’923 Conversely, the original approach adopted by the Commission of 
Employment Equity, was to coerce employers in carrying out their duties under the Act,924 
disregarding the fact that it did not have the necessary powers or financial resources to police 
them into action.925 Perhaps acknowledging the failure of its strategy, the Commission has 
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more recently started emphasising the fact that ‘Transformation Makes Business Sense’926 and 
opted to award employers that excel in capturing the true spirit of the Act’s objectives, rather 
than merely punish those that ignore it.927 Notably, this reflects a change in the strategy, rather 
than powers of the Commission, which could ‘make awards recognising achievements of 
employers in furthering the purpose of this Act’ from its inception, but chose not to.928  
 
The ability to devise and carry out an effective implementation strategy depends both on the 
expertise of those staffing the relevant institution and the resources that are available to them.929 
For example, choosing to monitor only procedural compliance with statutory obligations could 
reflect a lack of resources and adequate expertise to ensure substantive implementation of the 
law, rather than disinterest in the protection of human rights and promotion of the objectives 
of the Act. It is, after all, not a coincidence that the biggest and most successful human rights 
institutions in the world have been established in developed countries of Europe, North 
America and Australiasia.930 Governments experiencing severe economic difficulties, which is 
often the case with post-violence societies, are likely to opt for less ambitious implementation 
strategies, because these may be the only ones they can afford. As McAuliffe put it when 
exploring the limitations of certain institutions in inducing socio-economic change in post-
violence societies, ‘[h]owever willing may be the spirit, the flesh interpreted in terms of power, 
organizational capacity and know-how, is weak’.931 In this respect, ECNI is unique since its 
location in Europe and constitutional status as a UK public body, have provided it with 
considerable funding and expertise.932 As a result, it has been able to adopt an in-depth 
assessment of each employer’s affirmative action plan and substantively engage with it. It has 
also stressed the importance of employers liaising with it when reviewing their recruitment, 
training and promotion practices, and informed them of its duty to assist and offer advice to 
them during this process.933 This contrasts with the approach adopted in SA, where Ministry 
officials have expressly cited strict budgetary restraints as the reason for their strategic decision 
to focus on procedural, rather than substantive compliance.934  
 
V. Strategies for Better Human Rights Implementation  
The conditions outlined in Sections II, III and IV are significant because the reason that a 
human rights law or policy is unable to help build objective peace – in other words, whether 
its non-implementation is due to lack of political willingness, bad legislative drafting or limited 
institutional capacity – affects the response that peacebuilders should adopt.935 Two of the most 
popular responses in such situations are the involvement of the international community936 and 
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strengthening of civil society,937 with one imposing outside pressure for the implementation of 
human rights and the other pushing from the grassroots up. This section examines both 
strategies and argues that each can assist peacebuilders in distinct ways, depending on the 
challenge being addressed. If the problem is lack of political willingness, the international 
community can exert pressure on unwilling politicians to support the human rights policy. In 
such instances, civil society organisations can also push for human rights implementation 
through lobbying or mass demonstrations, thus increasing political costs for actors that refuse 
to support peacebuilding initiatives. Alternatively, if the problem is a practical one, such as 
deficient drafting of the law or limited capacity of domestic institutions, both the international 
community and civil society organisations can help by providing technocratic expertise to 
policy makers, or by supporting the enforcement body itself.938 The lens through which the 
involvement of the international community and strengthening of civil society organisations 
are examined here, should not be taken to mean that these can only be understood as responses 
to failures to adequately implement human rights. In fact, both strategies are valuable in their 
own right, with international actors, for instance, contributing more generally to peacebuilding 
efforts by providing financial assistance,939 and civil society organisations promoting conflict 
resolution through the creation of safe spaces where members of different groups can 
interact.940 Such peacebuilding effects notwithstanding, this section assesses the contributions 
of each strategy only in terms of offering support for the implementation of human rights.  
 
The term ‘civil society’ encapsulates several stakeholders that are not directly operating within 
the political process, such as activist non-governmental organisations, lobby groups, religious 
movements, the media, and research institutions, like think tanks and universities.941 
Conversely, it is less clear what is meant by ‘international community’ since the term 
incorrectly implies the existence of a unified group of actors. In fact, the ‘international 
community’ consists of states and organisations with often conflicting interests and different 
agendas,942 which might even be at odds with the best interests of the post-violence society 
itself.943 The distinction between the two strategies – involving the international community 
and strengthening civil society – is also not always clear-cut.944 Over the years, there has been 
an emergence of a ‘global civil society’,945 which includes local civil society with connections 
to international organisations, such as the UN, the EU, NATO and the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).946 Through this process of ‘glocalization’, well-
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organised and well-funded civil society groups act as a medium between the local and the 
national, but also the national and the global, which suggests that often, the two responses 
explored here go hand in hand.947 This is a valuable insight because purely citizen-driven civil 
society organisations that have no support from the state or the international community, rarely 
have an impact beyond the local level.948  
 
The extent of the international community’s involvement in assisting peacebuilding efforts 
ranges from context to context. While for instance, its presence in BiH was, and remains, 
keenly felt by the people, the transition in NI has been almost exclusively powered by domestic 
peacebuilders.949 However, even countries with mostly local peacebuilding initiatives, have 
been indirectly influenced by the agendas of international organisations, such as the World 
Bank, which make their funding conditional on this.950 It should be acknowledged from the 
outset that it is not the case that the greater the international community’s intervention, the 
more likely the promotion of security, justice and reconciliation.951 To the contrary, 
international involvement, especially when it is as direct and intrusive as in BiH, should be a 
measure of last resort, or should not be used at all, since it risks stifling local peacebuilding 
initiatives or making them forever dependent on international aid.952 Both dangers have 
arguably materialised in BiH, where fears that nationalist politicians would obstruct 
peacebuilding efforts, including ‘the promotion and respect of human rights’,953 led to the 
creation of the Office of the High Representative.954 The High Representative is an 
international official who was made responsible for the civilian implementation of the Dayton 
Agreement, a mandate that he is still operating under today. While in theory, the High 
Representative’s primary objective is to render his Office obsolete by ensuring that the 
Agreement is being enforced without his assistance, his powers were considerably expanded a 
mere few months after he started operating. From 1996 onwards, this appointed (and 
unaccountable) international official has been empowered to pass any legislation he considers 
necessary in both the entity and federal levels, and dismiss elected officials whose actions he 
considers to be contrary to peacebuilding efforts.955 The High Representative has used these 
powers extensively, especially in the early years after the war.956 This was often necessary, 
precisely because of unwillingness on behalf of politicians or technocrats to implement human 
rights policies, but overreliance on these powers has arguably undermined the peacebuilding 
process. Although it was easier in the short term for international peacebuilders to override the 
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elected representatives and take decisions themselves, this has had negative long-term 
consequences.957 Bosnian politicians quickly learned that if the situation got dire or urgent 
enough, the High Representative would intervene, while they could watch by, criticising any 
necessary action he took, without engaging in inter-ethnic cooperation or suffering any political 
cost themselves.958 This has arguably created a vicious cycle whereby the international 
community has locked itself in BiH, since the continuous intervention of the High 
Representative in everyday politics has stopped political elites from developing the skills and 
incentives to run the country on their own, in an effective and responsible manner.959  
 
Additionally, while good intentioned, the practices of the High Representative have on certain 
occasions, themselves been in violation of human rights, thus compromising a sense of justice 
among the population. For instance, after avoiding becoming involved in the adjudication of 
this conflict for years, the BiH Constitutional Court held in AP-953/05 that the High 
Representative’s practice of dismissing officials from their positions without providing them 
with an opportunity to explain their actions, or compensating them in any way, was in violation 
of the right to an effective remedy.960 In a move that resembled more dictatorial regimes than 
the democratic and peaceful state that the international community was trying to build in BiH, 
the High Representative issued a statement threatening that  
any step taken by any institution or authority in Bosnia and Herzegovina to establish any 
domestic mechanism to review the Decisions of the High Representative will be considered an 
attempt to undermine implementation of the civilian aspects of the Dayton Peace Accords and 
treated accordingly.961  
 
Arguably, this response has given nationalist voices a legitimate reason to complain about 
international intervention, and delegitimised other peacebuilding initiatives the High 
Representative had supported in the country.962  
 
Despite the dangers of excessive international intervention, it has also proven to be an 
invaluable aid in the enforcement of human rights and the building of peace in BiH. Perhaps 
no other instance exemplifies this better than attempts to protect the right to property, which 
remained unsuccessful for years, because of both the political unwillingness and technocratic 
challenges that surrounded its implementation. The eventual success of this human rights 
initiative becomes even more obvious because of a change in strategy that took place in 1999, 
which resulted in a clear ‘before and after’ picture.963 With this in mind, the ‘before’ picture is 
a rather bleak one: in the early stages after Dayton, the international community’s strategy was 
to encourage returns of displaced persons in areas where this was considered safe, but actively 
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discourage them in others, where it was believed that the conditions were not ripe yet.964 The 
strategy relied on the political right to return and the belief that peacebuilders could encourage 
ethnic groups to accept minority returnees in their areas of effective control through political 
pressure and economic incentives.965 Its implementation, which essentially prioritised the 
element of security over justice, was largely a failure because all three ethnic groups proved 
unwilling to cooperate. Despite encouraging promises, they adopted discriminatory laws 
against minorities, prioritised restitution applications by their own community members and 
were slow to stop any nationalist violence that took place upon the return of the displaced.966 
The political unwillingness to implement this strategy was easily camouflaged under the 
complexity of, and contradictions between, the laws that existed at the time.967 Consequently, 
between 1996 and 2000, the first time the international community started systematically 
collecting statistics, only 12 per cent of applications by displaced people had been dealt with.968  
 
The huge contrast between the ‘before’ and ‘after’ pictures is largely attributed to the 
abandonment of the political right to return and the implementation of the legal right to 
property instead. The change took place in 1999 when the international community introduced 
the Property Law Implementation Plan (PLIP). This relied on a series of legislative 
amendments, pushed through by the High Representative, and the active involvement of 
international peacebuilders for their enforcement in practice.969 On the one hand, PLIP’s 
objectives were both clearly and explicitly articulated: to implement the right to property of all 
displaced persons, which would, in turn, promote each of the elements of peace.970 On the 
other, the way specific amendments to the law were drafted, ensured that their enforcement 
would indeed contribute to the promotion of these objectives. Thus, PLIP retrospectively put 
out of force the discriminatory property laws that had been passed during and before the war, 
harmonised the claim procedures in both entities and created a process that was heavily 
weighted in favour of the claimants.971 In particular, under the new law, displaced people only 
had to show that they had pre-war rights to the property and the responsible authority had 30 
days to investigate the claim.972 If the current occupant had no right to occupy the property or 
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had access to other housing, s/he had to vacate it within 15 days.973 If s/he was in need of 
alternative accommodation, the authorities had 90 days to secure it for him/her and s/he had to 
be evicted, even if no such accommodation had been provided.974 Although these deadlines 
were often exceeded by several months, the new legislation jump-started the process and 
prevented uncooperative politicians and public officials from using excuses.975  
 
It is estimated that if restitution continued with the same rate as it did before 1999, the process 
would have taken another 40 years to complete.976 Rather, the international community’s 
implementation of the right to property meant that by December 2003, when PLIP came to an 
end, 93 per cent of the property claims had been handled and the few remaining cases were 
handed over to the local authorities to complete.977 Ultimately, ‘[t]he restoration of property 
rights and the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes must rank as the most 
dramatic success of the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina’.978 At the most basic level, 
the legislative amendments adopted by the international community, resulting in almost all 
displaced people being empowered to return to their houses, promoted security by sending the 
message that the war was truly over and the conflict was being left behind. As the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHRC) put it, ‘[w]hen they choose voluntarily to 
go back to their homeland, refugees are, quite literally, voting with their feet and expressing 
confidence in the future of their country.’979 It is arguably for this reason that the nationalist 
leaders in BiH were keen to prevent minority returns and why it is considered such a big success 
of the international community that this was prevented.  
 
Perhaps more importantly, the implementation programme promoted peace by contributing to 
a sense of objective justice in three ways. First, PLIP moved beyond empty political promises 
and put in place clear laws and procedures, which displaced people could rely on in practice. 
This empowered applicants since it clarified the process through which they could demand – 
rather than merely wait at the discretion of the uncooperative state – for the return of their 
properties.980 Second, the clear legal provisions made it easy to identify state officials who 
refused to protect the right to property and impose strict penalties on them. As a result, in 
November 1999 the High Representative removed 22 officials from office for failing to comply 
with PLIP and sent the message that the return of displaced people was a peacebuilding 
                                                 
on Abandoned Apartments (Official Gazette of BiH Law No. 11/98), Art. 6; Law on the Cessation of the 
Application of the Law on the Use of Abandoned property (Official Gazette of Republika Srpska Law No. 38/98), 
Art. 9. 
973 Law on Cessation of the Application of the Law on Temporarily Abandoned Real Property Owned by Citizens 
(Official Gazette of Federation of BiH, No. 11/98), Art. 7; Law on the Cessation of the Application of the Law 
on Abandoned Apartments (Official Gazette of BiH Law No. 11/98), Art. 3; Law on the Cessation of the 
Application of the Law on the Use of Abandoned property (Official Gazette of Republika Srpska Law No. 38/98), 
Art. 11a. 
974 Law on Cessation of the Application of the Law on Temporarily Abandoned Real Property Owned by Citizens 
(Official Gazette of Federation of BiH, No. 11/98), Art. 12a; Law on the Cessation of the Application of the Law 
on Abandoned Apartments (Official Gazette of BiH Law No. 11/98), Art. 7a; Law on the Cessation of the 
Application of the Law on the Use of Abandoned property (Official Gazette of Republika Srpska Law No. 38/98), 
Art. 11a. 
975 Philpott, ‘Though the Dog Is Dead, the Pig Must Be Killed’. 
976 Office of the High Representative, PLIP – Non Negotiable Principles in the Context of the Property Law 
Implementation (Sarajevo, Office of the High Representative, 7 March 2000). 
977 Office of the High Representative, Statistics. 
978 Cox and Garlick, ‘Musical Chairs’, 65. 
979 UNHCR, The State of the World’s Refugees: In Search of Solidarity (New York, UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees, 2012), 162. 
980 Wade, ‘Mind the Gap’, 414. 
 135 
priority.981 Third, PLIP’s singular and clear objective – the implementation of the right to 
property – helped coordinate different international organisations that were operating in BiH. 
Thus, OSCE and UNHCR officials were sent in every municipality in the country, where they 
collected statistics and delivered PLIP guidelines to the local authorities, which, in turn, assited 
the implementation process.982 These measures resulted in a speedier and more professional 
response by the authorities by, for example, stopping the popular practice of prioritising ‘easy 
applications’ (usually returns where the applicant was in the majority or there was no secondary 
occupier in the property). Instead, all applications were treated in the chronological order they 
had been submitted, hence preventing the privileging of applicants because of their personal 
connections or ethnic group membership.983 The process also gave a rough indication to people 
as to when their claim would be dealt with, therefore allowing them to better prepare, 
financially and psychologically, for their return.  
 
An assessment of the impact of implementing the right to property in BiH suggests that the 
international community can play a seminal role in encouraging human rights implementation. 
Importantly, its involvement in this instance was multifaceted, addressing the problem of 
political unwillingness by circumventing uncooperative politicians, avoiding the challenges of 
bad legislative drafting by undertaking this task itself, and responding to the difficulties of 
limited enforcement capacity by offering more hands-on assistance. Had only one of these 
strategies been preferred, the intervention of the international community would not have been 
as effective. At the same time however, the positive effects of these policies in relation to the 
right to property, should be assessed by bearing in mind the detrimental consequences of 
excessive international intervention. This suggests that peacebuilders should prefer, where 
possible, more light-touch interventions, which seek to guide, rather than replace local 
actors,984 who will after all remain in the country, long after the international personnel has 
left.985 They should, in other words, shape their actions and policies by bearing in mind that 
‘[t]he international community is, at best, the facilitator of peace, but certainly not the engineer 
of it.’986 If such light-touch interventions fail to promote human rights implementation, 
strengthening civil society organisations may be a more organic and sustainable response to 
the problem, than sidestepping local political actors altogether. In fact, the more time passes 
from the signing of the peace agreement and as the post-violence society moves from a phase 
of intervention through to stabilisation and finally to normalisation, the more appropriate the 
adoption of this alternative strategy becomes.987 
 
The involvement of civil society is already a popular peacebuilding strategy in post-violence 
societies.988 However, arguably, to the extent that local initiatives and civil society 
organisations have played a role in conflict resolution efforts, these have mostly been as 
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afterthought reactions to the limitations of the liberal peacebuilding agenda.989 What is being 
proposed here is the opposite: peacebuilders should appreciate the limitations of their existing 
strategies and planning ahead, empower the types of local actors that can address these. The 
first contribution that civil society can make in this respect is bring into the spotlight, and add 
to the public agenda, the private grievances of individuals,990 and therefore put the government 
under increasing pressure to respond to them.991 In other words, civil society organisations can 
identify an injustice, frame it in human rights terms and encourage the grassroots to demand 
from officials the adoption of a policy that will address it.992 Arguably, one of the reasons the 
international community has not been as successful in its efforts to reform key institutions in 
BiH, such as the police force, is precisely because of the absence of public participation and 
civil society involvement in the process, which could have motivated unwilling politicians to 
act.993  
 
Conversely, in NI it was the good cooperation between civil society actors and the government 
that contributed to the reform of the Historical Enquiries Team (HET), resulted in the more 
effective protection of the right to life, and the consequent promotion of justice. HET was 
established in 2005 as part of a ‘package of measures’ announced by the UK government 
following findings of the ECtHR that the investigation processes that took place after the deaths 
of members or sympathizers of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) were so defective that they 
constituted violations of the procedural aspect of the right to life.994 In light of these 
deficiencies, the UK committed to re-examine, through the HET, 3,268 conflict-related deaths 
that occurred between 1968 and 1998.995 In 2009, Dr (now Professor) Patricia Lundy, an 
academic at the University of Ulster, approached the then Chief Constable of the Police Service 
of Northern Ireland and secured access to the HET to undertake research on how it operated.996 
Her findings were damning: among others, she identified problems with the procedures that 
were being followed; showed that the HET was not always operating in a consistent manner, 
since it distinguished between suspects who were state actors and those who were not; and 
raised questions about the lack of independence of some of the HET’s staff.997 The 
identification of these problems by a civil society actor transformed the personal complaints of 
the victims’ families into issues of public concern and put pressure on the government to 
respond to them. Thus, a formal inspection of the HET was instituted in order to assess whether 
Professor Lundy’s findings were indeed accurate.998 When these were confirmed by Her 
Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary in 2013, the HET undertook changes to its procedures 
with the express objective of ensuring that it was complying with the judgments of the 
European Court ‘in a way that commands the confidence of the wider community’.999  
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The HET’s reform offers an example where a civil society actor was able to push for the 
implementation of a human rights judgment in a way that promoted justice and reconciliation. 
At the same time, it suggests that the effectiveness of civil society largely depends on the 
context in which it is operating1000 and the extent to which the state is willing to cooperate with 
it.1001 Professor Lundy’s contribution to the improvement of the HET became possible due to 
the UK’s culture of valuing expert opinions and because it took place in a context where human 
rights are usually taken seriously, factors that enhance the effectiveness of civil society 
organisations.1002 Had these not been present, her request to secure access to the HET, which 
after all dealt with some very sensitive information, would have been denied, or her 
recommendations would have simply been ignored. This is supported by the experiences of 
BiH civil society organisations, which failed to make any positive peacebuilding contributions 
in the early stages after Dayton, because they were used to operating within a context where 
free speech, especially when unpopular or unsupportive of the interests of political elites, was 
curtailed.1003  
 
The second peacebuilding contribution that civil society organisations can make is that they 
can push for the resolution of a conflict by lobbying to amend problematic legislation or adopt 
new human rights initiatives.1004 For instance, when the TRC in SA was being set up, civil 
society organisations successfully lobbied against the idea that was being considered at the 
time of holding hearings behind closed doors.1005 By using human rights language and 
changing the state’s preferred policy, civil society contributed towards making the TRC’s 
findings more well-known among SA, helped dispel any myths about the actions of the 
apartheid government and started the reconciliation process.1006 Moreover, at the end of the 
TRC’s proceedings, civil society came to the forefront again when, following delays in the 
payment of compensation to the victims, it successfully pushed the government to fulfill its 
obligations.1007 The final contribution of civil society organisations is that they can provide 
practical guidance and support to public bodies, which, in turn, can enhance their capacity, 
make it easier for them to enforce human rights and promote peace. Thus, the database that the 
TRC relied on in order to collect evidence about past human rights abuses, which formed the 
basis of its operations, was developed by representatives of six human rights organisations with 
experience in the design of human rights information systems.1008  
 
Like with the involvement of the international community, the strengthening of civil society 
can assist peacebuilding efforts, both in instances where the problem concerns a lack of 
political willingness to see change and when human rights institutions would benefit from 
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greater practical support. At the same time however, indiscriminately empowering these 
organisations, without having a better understanding of their profile and objectives, is not 
always conductive to peace. Despite simplistic assumptions that all civil society actors 
encourage the protection of human rights,1009 and that this will, in turn, lead to peace,1010 they 
can, in fact, also have the reverse effect, especially if they do not enjoy the trust of the general 
public. Thus, while there are some organisations that do not accept any external funding in 
order to preserve their independence,1011 most receive either direct or indirect support from the 
international community.1012 If this is, for any reason, discredited among the population, civil 
society organisations that are supported by it are also likely to be dismissed as biased.1013 At 
the same time, whether an organisation is associated with the international community or not, 
it is possible that its offices are populated by members of local elites that might be using its 
neutrality veneer in order to further their own agendas. This can potentially put civil society 
actors in a lose-lose situation: although attracting attention from local elites for the wrong 
reasons can be dangerous, being ignored by them is also counterproductive in terms of making 
any real impact on the ground.1014 Also important in terms of an organisation’s profile is its 
staff composition, and in particular, whether it is ran by professionals or volunteers.1015 Those 
that are operating almost exclusively in urban centres and are staffed by professional 
peacebuilders, are less likely to represent, and properly communicate with, the grassroots 
throughout the post-violence society, a factor that can undermine both their effectiveness and 
credibility.1016 These observations suggest that the strengthening of civil society organisations 
has to mean more than simply throwing money at them. Doing so, runs the risk of ‘taming’ and 
turning them into urban-focused ‘service deliverers’, or even empowering actors that, in fact, 
seek to undermine the peacebuilding agenda.1017 
 
In order to identify which civil society actors should be empowered, peacebuilders must pay 
attention to each organisation’s objectives and consequently, the way it utilises human rights 
language in order to achieve these. If it represents a single ethnic group, or has a more 
nationalist agenda, it is likely to use human rights as a way of justifying maximalist demands, 
thus polarising the public and further fueling the conflict.1018 This is, for example, the case with 
many civil society organisations in Cyprus, which receive either exclusively GC or TC 
support.1019 These bodies have over the years been organising events commemorating the 
suffering of their ethnic group’s members (while ignoring similar experiences of the other side) 
and pushing for laws and a peace agreement that will fully safeguard their interests, despite the 
fact that the other ethnic group considers these unacceptable. Even when their intention is to 
protect the interests of their members, rather than undermine peacebuilding efforts per se, they 
might inadvertently have this effect when they conceptualise human rights in communal, rather 
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than universal terms.1020 For instance, GC displaced peoples’ organisations have played a key 
role in interpreting Loizidou in a very specific light, which in turn has discouraged GC from 
accepting a solution that does not fully safeguard restitution of their properties.1021 Being aware 
of these dangers should not automatically give rise to ‘defensive formalism’, where only state 
institutions are trusted to participate in the peacebuilding process.1022 Rather, they should act 
as a warning, especially to international peacebuilders who are not as familiar with the local 
context, to be careful when distinguishing between civil society organisations that can help 
promote peace and others that might have the reverse effect.1023  
 
VI. Conclusion 
Human rights implementation can indeed resolve outstanding conflicts and promote security, 
justice and reconciliation. Conversely, when the state does not comply with its human rights 
obligations, or when it only partially complies with them, this can have detrimental 
peacebuilding effects. While often accurate, this binary schema of the relationship between 
human rights and peace fails to explain situations where human rights have technically been 
implemented, but have nevertheless, not contributed to conflict resolution. Moreover, it offers 
little guidance to peacebuilders about the conditions that must be in place for the 
implementation of the former to assist in the building of the latter and what strategies should 
be adopted when these are not present. This chapter has argued that three factors affect the 
peacebuilding potential of enforcing human rights and that distinguishing between them is 
important because the absence of each, merits a different peacebuilding response.  
 
Successful conflict resolution depends on sufficient political willingness to induce 
comprehensive change, the human rights policy being guided by clear peacebuilding objectives 
and it being drafted in a way that reflects these. Finally, it is necessary that the body that has 
been tasked with the implementation of human rights has the institutional independence, 
powers, resources and expertise to achieve its objectives. If these conditions are not present, 
two strategies that peacebuilders can adopt are to involve the international community and 
strengthen civil society. These strategies respond to the absence of each of the three conditions 
in distinct ways, such as by imposing international or grassroots pressure on politicians that are 
unwilling to take action, offering practical assistance in the drafting of human rights provisions, 
or strengthening the capacities of enforcement bodies to undertake their task. At the same time 
however, while capable of aiding peacebuilding efforts, both the involvement of the 
international community and the strengthening of civil society organisations can be dangerous, 
when the former completely takes over the functions of domestic actors, or in cases where 
peacebuilders fail to distinguish between ‘civil’ and ‘uncivil society’.1024  
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Chapter 6 – Protecting Human Rights and Promoting Subjective Peace 
 
 
I. Introduction 
The previous chapters focused on the adjudication and implementation of human rights and 
argued that under the right conditions, these can directly lead to institutional and legal reforms 
that contribute to the objective improvement of security, justice, and reconciliation. This 
chapter is concerned with the way in which human rights can help resolve conflicts as 
psychological states of affairs and induce socio-economic and psychological changes, 
necessary for the promotion of subjective feelings of peace.1025 The impact of law on social 
change has been the subject of scholarly debate for decades, with academics disagreeing on 
whether, and in what ways, the former can effectively promote the latter.1026 On the one hand, 
some argue that a change in the law, especially when this comes from the bench rather than an 
elected body, is unlikely to affect social perceptions,1027 or could even result in negative 
outcomes.1028 Others have contended that public interest litigation can induce positive social 
change, but have disagreed on the reasons why. McCann, for instance, believes that rights allow 
activists to put specific issues on the public agenda and threaten to impose litigation costs, 
unless legislative – and subsequently social – change, takes place.1029 Alternatively, Scheingold 
proposes that the main contribution of rights is that their ethical connotations help mobilise the 
masses, who, in turn, can push legislators to action.1030 However, while fruitful, these debates 
have mostly focused on seminal cases of the US Supreme Court, such as Brown v Board of 
Education of Topeka1031 and Roe v Wade,1032 and have only been applied to post-violence 
contexts sparingly.  
 
Although the peacebuilding literature lacks a detailed analysis of the relationship between 
human rights and social change, especially in relation to feelings of reconciliation, it is filled 
with brief assertions that this very relationship is a positive one. Yet, the absence of a well-
developed theoretical framework has left decision-makers unclear as to how one leads to the 
                                                 
1025 Social and psychological change relate to each other since ‘[w]hat is happening at the social level, such as the 
destruction of social ties, is integrally connected to individual well-being, and vice versa.’ (Brandon Hamber, 
Dealing with Painful Memories and Violent Pasts: Towards a Framework for Contextual Understanding (Berghof 
Handbook Dialogue Series No 11, Berlin, Berghof Foundation, 2015), 4.) Also see, Nadim N. Rouhana, ‘Identity 
and Power in the Reconciliation of National Conflict’ in Alice H. Eagly, Reuben M. Baron and Lee V. Hamilton 
(eds), The Social Psychology of Group Identity and Social Conflict (Washington D.C., American Psychological 
Association, 2004), 180; Patrick Bracken and Petty Celia (eds), Rethinking the Trauma of War (London, Save the 
Children /Free Association Books, 1998). 
1026 Sharyn L Roach-Anleu, Law and Social Change (2 edn, Los Angeles, SAGE, 2010). 
1027 Gerarld N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? (2 edn, Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press, 2008). 
1028 Jeremy Rabikin, ‘Racial Progress and Constitutional Roadblocks’ (1992) 34 William and Mary Law Review 
75. 
1029 Michael McCann, ‘How Does Law Matter for Social Movements’ in Bryant G. Garth and Sarat Austin (eds), 
How Does Law Matter? Fundamental Issues in Law and Society Research (Evanston, Northwestern University 
Press, 1998), 92. 
1030 Stuart A. Scheingold, The Politics of Rights: Lawyers, Public Policy, and Political Change (2 edn, Ann Arbor, 
University of Michigan Press, 2004). 
1031 Brown v Board of Education of Topeka 47 U.S. 483 (1954) (US Supreme Court, 31 May 1955). 
1032 Roe v Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (US Supreme Court, 22 January 1973). 
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other. The chapter addresses this gap by applying the conclusions of the socio-legal literature 
to post-violence societies. Section II outlines specific ways in which human rights can 
contribute to the resolution of conflicts as psychological states of affairs, namely by providing 
a vocabulary, which allows victims to articulate their plight and incentivises state institutions 
to officially acknowledge, and ultimately respond to, it. It further asserts that subjective 
feelings of peace do not automatically follow when such a vocabulary is utilised, or even when 
a technically flawless implementation of the law has taken place, but can only materialise in 
the presence of at least two sets of conditions. The first, outlined in Section III, is that human 
rights institutions must deliver on their promises and induce meaningful change in the lives of 
the people, since a failure to do so, can result in disillusionment and loss of confidence in the 
peacebuilding process. The second set of conditions, discussed in Section IV, relate to the idea 
that human rights must not only promote security, justice and reconciliation, but they must be 
perceived by the population at large as also having this effect. What must be done for these 
conditions to develop depends on the context, needs and demands of each post-violence 
society. Nonetheless, there are strategies that peacebuilders can consider, which when adopted 
together with the protection of human rights, can help induce subjective change. Section V 
elaborates on two of these, namely rethinking the composition of the peacebuilding teams and 
establishing effective communication channels between them and their target audience. 
 
II. Protecting Human Rights and Inducing Social and Psychological Change 
An explicit expectation that human rights can induce social and psychological change within 
the post-violence society is articulated by the Brahimi Report, which confidently declares that 
‘the human rights component of a peace operation is indeed critical to effective peace-building. 
United Nations human rights personnel can play a leading role, for example, in helping to 
implement a comprehensive programme for national reconciliation.’1033 Similarly, legislation 
in SA often draws a connecting line between the protection of human rights and the promotion 
of reconciliation in the country. Section 3 of the Promotion of National Unity and 
Reconciliation Act [34 of 1995] states that its main objective is ‘to promote national unity and 
reconciliation in a spirit of understanding which transcends the conflicts and divisions of the 
past’ by ‘establishing as complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature and extent of the 
gross violations of human rights’. Likewise, the preamble of the Promotion of Equality and 
Unfair Discrimination Act [4 of 2000] refers to SA’s international and constitutional human 
rights obligations and declares that these can result, though the adoption of ‘special legal and 
other measures’, to the transformation of society into a democracy ‘united in its diversity, 
marked by human relations that are caring and compassionate.’ 
 
Despite these proclamations however, arguments have also been made that the language of 
reconciliation can be, and has been, used in order to prevent the protection of human rights, 
thus resulting in a reverse relationship than the expected one.1034 Moreover, critical scholars 
                                                 
1033 Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, 
A/55/305–S/2000/809 (New York, United Nations, 2000). (Henceforth, ‘Brahimi Report’), [41]. See also, ibid, 
[24]. 
1034 Lesley McEvoy, Kieran McEvoy and Kirsten McConnachie, ‘Reconciliation as a Dirty Word: Conflict, 
Community Relations and Education in Northern Ireland’ (2006) 60 Journal of International Affairs 81; Christine 
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have contended that legal tools are ill-suited, and in fact unable to induce social and 
psychological changes within the post-violence society.1035 Ultimately, they continue, this 
inability leads to a ‘hollow peace’, to the promotion of security, justice and reconciliation in 
the eyes of the outside observer, but the lack of any meaningful change as experienced by the 
population itself.1036 Rejecting these pessimistic views, the chapter argues that human rights 
can contribute to – although not wholly achieve – the resolution of conflicts as psychological 
states of affairs in three distinct steps. As a first step, they can provide victims with a vocabulary 
to articulate their grievance, communicate ‘their awareness of the discrepancy between the 
actual and the possible’,1037 evaluate the state’s performance in closing this gap, and lay the 
foundations for protest.1038 While there have been claims that requiring victims to articulate 
their grievance in a formal setting, such as a court of law, risks leaving them feeling 
dismayed,1039 most references in the literature suggest that being given the opportunity to voice 
one’s indignation does contribute to a sense of justice.1040 This is supported by claims that the 
assertion of one’s entitlement to fair treatment results in a feeling of being recognised by the 
state1041 and causes victims to identify more strongly with the dignity and self-respect that their 
claim assumes.1042 Notably, these positive feelings that can help promote justice and 
reconciliation are not wholly dependent on the provision of a remedy at the end of the process; 
rather, the articulation of the grievance is in itself a positive first step towards peace.1043  
 
Relying on human rights is an especially effective way of asserting a political or social demand, 
because they ground one’s expectations in law, on which most governments base their own 
legitimacy.1044 In practice, making such a demand, either requires the victims to resort to 
adjudication, or rely on human rights in order to mobilise a movement that will lobby and push 
                                                 
Bell and Johanna Keenan, ‘Lost on the Way Home? The Right to Life in Northern Ireland’ (2005) 32 Journal of 
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1035 John D. Brewer, Peace Processes: A Sociological Approach (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2010). 
1036 Roger Mac Ginty, ‘Indigenous Peace-Making Versus the Liberal Peace’ (2008) 43 Cooperation and Conflict 
139, 158. 
1037 David Elkind, ‘Adolescent Cognitive Development’ in James F. Adams (ed), Understanding Adolsence: 
Current Developments in Adolsescent Psychology (Boston, Allyn and Bacon, 1968), as quoted in Judith Gallatin 
and Joseph Adelson, ‘Legal Guarantees of Individual Freedom: A Cross-National Study of the Development of 
Political Thought’ (1971) 27 Journal of Social Issues 93, 104.  
1038 Frances Kahn Zemans, ‘Legal Mobilization: The Neglected Role of the Law in the Political System’ (1983) 
77 American Political Science Review 690, 700; Patricia Ewick and Susan Silbey, The Common Place of Law: 
Stories from Everyday Life: Language and Legal Discourse (Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1998) 43. 
1039 Eric Stover, The Witnesses: War Crimes and the Promise of Justice in the Hague (Philadelpia, University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2005). 
1040 Kathryn Abrams, ‘Emotions in the Mobilization of Rights’ (2011) 46 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties 
Law Review 551. 
1041 David M. Engel and Frank W. Munger, Rights of Inclusion: Law and Identity in the Life Stories of Americans 
with Disabilities (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2003) 4, noting that ‘[a]lthough relatively few 
[interviewees] have actually asserted their rights by using […] legal mechanisms […], many have found their 
lives and careers changed by the indirect, symbolic, constitutive effects of rights.’ 
1042 Patricia Williams, ‘Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights’ (1987) 22 Harvard 
Civil Rights – Civil Liberties Law Review 401.  
1043 Abrams, ‘Emotions in the Mobilization of Rights’, 580. 
1044 Beth Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2009) 139. 
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for change through legislative amendments.1045 An example of the former is when TC residing 
in the areas controlled by the RoC challenged the fact that they had been disenfranchised for 
50 years on the ground of their ethnicity, by taking a case to the ECtHR.1046 Conversely, an 
instance of the latter is when Greek and Turkish Cypriot relatives of missing persons exerted 
pressure on their respective leaders to locate and identify the remains of their family 
members.1047 It is also possible that the two strategies are used simultaneously, with the lawsuit 
raising public awareness, revealing the vulnerability of structural arrangements that result in 
the violation of the right and encouraging mass mobilisation,1048 while at the same time, 
lobbyists threatening with increased litigation costs if change does not materialise.1049 This is 
the approach adopted in relation to the property rights of GC displaced persons, who rely both 
on litigation at the ECtHR and the lobbying of governments and international organisations, in 
order to address the injustice they have been suffering from.1050 
 
An additional advantage of articulating a grievance under the banner of human rights is that 
this can foster a new political identity among the divided population and further contribute to 
the development of reconciliation.1051 Human rights aid in this identity transformation process 
by challenging dominant narratives that present one group’s interests and concerns as 
diametrically opposed to the other’s.1052 In this respect, Abrams argues that human rights can 
be particularly effective in facilitating connections among victims from different groups, since 
they highlight the similar affronts or losses they have experienced.1053 This view is supported 
by statements made by a missing person’s relative in Cyprus, who described how the joint 
experience of victimhood created ‘interpersonal bonds’ between Greek and Turkish Cypriot 
family members and encouraged them ‘to come forward and speak out instead of leaving the 
nationalists to use our problem to further their own interests […] because nobody has 
experienced what we [relatives] have gone through.’1054 It should be noted that identity 
transformation in this context only took place after family members started relying on human 
rights to express their grievance; before that, the victimhood language had been hijacked by 
each community and even mentioning the existence of a missing person from a different ethnic 
                                                 
1045 Pieter Bouwen and Margaret McCown, ‘Lobbying Versus Litigation: Political and Legal Strategies of Interest 
Representation in the European Union’ (2007) 14 Journal of European Public Policy 422. 
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group was considered a national betrayal.1055 Given that in a recent survey, more than 20 per 
cent of Cypriot respondents claimed that a close family member was a missing person,1056 the 
coming together of different communities’ members under the single banner of ‘human rights 
victims’ could have a significant impact for reconciliation on the island.1057  
 
The second step that can lead to conflict resolution and subjective feelings of peace flows from 
the official acknowledgment that the human rights violation deserves a response. The acts of 
formally recognising that the victims have suffered an injustice and naming the perpetrator, 
further promote justice and can enhance efforts for reconciliation.1058 Commenting on Brown 
v Board of Education, Schiengold rightly points out that the victims of the discriminatory 
strategy did not have to be told by the US Supreme Court that their schools were inferior – they 
were perfectly aware of this already.1059 Rather, the case’s significance lies in the fact that it 
affected American culture because it was ‘read as a signal that changes were on the way, and 
surely it gave rise to anticipations which set the tone, established the direction, and influenced 
the outcome of a political controversy’.1060 In other words, it was the official acknowledgement 
of the injustices, which the victims already knew they were experiencing, that was seen as a 
victory by them. This is further supported by Ms Loizidou’s statement that she felt vindicated 
and respected following the ECtHR’s decision, which recognised and confirmed the violation 
of her right to property, despite the fact that this did not result for another five years, in the 
provision of a remedy.1061 Reliance on human rights is particularly likely to lead to the official 
acknowledgement that a harm has been committed because they provide standards against 
which both the demands of the populace and the actions of the government can be assessed. 
When applicants articulate their complaint as a failure of the state to meet these benchmarks, 
the latter will more readily admit the harm that it has caused, rather than if this was expressed 
as an abstract complaint that an injustice has taken place.1062 On the other side of the coin, a 
failure of the victims to label, or an unwillingness or inability of the authorities to acknowledge, 
an injustice as a human rights violation can have the reverse effect and undermine efforts to 
induce social and psychological change.  
 
The final contribution of human rights to subjective feelings of peace, stems from the provision 
of remedies, a step that most effectively communicates that an injustice is coming to an end.1063 
For this to happen, it is not necessary that every single victim turns to the law, since one human 
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rights case or initiative can inspire rule revision with a broad impact.1064 In addition to having 
a direct effect on the victims, the provision of a remedy can promote feelings of peace among 
the general population in three ways. First, if the remedy includes measures to punish past 
human rights violations, or ensure that they are not repeated again, this can contribute to a 
general sense of security.1065 Second, while violations are targeted against specific individuals, 
in cases where they are triggered by the victims’ ethnic or racial identities, they are experienced 
as an affront by members of the group as a whole.1066 In such instances, remedying the violation 
empowers the victim, but also sends a broader message that the society remembers, regrets and 
condemns the injustice, while looking towards the future. The effect of addressing past 
injustices on feelings of reconciliation is illustrated by the implementation of the Fair 
Employment and Treatment Order (FETO) in NI, a response to discriminatory practices in the 
employment sphere, which had left Catholics economically worse off than Protestants.1067 
While there are differences among sectors, FETO has resulted in an improvement in overall 
employment, with segregated occupations between the two communities declining and 
integrated firms growing in number.1068 In turn, this has improved socio-economic conditions 
among disempowered members of the population and NI more generally,1069 and resulted in 
greater willingness for peaceful co-existence.1070 Admittedly, there are some indications that 
the empowerment and increasing confidence among Catholics has caused Protestants to feel 
marginalised,1071 but other studies suggest that legal and political changes post-1998, including 
in the employment sphere, have encouraged members of the Protestant community to critically 
examine their identities and helped ‘mellow’ their perception of the other.1072 
 
Third, the provision of a human rights remedy can help break down identity barriers by 
providing a reference point, which reminds people of the things they have in common and the 
ideals they all value, despite their distinct ethnic or racial identities.1073 Such ideals, like 
inclusivity, dignity and respect of the person that are popularly associated with human rights, 
could help promote reconciliation.1074 In this respect, human rights can be used as educational 
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and communicative tools by a range of different legal actors.1075 Academics have already raised 
the possibility of the judiciary utilising human rights in this way1076 and the SA Constitutional 
Court has often linked their protection to the need to introduce social and psychological 
changes that will overcome the country’s apartheid history.1077 For instance, making specific 
reference to the educational potential of human rights, the Court has held that the state has an 
obligation to educate the public through the use of, inter alia, ‘road shows, regional workshops, 
radio programs and publications’.1078 The objective of such educational activities is to facilitate 
an informed and continuous dialogue between the public and policy makers, which will 
encourage the latter to be more responsive to the former’s needs, and therefore promote feelings 
of justice and reconciliation in the post-violence society.1079 Additionally, (legal) human rights 
can contribute to educating the citizenry and inducing social and psychological changes when 
they are being used by bodies other than the judiciary, such as the Human Rights Ombudsman 
in BiH,1080 the Independent Commission on Policing for NI,1081 and the SA Human Rights 
Commission.1082  
 
Notably, the three ways in which human rights can lead to change – articulation of the harm, 
its acknowledgment, and the provision of a remedy – are interrelated. If, for instance, the victim 
is given the opportunity to communicate the injustice s/he has suffered, but this injustice is not 
then recognised as a violation by the state, or is not effectively remedied, this is likely to result 
in ‘too much law and too little justice’ and have a negative effect on peacebuilding efforts.1083 
The importance of combining the three types of human rights contributions is illustrated 
through the workings and impact of the TRC in SA. The way the TRC received information 
about gross human rights violations from victims and perpetrators, and then based on these 
testimonies, published its report and findings,1084 provided an effective medium both for the 
articulation and formal acknowledgment of grievances, and contributed to feelings of security, 
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justice and reconciliation in the short and medium term. However, the Commission’s inability 
to push the government to provide victims with the remedies it considered most appropriate in 
a timely fashion, ultimately undermined efforts to resolve conflicts in the long term. 38 per 
cent of those who testified before the TRC requested financial assistance to improve the quality 
of their lives and nine in 10 asked for a range of services which could be purchased, if money 
had been made available (for example, education, medical care and housing).1085 The need to 
provide such remedies to the victims was also recognised by the SA Constitutional Court, 
which recommended the payment of compensation, bursaries and scholarships; the provision 
of occupational training, complex surgical interventions and medical help; and subsidies to 
prevent evictions.1086 The TRC adopted in its report some of these recommendations, such as 
the payment of reparations and the establishment of skills training, and further added as 
proposed remedies, the resettlement of those who had been displaced by political violence and 
the provision of mental health services.1087 Despite these promising recommendations 
however, the SA government decided to award only monetary compensation to the victims 
(and for a significantly lower compensation amount than that suggested by the Commission), 
considerably delayed the process and acted in a way that failed to treat the victims with respect. 
For instance, after refusing to engage in a dialogue with them and civil society organisations 
about the payment of reparations, government officials justified their actions and dismissed 
criticisms, by noting that they were under no legal obligation to consult with stakeholders at 
any point in the process.1088 Ultimately, the ability of the applicants to articulate their 
grievances, and the state’s formal recognition of these through the TRC’s report, contributed 
to subjective feelings of peace only temporarily. These were eventually undermined by the 
inadequate remedies received by the victims and the way in which the whole process was 
managed by the government.  
 
The preceding analysis suggests that the protection of human rights can indeed contribute to 
socio-economic and psychological changes, which are necessary for the promotion of 
subjective feelings of peace. As the next sections suggest however, these contributions do not 
follow automatically from the articulation and acknowledgement of the human rights violation, 
or even from the provision of the remedy. Rather, the ability of human rights to resolve 
conflicts as psychological states of affairs is dependent on at least two sets of conditions that 
must also be present in the post-violence society. The first is that human rights remedies must 
actually deliver what they promised to achieve, namely make a meaningful change in people’s 
lives, lest they result in disappointment among the population. The second is based on the 
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notion that what is important is not only the protection of human rights itself, but also ensuring 
that this happens in a way that people perceive as being conductive to the promotion of peace.  
  
III. The Gap Between the Legal and the Real: Making a Meaningful Change in 
People’s Lives 
One of the strengths of human rights and the reason many see them as powerful peacebuilding 
tools is that they are legally binding and their use sends the message that any promises made 
in the peace agreement will be kept. However, in addition to the implementation challenges 
explored in chapter five, there is a danger that even when human rights have been enforced, 
the remedy they give rise to may not result in meaningful changes in practice.1089 In turn, this 
can undermine efforts to build subjective peace because if the state makes a promise to improve 
people’s lives, which the intended beneficiaries do not experience as having been fulfilled, they 
are likely to feel cheated or betrayed, and lose their confidence in the new state of affairs.1090 
Conversely, ensuring that the provision of a legal remedy makes a real impact in the lives of 
the people allows them, to the extent that is possible, to leave the experiences of the past behind 
them, and becomes one of the most effective ways of resolving conflicts as psychological states 
of affairs. Since subjective peace depends on the perceptions and beliefs of the population 
within the post-violence society, what is important in this respect is not that a human rights 
institution is set up, but that the public – the victims and the general population alike1091 – is 
satisfied with the results it delivers. For this to happen, it is necessary that peacebuilders take 
the context in which they operate into account and tailor their strategies accordingly. As 
McAuliffee put it, such strategies  
must understand and relate to the power relations at play in the distinct post-conflict context. 
Without grounding theory in the realities of post-conflict states, [peacebuilding strategies can 
result in] a form of ideological support devoid of any realistic or pragmatic [plan] to actually 
address the deprivations identified and with little regard for what can reasonably be 
accomplished.1092 
 
Perhaps the importance of making meaningful changes to people’s lives is most clearly 
illustrated through an analysis of the Property Law Implementation Plan (PLIP) in BiH.1093 As 
a result of PLIP, four years after its inception, 93 per cent of displaced persons had been given 
the title to their properties and told they could return back to their homes.1094 Yet, this statistical 
success has not been translated in the physical return of the victims: although it is unclear how 
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many displaced persons resettled back to their properties, anecdotal evidence is 
disappointing.1095 For instance, in the Republika Srpska (one of the two entities in BiH), only 
20-30 per cent of those to whom property was returned actually live in it, since the remaining 
applicants obtained their property titles and sold them on, so that they could buy a house in 
areas where they were in the majority.1096  
 
In order for the remedy of restitution to be a meaningful one, it was necessary that the return 
of the displaced population to their houses was a real option that people could use if they wished 
to. Important factors influencing this outcome, in addition to making it legally possible, include 
the extent to which the social climate around return is welcoming and whether people have the 
economic resources for this move.1097 In BiH, the disproportionate emphasis on the legal 
protection of the right to property to the detriment of these additional considerations often made 
the option to return merely imaginary. Especially in the early days after Dayton, there was an 
endemic problem of discrimination in all areas of life: a minority returnee found it difficult, if 
not impossible, to get a job, be served without discrimination by public officials and socialise 
with the majority of the community, which was of a different ethnic group.1098 Lack of legal 
access to property was not the only barrier to return, something confirmed by the fact that 20 
per cent of Bosnians, who were unwilling to return to their houses, would reconsider their 
decision if the job market improved.1099 This raises questions as to whether displaced people 
who sold their returned properties and moved to areas where they were in the majority, did so 
voluntarily, or because they lacked the support to remain there. However, if the low number of 
returnees is due to socio-economic difficulties to resettle, rather than a voluntary decision on 
their behalf, it is unlikely that they felt that justice had truly been done.  
 
The insight that law is only one variable in the efforts to achieve social change is a well-
rehearsed theme in the general socio-legal literature1100 and has also been shared by 
peacebuilders themselves.1101 In theory, the need to supplement legal protections with other 
peacebuilding strategies in order to achieve the multidimensional objective of refugee return 
was accepted by the international community in BiH, which stated just before closing down 
PLIP that 
[w]hile property law implementation is the fundamental first step, it is only one among many 
of the elements underpinning sustainable return. Full implementation of Annex VII means that 
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not only can people return to their homes but that they can do so safely with equal expectations 
of employment, education and social services.1102 
 
In practice however, there was a continuous overreliance on law as a tool for social change that 
failed to take these insights into account. Despite appreciating the limitations of a purely legal 
solution to the problem of forced displacement, no other approach was seriously adopted to 
supplement it and therefore, PLIP’s potentially transformative message was lost in translation. 
The emphasis that was put on the legal protection of the right dwarfed any attention to issues 
of social justice, which in turn made the possibility of return an illusory one. In 2011, the 
unemployment rate in BiH was more than 40 per cent1103 and in 2009, approximately half of 
the population in both entities lived below the poverty line or was at risk of falling below it at 
any time.1104 In this difficult economic climate, minority returnees ‘face[d] discrimination in 
all areas of daily life’1105 and found it even harder than the rest of the population to get a job,1106 
send their children to school1107 and enjoy an adequate level of healthcare.1108 None of these 
problems were addressed by PLIP. However, if returnees cannot secure their employment, if 
their children do not feel safe going to school, or if they find it difficult to enjoy social services 
– in other words, if the socio-economic conditions that make their return possible are absent – 
then being legally allowed to take such a step on paper, fails to provide a real option to them 
and does little to promote justice in their own eyes.1109 It seems that peacebuilders in BiH 
ignored the basic truths that restitution is not the same as return, that human rights do not in 
themselves guarantee justice and that ‘[r]ecognition of title in a vacuum, where the conditions 
for return do not exist, will at best result in a mass sell-off of property.’1110 In essence, their 
excessive focus on the law hid the ‘messiness and tough choices that characterize the lives of 
many’ and was thus unable to help peacebuilders navigate these very choices.1111 
 
The emphasis on the law has not only prevented real change in BiH in terms of promoting 
subjective feelings of justice, but also reconciliation. Even in cases where people did return 
permanently to their old houses, this resulted in some co-existence and interaction between 
ethnic groups, but no genuine improvement in inter-ethnic relations. Stefansson vividly makes 
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this point through his analysis of the ‘big’ and the ‘small home’.1112 The right to property can 
successfully protect the latter – the return to the actual structure – but it cannot on its own 
promote the former – the feeling of a shared community between the ethnic groups. Indicative, 
is his example of minority returnees of Muslim origin, who avoided wearing green, a colour 
associated with their religion, in public places so that they did not provoke reactions.1113 This 
is not to argue that changing a state’s formal practices cannot influence the politicians’ and 
public’s opinions and eventually make a positive impact on reconciliation. There are 
suggestions, for instance, that as human rights are implemented, they become institutionalised, 
which, in turn, makes state actors and subsequently the people, more receptive to the 
peacebuilding messages communicated through the language they use.1114 Moreover, Gibson 
and Gouws provide evidence that a human rights decision by the SA Constitutional Court to 
allow an unpopular party to protest is likely to increase levels of ‘grudging tolerance’ in the 
population.1115 However, it is unclear what the long-term impact of legal decisions is on 
people’s feelings and whether tolerant attitudes usually take root or are ephemeral, especially 
when these are not accompanied by additional reconciliation-promoting measures. Ultimately, 
in BiH, the implementation of the right to property happened to the detriment of such measures. 
Partly due to this lack of legal humility, people from different ethnic groups live parallel lives 
side by side, but they do not interact meaningfully.1116 This might be an improvement from 
being actively hostile to others, but it is a far cry from having achieved reconciliation or 
subjective peace more generally. 
 
Similar conclusions concerning the importance of inducing real change in the lives of the 
people arise from an assessment of the SA Commission on Restitution of Land Rights (CRLR 
or Commission), a body tasked with remedying those who had been forcibly displaced during 
apartheid, by providing either restitution or compensation to them.1117 The Commission failed 
to make an impact in people’s lives because it sought to legally protect the right to property, 
without considering the context in which this was happening and the possibility that socio-
economic support structures would be needed to render its protection effective. Essentially, the 
CRLR assumed that the implementation of the law and the remedying of victims marked the 
end, rather than beginning, of the state’s efforts to promote justice. As a result of this 
assumption, large areas of land were returned back to communities that had been displaced 
decades ago, but had no rural life experience. Left to their own devices and with no post-
restitution support from the state, the new owners were expected to make a living by competing 
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with commercial farmers.1118 The outcome of this policy has often been the dismantling of 
successful farming enterprises – and the consequent losing of jobs – in order to replace them 
with the inexperienced running of properties and barren fields.1119 Confirming this, is a study 
in which the majority of the 179 projects examined were dysfunctional in that little, if any, 
production was being pursued.1120 Responding to this, the government has started making 
restitution conditional on the existence of strategic partnerships between the displaced 
communities and commercial farmers. Nevertheless, because the interests of the two parties 
are not always aligned, these partnerships do not necessarily improve the lives of displaced 
persons.1121 For example, in an attempt to maximise yield, the agreements usually prevent 
communities from residing on the restituted land or growing crops for their own personal 
use.1122 As a result, community members become landlords of large estates on paper and remain 
homeless and destitute in practice.1123 Considering that two of the four objectives of the 
restitution process in SA were ‘to redress the injustices of apartheid; [and] to foster national 
reconciliation and stability’1124 the failure of the Commission to deliver, despite its technical 
compliance with the letter of the law, is unlikely to contribute to subjective feelings of peace.  
 
The limitations of the CRLR’s legalistic approach in making meaningful changes in people’s 
lives have also become apparent when providing the remedy of compensation. In theory, 
compensation promotes reconciliation by creating a feeling of closure to the victims and 
empowering them to leave the past behind them.1125 In order for this to happen however, it is 
necessary to not only compensate them with an adequate amount, but also explain to the victims 
why compensation was paid in the first place.1126 Problematically, neither of the two conditions 
was satisfied in SA. During apartheid, often, a single property was occupied by several 
families, whose members have multiplied since their dispossession. By the time the 
compensation award was shared between them, there was very little money left and was usually 
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used to buy everyday supplies or pay off debts, rather than in a way that could make a long-
term difference in people’s welfare.1127 This likely undermined feelings of justice and 
reconciliation among the different communities in the country because the continuing 
inequality had the effect of reinforcing the marginalisation of the displaced from the rest of the 
population.1128 
 
Therefore, what is needed in order to address feelings of injustice is the payment of an amount 
that empowers the recipients to take steps to integrate themselves back into society. 
Reparations cannot, and should not, replace long-term development strategies, which should 
also be part of the peacebuilding process1129 and can more effectively respond to socio-
economic inequalities.1130 At the same time however, the compensation amount must be such, 
that it can convey an intention to develop a more equitable relationship between the state and 
its citizens and among the citizens themselves. This has not been the result of payment of 
compensation in SA, where  
[t]he disparity between the promise of the constitution and the material progress ‘on the ground’ 
is striking. The symbolic break with the past does not correspond with the actual distribution 
of property rights in South Africa, which is still based, in many ways on the Apartheid era.1131 
 
Perhaps more problematic than the actual amount however, has been the fact that some of the 
displaced people did not even understand why they received money in the first place. They 
perceived the compensation as another piece of financial help from the haves (including the 
state) to the have-nots, rather than as a unique payment reflecting an acknowledgment of the 
injustices they had suffered.1132 However, if victims did not understand the purpose of the 
compensation, the remedy is unlikely to have helped them feel reconciled.1133 Evidence 
suggests that when state officials apologise using appropriate language alongside suitable 
remedies,1134 they contribute to psychological and social change.1135 Conversely, if no 
apologies are made, or are perceived as inauthentic, they can have the reverse effect.1136 In the 
absence of a communication strategy accompanying the right to property, its protection 
produced legal changes, but not the psychological ones that were crucial for the building of 
subjective peace. Moreover, this legalistic response to the problem has not only prevented the 
victims from feeling reconciled, but has arguably had similar consequences for the perpetrators. 
The lack of an apology that should have preceded the compensation awards has allowed most 
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of those who benefited from the displacement to go on with their lives and pretend that the 
geography and wealth distribution in the country are unrelated to its apartheid past. To the 
extent that land restitution is discussed among white SA, debates tend to focus on how much 
compensation has been paid and whether displaced persons have used that money wisely, rather 
than what the remedy signifies.1137 Consequently, ‘land issues are terribly important to black 
South Africans, and they are practically invisible to white South Africans’,1138 with 77 per cent 
of the former considering apartheid to be a factor that has influenced land inequality and only 
34 per cent of the latter agreeing.1139 This points to a lingering perception, detrimental to 
reconciliation efforts, which the current human rights strategy has been unable to address, that 
economic inequalities are better explained by the laziness of the majority, rather than the 
history of the country. 
 
The final illustration of the need to look beyond the law and assess the social consequences of 
a human rights initiative, stems from the experience of the relatives of missing persons with 
the SA TRC. The Commission has been the subject of a vast literature, much of which has 
applauded its achievements.1140 However, relatively absent from this – albeit with notable 
exceptions1141 – is an examination of the TRC’s efforts to uncover the truth about those who 
went missing during apartheid. The academic disinterest in this aspect of the TRC’s mandate 
is, on the one hand, understandable, considering the relatively small number of missing 
persons. To put it in perspective, of the 38,000 allegations of gross violations of human rights 
made to the Commission, nearly 10,000 were killings1142 and only 2,000 concerned 
disappearances.1143 Nonetheless, the lack of greater attention to this issue has also been 
surprising in light of the TRC’s stark self-admission that ‘[t]he resolution of these 
disappearance cases is perhaps the most significant piece of unfinished business for the 
Commission.’1144  
 
As a result of political support and generous funding, the TRC was able to set up an impressive 
network of investigations in order to uncover the truth about human rights violations that took 
place during apartheid. The work of the 17 Commissioners was supported by some 400 
members of staff and a separate research department, the operations of which were 
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geographically dispersed in six offices around the country.1145 Over its three years of 
operations, the TRC held several hundred public hearings (during which over 1,800 victims 
were heard), concluded more than 21,000 victim interviews and processed approximately 7,000 
amnesty applications.1146 Through these efforts, the Commission made it impossible ‘for the 
average South African to suffer from selective amnesia or to deny the nature and extent of the 
gross human rights violations.’1147 Its impressive operations notwithstanding, the TRC has 
been unable to contribute to feelings of justice and reconciliation among the relatives of the 
missing for two reasons: first, it has not returned the bodies of the missing to their families and 
second, it has not made the perpetrators in any way accountable. In short, despite its compliance 
with the law, the TRC produced no results that could have made a real difference in the lives 
of those most directly affected by the violations. Consequently, family members of the 
disappeared have bitterly complained that the Commission deprived them of closure and 
dignity, not least because they have perceived the nominal compensation amount they received 
as ‘blood money’;1148 as payment for their silence and exertion of unwanted pressure to stop 
them from expressing their ongoing sense of injustice. 
 
The TRC’s inability to return the bodies of missing persons to their families stems from two 
limitations in the way it operated. First, although the Commission had heard approximately 
1,500 testimonies about disappearances, it decided to rely on an exceptionally narrow 
definition of a ‘missing person’, which reduced the number of cases under its mandate to 
477.1149 In particular, in order for someone to be considered a disappeared person for the 
purposes of the TRC, his or her disappearance had to have been politically motivated,1150 a 
requirement that was difficult to prove at a time when many opposed apartheid, without 
necessarily being members of a political organisation. This narrow definition meant that many 
families that experienced the detrimental effects of a relative’s disappearance, whether these 
were economic or psychological, could not benefit from the Commission’s investigative 
powers or the provision of a remedy at the end of the process. Second, the practices of the 
Missing Persons Task Team, a follow-up to the TRC established in 2005, also resulted in 
disappointing outcomes. Its decision not to rely on DNA testing (at a time when the technology 
was available and used, for example, in BiH) resulted in just 89 identifications, of which only 
60 per cent were accurate.1151 In instances of misidentification, families had to return the body 
they had been given, thus causing their re-traumatisation and inhibiting the process of 
reconciliation.  
 
In terms of its second limitation, the TRC could not issue blanket amnesties, but it did provide 
individual amnesties to those perpetrators who came forward and admitted their crimes.1152 
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While this was a bitter pill to swallow for family members,1153 the expectation was that finding 
out the truth would have a more positive peacebuilding impact for the society at large than 
making the perpetrators legally accountable for their past crimes.1154 This assumption has been 
challenged as being principally flawed, since it does not necessarily follow that truth leads to 
feelings of justice or reconciliation.1155 Even more problematically on a practical level, no 
prosecutions took place, even when it became clear that perpetrators had not told the truth 
during the TRC hearings. For example, in the ‘Pebco Three’ case in Eastern Cape, the 
perpetrators testified before the Commission that they had burned the bodies and thrown the 
ashes in a nearby river to destroy incriminating evidence. More than a decade after their 
testimony, forensic evidence from exhumations contradicted their original statement, since 
parts of the victims’ bodies were found in a nearby septic tank.1156 This forensic evidence could 
have been used as a legal basis to overturn the perpetrators’ amnesty, yet this did not happen, 
thus further compromising feelings of justice and reconciliation among the family members. 
 
Like PLIP and the CRLR, the TRC offers a stark example of a body which technically complied 
with its mandate of responding to human rights violations, without meeting the expectations of 
some of the victims, thus failing to resolve the conflict as a psychological state of affairs. Part 
of the reason for this failure is the excessive reliance of all three institutions on legal provisions 
and strategies that did not – and could not – fully address the needs and concerns of the intended 
beneficiaries. This critique should not be taken to mean that human rights must not be protected 
at all, or that they are altogether ineffective peacebuilding tools. Rather, it is making the more 
nuanced point that legal humility is necessary because, while human rights might be able to 
contribute to some socio-economic and psychological changes, they cannot complete this 
process on their own. Building subjective peace also requires the adoption of a range of other 
peacebuilding strategies that will supplement the protection of human rights, such as initiatives 
that will promote community-building in BiH and provide better social services in SA.  
 
IV. Peace Must be Built and Be Seen to Be Built 
In addition to ensuring that real change takes place in post-violence societies, subjective peace 
requires that the public perceives that change in a positive light.1157 Human rights can help 
achieve this goal and shape public perceptions, when at least four conditions are met. These 
are that human rights are implemented in a climate that is conductive to social change; the 
                                                 
1153 Hamber, ‘Narrowing the Micro and Macro’, 4. 
1154 The Azarian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO), [17].  
1155 Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall, Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, 
Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2016) 294, arguing that from the 
point of the ANC, the main objective of the TRC was to be a Truth Commission; reconciliation was mostly an 
afterthought, pushed by Archbishop Tutu. Also see Robert Rotberg, ‘Truth Commissions and the Provision of 
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation’ in Robert Rotberg and Dennis Thompson (eds), Truth v Justice: The Morality 
of Truth Commissions (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2000). 
1156 Kovras, Grassroots Activism 200.  
1157 Tomas Amparo, ‘Reforms That Benefit Poor People – Practical Solutions and Dilemmas of Rights-Based 
Approaches to Legal and Justice Reform’ in Paul Gready and Jonathan Ensor (eds), Reinventing Development? 
Translating Rights-Based Approaches from Theory into Practice (London, Zed Books, 2005) 172, arguing that 
‘the question is not only whether particular laws or institutions exist or how they appear, but rather how laws and 
institutions relate to people and how people perceive, use, change and develop them’. 
 157 
public is made aware of human rights-inspired policies and the way they connect to 
peacebuilding objectives; these policies are understood by people as genuine attempts to 
promote peace; and they are implemented by a body that the public considers legitimate. Of 
course, whether a peacebuilding strategy will affect the perceptions of a given individual, also 
depends on factors that are wholly outside the peacebuilders’ control, such as the psychology 
of each person. However, paying attention to the four conditions can at least improve the 
possibility of resolving conflicts as psychological states of affairs. Importantly, these are 
neither exhaustive nor to be seen in isolation from each other. For instance, making the public 
aware of human rights-inspired policies and their peacebuilding objectives becomes more 
difficult if they are implemented in a climate that is not conductive to peace. It is only by 
considering the different conditions in tandem therefore, that human rights can start 
contributing to social and psychological, in addition to legal and institutional, changes for 
peace.  
 
Since human rights do not operate in a vacuum, the first, and perhaps most difficult condition 
to satisfy, is that they are protected within a context that is already somewhat supportive of 
peacebuilding efforts.1158 If this does not happen, human rights institutions will, at best, become 
marginalised and ineffective and, at worst, be hijacked by spoilers and used in a way that 
undermines the conflict resolution process.1159 Illustrative of this danger are the effects of 
Selimović and Others v Republika Srpska (RS), in which relatives of people who had gone 
missing during the Srebrenica massacre, argued before the Human Rights Chamber of BiH that 
the continuous lack of effective investigation constituted violations of Articles 3, 8 and 14 of 
the European Convention.1160 While the RS had already published a report about what had 
allegedly happened in Srebrenica, this was one-sided since it only included details about 
violations that had been perpetrated against the Serbs, sought to excuse and justify any 
violations against Bosniacs and its description of the events was in contrast to the ICTY’s 
findings in Krstić,1161 which had dealt with the same issue.1162 The Human Rights Chamber, 
reasoning that the authorities had failed to locate, discover and disclose accurate information 
about the fate of the missing, found in the applicants’ favour and ordered a number of 
remedies.1163 Taking into account that more than 1,800 family members had filed related 
motions with the Chamber between November 2001 and March 2002,1164 it ordered that the 
payment of compensation should be made, not to the individual applicants, but to the 
Srebrenica-Potocari Memorial and Cemetery Foundation, which would use it for the benefit of 
all the families and victims.1165 Moreover, the RS was ordered to adopt a number of measures 
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which had the objective of directly challenging social perceptions about what had happened in 
Srebrenica and making the applicants feel properly remedied. For instance, the authorities were 
asked to release any information they had about the fate of the missing persons,1166 conduct an 
effective investigation into the events in question1167 and disseminate the information included 
in the Chamber’s decision as widely as possible within their territory.1168  
 
At the insistence of the High Representative, the RS authorities implemented the decision and 
formed a new ‘Commission for the Investigation of the Events in and around Srebrenica 
between 10 and 19 July 1995’.1169 This Commission, involving RS government members, 
representatives of survivor groups and international observers, concluded that large-scale 
massacres, mostly against Bosniacs, had taken place in July 1995, disclosed the location of 
more than 30 mass graves, and provided additional information that aided in locating the 
missing.1170 While the Commission’s findings were also followed by an apology from RS 
President Dragan Čavić,1171 the implementation of this case has not resulted in any notable 
social or psychological changes in BiH or the promotion of reconciliation among the ethnic 
groups. In a 2011 survey, some seven years after the publication of the Commission’s findings, 
only 71,6 per cent of Bosnian Serbs had heard of the events in Srebrenica and less than a third 
believed that these were true.1172 The ineffectiveness of the human rights judgment to induce 
those changes that were necessary for subjective peace, despite its successful implementation, 
is arguably because this took place within a social and political climate where nationalism and 
denialism were the norm.1173 Yet, if the context itself is hostile to change, solely relying on the 
law is most likely to have a superficial or no impact on people’s perceptions and practices.1174 
In Osiel’s words, ‘[w]hen collective memory has already become comfortably entrenched, the 
law’s efforts to excavate and scrutinize it are only likely to discredit the law and its professional 
spokesmen.’1175 In such instances, peacebuilders are advised to rely on alternative strategies, 
such as reforming the educational system, or launching an information campaign, that will 
more effectively reach, and have an impact on, the masses. 
 
The second condition is that people must be made aware of the existence of human rights-
inspired policies or case law and the ways these connect to peacebuilding objectives. Referring 
to the judiciary, Rosenberg argues that ‘[i]t is naïve to expect an institution seen as distant and 
unfamiliar, shrouded in mystery, and using arcane language and procedures to change people’s 
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views.’1176 To put it simply, if the average person does not know or understand what human 
rights institutions are doing, then their actions and decisions, no matter how well-reasoned or 
intentioned, will be unable to contribute to subjective feelings of peace.1177 This makes it 
necessary that specific efforts are made to inform the public about human rights initiatives, and 
the rationale behind them.  
 
One example in which this was done successfully was during the proceedings of the Patten 
Commission in NI, a body that was tasked with making recommendations for the reform of the 
police following the signing of the Belfast Agreement.1178 The Commission’s terms of 
reference explicitly stated that what was important was not only that the police service was 
reformed, but that it was also perceived as being reformed, so that it ‘can enjoy widespread 
support from, and is seen as an integral part of, the community as a whole.’1179 Operating under 
this mandate, the Commission put human rights at the centre of its recommendations, but did 
not stop at that.1180 Further, it relied on a methodology, which had the express objective of 
challenging social perceptions and building ‘reconciliation, tolerance and mutual trust’ among 
its target audience.1181 For instance, it recommended that police stations have, as far as possible, 
the appearance of ordinary buildings;1182 the composition of the police staff be broadly 
reflective of the population of NI as a whole;1183 and community leaders encourage their 
members to apply to join the force.1184 In making these recommendations, the Commission 
took into account findings about the perception of the police service among the Protestant and 
Catholic communities and stressed that efforts needed to be made to ensure that the differences 
between the two were eliminated.1185 Moreover, it worked towards operating in a manner that 
was as inclusive as possible, for example, by inviting the views of the public about the police 
service, both through a press conference and newspaper advertisements.1186 In addition, it 
contacted directly about 130 stakeholders, such as political parties, churches, non-
governmental organisations and others known to have a particular interest in policing, and 
asked them to participate in the consultation exercise.1187 As a result of this effort, more than 
10,000 people attended public meetings that were organised by the Commission and 
approximately 2,500 written submissions were received.1188 This community-centered 
approach and the subsequent implementation of the Commission’s recommendations has 
arguably had a positive impact on improving social perceptions of the police, and promoting 
subjective feelings of security among the two communities. Thus, while in 2016 Protestants 
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were still more satisfied with the performance of the police service when compared to 
Catholics,1189 the difference between the two groups had decreased considerably since 
1996.1190  
 
The condition that people must be informed about human rights-inspired policies and their 
peacebuilding objectives, sounds almost tautological, yet examples where conflicts remained 
unresolved because this was taken for granted, abound in almost all post-violence societies. 
Such was, for instance, the case with the efforts of the international community to locate the 
remains of missing persons in BiH. This peacebuilding initiative could have resulted in 
important social and psychological changes among the population, because the suffering of 
missing persons’ relatives, and the need to address it, is almost universally perceived as 
transcending ethnic divisions.1191 Although attempts to locate the disappeared were originally 
framed in humanitarian terms, over time, and as a result of case law from Bosnian and 
European Courts, they started being understood as a human rights issue.1192 In turn, this has 
had a significant positive impact on efforts to locate missing persons, confirming the previous 
chapter’s conclusions that the enforcement of human rights can result in reforms that are 
instrumental to the building of objective peace. Thus, in 2004 and with the help of the 
International Commission on Missing Persons, BiH passed the Law on Missing Persons, the 
first of its kind in a post-violence society, and established the Missing Persons Institute.1193 
The Institute, has been responsible for locating grave sites and identifying bodies, a task that 
has been progressing successfully, with more than 70 per cent of missing persons having been 
found.1194 Over the last years, laboratories set up by the International Commission on Missing 
Persons in BiH have amassed such expertise, that they are now providing technical assistance 
to other post-violence societies facing similar problems, such as Cyprus.1195 
 
However, despite the objective success of the process, this has not been conveyed effectively 
to the population itself. Bosnians seem to have underappreciated what the Commission has 
achieved, at the same time as entertaining excessive expectations about what it should 
accomplish. Specifically, in a 2014 study, only 17 per cent of the people asked about the 
number of missing persons that had been located gave the correct answer, which, at the time, 
was approximately two thirds.1196 Simultaneously, almost 60 per cent of survey respondents 
believed that justice would only be achieved when every single person had been identified, an 
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objective that, in light of the large numbers of victims involved and the passage of time since 
their disappearance, is practically impossible to meet.1197 In addition to being misinformed 
about how much the relevant human rights bodies have accomplished, the general population 
also harbours negative perceptions about the procedures followed by key peacebuilding actors, 
with more than half of the people asked, believing that the Institute’s attempts to locate missing 
persons favour one ethnic group over the others.1198 Importantly, this percentage is lower 
among family members – 42 per cent of them share the same belief – thus suggesting that those 
who are closer to its work and better informed about it, have a more positive view of the 
Institute.1199  
 
This more positive perception among family members is arguably, partly due to the conscious 
efforts made by the BiH Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees to involve key stakeholders, 
including family associations, the International Commission of Missing Persons and the 
International Commission of the Red Cross, in a consultation exercise regarding the passing of 
the Law on Missing Persons.1200 Moreover, it has possibly also been enhanced by the fact that 
the Institute has a mandate to help family members, even after the remains of the missing 
person have been identified, by for example, providing financial assistance for the funeral 
costs.1201 Conversely, the more negative perceptions among the general population could be 
due to public allegations from mostly the Serb members of the Institute, which were made even 
before it began its operations, that it was acting in an ethnically biased manner.1202 These 
observations suggest that while important, implementing human rights might not be a sufficient 
peacebuilding measure in itself; it will also be necessary to accurately inform the general public 
about what peacebuilders are trying to achieve and how specific steps taken by them contribute 
to these objectives. Unsurprisingly, the more powerful and vocal the opposition to peace within 
the post-violence society, the more it can delegitimise the reconciliation process and the greater 
the emphasis that must be paid to this condition.1203 Although peacebuilders are already diligent 
and well-versed in communicating the success of their projects to external funders, it is 
necessary that they use these skills towards a different audience as well. Rather than seeking 
to convince outsiders of the need for, and achievements of, human rights institutions, they 
should explain to the victims and general population within the post-violence society how these 
promote their interests and can address their concerns. In doing so, peacebuilders should be 
able to respond to spoilers’ allegations and find ways of effectively conveying messages of 
justice and reconciliation to potentially negatively predisposed audiences.  
 
The third condition for inducing psychological changes requires that people perceive the 
protection of human rights as a genuine attempt to build peace, rather than something the state 
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does because it has a legal obligation to.1204 Such authenticity can be conveyed through 
unilateral gestures of good will, reciprocal acts of concession and joint ventures among 
previously warring parties.1205 When these are absent and if the belief is that the government 
is doing as little as possible to comply with its human rights obligations, rather than as much 
as possible to resolve the conflict, even when technically implemented, a human rights strategy 
will fail to induce feelings of peace among the population.1206 In order for this condition to be 
satisfied, peacebuilders must pay attention to ‘how things are done – that is whether the 
discussion and delivery of [the remedy] is set up in a way that makes the goals of 
acknowledgement, respect, the restoration of dignity and civic interest in the betterment of 
lives a felt reality for the survivors.’1207 Illustrative of this are the (disappointing) peacebuilding 
effects of the HET, a body that had been tasked with re-examining conflict-related deaths that 
had taken place in NI.1208 At a first glance, the HET was a successful attempt by the UK 
government to comply with the ECtHR judgments that flagged up the absence of an effective 
and impartial investigation into these deaths.1209 Yet, despite its technical compliance with 
human rights, both the HET’s mandate (what it was trying to achieve) and its practices (how 
this would happen) left much to be desired. The HET’s failure to appreciate the importance of 
these factors, undermined its efforts to be perceived as a genuine peacebuilding institution and 
contribute to feelings of justice and reconciliation to the extent that it could have. 
 
In terms of what it sought to achieve, the HET’s objective was  
to reexamine all deaths attributable to ‘the troubles’ and ensure that all investigative and 
evidential opportunities are subject to thorough and exhaustive examination in a manner that 
satisfies the Police Service of Northern Ireland’s obligation of an effective investigation.1210  
 
The HET had interpreted this as requiring the review of previous investigations and assessing 
whether they had left unexplored any ‘evidential opportunities’. If such evidential opportunities 
existed, it was its responsibility to investigate them internally and subsequently report them to 
the Police Service of Northern Ireland.1211 This review process, which was intended to bring ‘a 
measure of resolution’ to the families of the victims,1212 was ‘designed to be exhaustive and 
include[d] the re-examination of all documentation.’1213 Yet, at the same time, it was clear that 
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the HET was part of a ‘package of measures’ and these procedures were not intended to fully 
comply with the UK’s human rights obligations on their own.1214 This, as was pointed out 
during an official review of the HET’s practices in 2013, resulted in ‘confusion, both internally 
and externally about whether the HET is a body which investigates crimes; reviews previous 
investigated cases; conducts “cold case” reviews; or gathers information for families.’1215 Due 
to this confusion, family members often believed that the HET’s mandate was to re-investigate 
their loved ones’ deaths and were disappointed, leading to renewed feelings of injustice, when 
this did not happen.1216 The lack of clarity was addressed following the official review of the 
HET and its terms of reference were revised to state the organisation’s objectives, values and 
purpose more clearly.1217 This improvement notwithstanding, the line between review and re-
investigation is a thin one and still likely to lead to misunderstandings and disappointment 
among family members.  
 
In addition to the lack of clarity about the HET’s mandate, its practices also left much to be 
desired. Perhaps the most problematic of its procedures was the fact that it distinguished 
between cases based on whether the alleged perpetrator was a state official or not, and 
investigated the latter much more vigorously.1218 This distinction was based on the reasoning 
that ‘it is not appropriate to compare the review process in military cases with reviews of 
murders committed by terrorists.’1219 The practice was considered to be so problematic during 
the official review of the HET, that all investigations of state involvement cases were 
suspended until the review’s recommendations for improvement were implemented.1220 This 
preferential treatment of state agents also permeated the Team’s ‘pragmatic approach’, a 
practice where HET agents dispensed with the caution before an interview with a potential 
suspect, in order to encourage him to provide as much evidence as possible.1221 Under the 
pragmatic approach, the suspect was essentially treated as a witness, his testimony was not 
recorded and no notes were taken, thus making the evidence that he was providing inadmissible 
in potential criminal proceedings.1222 Considering the HET’s distinction between state agents 
and ‘terrorists’, this practice is likely to have been favoured when interviewing the former, 
something confirmed by the fact that of the 39 cases that had been referred to the Police Service 
of Northern Ireland for further investigation by the time the official review took place, not one 
involved a state agent as a suspect.1223 However, if the victims’ families resorted to the ECtHR 
because they felt that the original investigations into their relatives’ deaths lacked 
independence, the HET practices failed to change their perceptions, and in fact, reinforced 
them. The ‘measure of resolution’ that the HET was intended to bring – in order words, those 
psychological changes that would contribute to feelings of peace – could only be achieved if it 
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was clear that the deaths had been investigated in a non-biased manner, a goal that such 
practices undermined.  
 
Attempts to promote subjective peace were arguably undercut, even in cases where the HET 
had found evidence of problematic practices in the original investigation and sent a letter of 
apology to the families. According to the official review report, by 2013, at least five individual 
families had received an apology, but no information is provided on what exactly these letters 
consisted of.1224 Other sources indicate that in many cases, the language used by the HET in its 
letters was distant and sought to excuse, instead of properly apologise for, the death of the 
victim.1225 For instance, some of the letters sent out to the families stated that the soldier, 
‘honesty and genuinely believed’ that he was shooting at a dangerous person, that he had ‘no 
recollection’ of the incident, or that he would ‘never have intentionally fired.’1226 On other 
occasions, the letters contained inaccuracies concerning the steps that were taken by the HET 
during the review process, the health of the alleged perpetrator, and the extent to which he had 
expressed any remorse.1227 Considering that many families had been waiting for years for a 
genuine apology that would help them overcome the injustices they had suffered, it is unlikely 
that these ‘formalistic’ responses from the state, or those that tried to ‘explain’ rather than show 
remorse for the death, actually had this effect.1228  
 
The HET’s failure to properly engage with, and change the perceptions of, its target audience, 
despite its technical compliance with human rights obligations, is reflected through several 
satisfaction surveys that had been carried out on its behalf. While the survey results appear 
promising at a first glance – with 64 per cent of respondents being satisfied with the 
organisation’s performance and only three per cent expressly disagreeing with this statement – 
these numbers do not cover all of the intended beneficiaries.1229 Specifically, they exclude the 
categories of people who were most likely to be dissatisfied with HET, like families who 
refused to engage with it from the beginning of the review process, others who disengaged 
along the way and those who were still waiting for a report. The bias in these results is also 
confirmed by independent research, which suggests that the percentage of those who were glad 
that they had engaged with the HET only reached 12 per cent, with four in 10 definitely not 
being glad that they had done so.1230 Perhaps more worrying, is the fact that even when the 
HET’s disappointing performance was highlighted during its official review and it was 
recommended that satisfaction surveys are used more regularly, this proposal was among the 
few that was ignored.1231 When faced with the HET’s unsatisfactory practices and reluctance 
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to hear from those that are directly affected by them, one could be excused for thinking that it 
was established only as a way of complying with the UK’s ECHR obligations, rather than as a 
genuine peacebuilding body. In turn, this perceived unwillingness to honestly and effectively 
address the injustices of the past, despite the presence of institutions suggesting otherwise, 
made it less likely that social and psychological change would be induced. 
 
The HET had not completed its mandate, when in January 2015 its tasks were taken over by 
the newly established Legacy Investigation Branch, which, unlike its predecessor that was 
institutionally independent, is part of the Police Service of Northern Ireland.1232 In theory, the 
change should not affect the public’s perceptions of the peacebuilding initiative, since the new 
body’s mandate and practices have remained the same.1233 Ultimately, it has been argued, what 
is important is not the title of the body, but ‘the confidence of the families and the public at 
large’.1234 However, especially in post-violence contexts, symbolism matters. It makes a 
difference that the Legacy Investigation Branch is much smaller and commands far fewer 
resources than the HET, not only because this is likely to further delay ongoing investigations, 
but also due to the importance that the government is seen as ascribing to this matter.1235 
Moreover, considering that the main problem with the original investigations was one of 
partiality, asking the Police Service of Northern Ireland, which currently employs former long-
serving Royal Ulster Constabulary officers, to review past actions of their old colleagues, 
seems counterintuitive.1236 Finally, it is expected that, also due to limited resources, the Legacy 
Investigation Branch will engage less directly than the HET with the families of the victims.1237 
Yet, this decision will do little to convey a genuine interest in promoting feelings of peace. 
Since one of the hurdles for reconciliation is the lack of trust between family members and the 
state authorities, a close relationship between the two during the review process could help 
address this. Reducing communication between the key stakeholders and the investigating 
officers undermines both transparency and the possibility that this trust will develop.  
 
The final condition for human rights to successfully induce subjective psychological changes 
among the population is that they are protected by an institution that the public trusts and does 
not consider biased or illegitimate.1238 If the institution does not possess these characteristics, 
the victims and the general population observing its proceedings, are unlikely to feel that rights 
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have been adequately protected, and risk being disillusioned with the peace process.1239 
Allegations of illegitimacy or bias are usually spread by those who oppose the human rights 
policy, and can take root, especially in instances where the public does not know or understand 
much about the institution’s operations.1240 Moreover, such allegations are generally more 
pronounced and effective if the decision of the human rights body is controversial or unpopular, 
or if it rests on a complicated or nuanced point of law that non-lawyers might not be able to 
follow easily.1241 In such cases, suspicious audiences might view human rights as tools through 
which policy makers are trying to trick or manipulate them, and therefore become even more 
resistant to social or psychological changes associated with their protection.  
 
This was, for instance, the case with Demopoulos v Turkey, in which it was held that GC 
displaced persons had an obligation to apply to the Immovably Property Commission (IPC) 
and exhaust domestic remedies before they resorted to the ECtHR.1242 Until Demopoulos, the 
argument made by the applicants and accepted by the Court was that the legal and factual 
situation in the occupied area of Cyprus was such, that it was futile applying to the ‘TRNC’ 
Courts for a remedy since the outcome of that application was forlorn.1243 This was primarily 
because of two reasons. First, as a matter of law, under Article 159 of the ‘TRNC’ Constitution, 
GC were considered as having voluntarily abandoned their properties in 1974, which 
subsequently became ownership of the ‘TRNC’.1244 Second, as a matter of fact, the effects of 
Article 159 were that GC were prevented from using, accessing or benefiting from their 
properties in any way.1245 In Demopoulos, the Court completely reversed this position and held 
that the newly established IPC, which had been set up by Turkey in occupied Cyprus in order 
to remedy GC displaced persons, was an effective domestic remedy that applicants should use. 
This is despite the fact that both Article 159 and the factual situation on the ground remained 
unchanged. The ECtHR theoretically addressed the applicants’ concerns with regards the IPC’s 
(lack of) legality, legitimacy and effectiveness by arguing, for instance, that since they could 
sue Turkey for its actions in the areas not under the control of the Republic, then it was Turkey’s 
right, and indeed responsibility, to respond in some way to their allegations.1246 The IPC was 
simply Turkey’s response to these allegations and should not be seen as legitimising the illegal 
invasion or the ‘TRNC’ in any way.1247 
 
Yet, in its reasoning, the Court failed to pay adequate attention to the fact that the IPC was in 
no way an organ that the target audience trusted or considered legitimate. GC had been 
displaced from their properties and forced to stay away by an occupying power. Now the only 
remedy that was available to them for this injustice was to turn to the very same occupying 
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power and, starting from the premise established by Article 159 of the ‘TRNC’ Constitution 
(that remains in place and on which the IPC Law is based1248), receive compensation for the 
loss of their property. The IPC can offer no apology for the forced displacement, cannot order 
the withdrawal of the Turkish troops from the occupied area of Cyprus – in fact, its very 
existence is premised on Turkey maintaining effective control over that part of the island – and 
in the vast majority of cases, cannot offer restitution to the displaced persons.1249 Moreover, in 
practice, the IPC is almost designed to make applicants distrustful of it: it imposes unreasonable 
obligations in terms of the documents that they are expected to produce (such as a complete 
list of all the movable properties they had left behind in their homes more than 40 years 
ago),1250 uses the criminal standard of proof of beyond reasonable doubt1251 and its language 
of operation is Turkish, which almost none of the applicants (nor the two international members 
that lend credibility to it) speak.1252 Perhaps most problematically, both its composition and 
procedures are designed to protect the interests of Turkey and the ‘TRNC’ and not the GC 
applicants, who tend to resort to it because they have lost hope that there will be a 
comprehensive settlement to the Cyprus problem, or are financially desperate.1253 As a result, 
since 2005 when the IPC was established, only 6,539 of the 165,000 eligible displaced persons 
have applied to it.1254 Consequently, both the ECtHR and the IPC have been delegitimised in 
the eyes of GC, a phenomenon that has further aggravated efforts for reconciliation on the 
island.1255 In the absence of a body that the public trusts and considers legitimate, even when 
human rights are technically protected, conflicts as psychological states of affairs are likely to 
linger, rather than be properly resolved. 
 
V. Strategies For Promoting Subjective Feelings of Peace 
At a first glance, the conditions for ensuring that human rights contribute to subjective feelings 
of peace might sound abstract and unable to shape peacebuilding policies on the ground. This 
section addresses the criticism by outlining two practical proposals that can help with their 
materialisation. The first recommends that peacebuilding responses to complex and 
multidimensional conflicts are tailored to the needs of the specific post-violence society and 
are themselves equally multifaceted.1256 In turn, this necessitates a partial shift in the staffing 
of peacebuilding operations along two axes: from international to local experts on the one hand, 
and from lawyers to a range of other professionals, on the other. The second proposal focuses 
on the adoption of a two-way communication strategy between the peacebuilders and the 
population within the post-violence society.  
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A. Rethinking the Composition of the Peacebuilding Team 
Perhaps one of the most insightful scholarly works on the limitations of liberal peacebuilding 
is Peaceland by Severine Autesserre, an academic with previous experience as a 
peacebuilder.1257 Autesserre notes that there are two types of knowledge that could be helpful 
to the conflict resolution process, namely thematic or technical expertise on the one hand, and 
local or country expertise, on the other. Over the years, the international peacebuilding 
community has been consistently favouring the former because locating local and reliable 
experts can be difficult when trying to intervene in a post-violence society on short notice. 
Thus, international policy-makers and the peacebuilders they employ on the ground have 
tended to operate on the assumption that thematic expertise is easily transferable from one post-
violence society to the next, and that programmes that have been successful in one place can 
be implemented in another with relatively little knowledge of the context. This favouring of 
thematic experts (who are almost always non-local) has been further promoted by several 
competitive advantages they enjoy over domestic actors. International peacebuilders do not 
have any connections to the post-violence society to which they are deployed, which makes it 
easier for them to avoid pressures from family members or friends to secure jobs, money or 
other services for them, and minimises the possibility that they will be coerced in any way.1258 
Moreover, their detachment from the context means that they can avoid the perception of a 
group bias and that unlike some local elites, they have no vested interest in the status quo.1259 
Due to these practical advantages, international peacebuilders have been discouraged from 
mingling with the locals or spending too much time in the same post-violence society, which 
has in turn, resulted in their even more sanitised understanding of the context, glimpsed mainly 
through reports and executive summaries.1260  
 
While to some extent understandable, the remoteness of international peacebuilders risks 
undermining the effectiveness of their strategies because even in rare occasions when they are 
stationed in the same post-violence society for several years, they lack the network, reputation, 
legitimacy and credibility that is often enjoyed by their local counterparts.1261 Furthermore, 
since international actors do not have a deep insight of the post-violence society, they have to 
rely on dominant narratives, rather than more complex analyses of what specific conflicts are 
about and how their resolution may be hindered by customs, taboos, history and politics.1262 
However, a peacebuilding strategy can only address the conflicts that its designers know about 
and understand. A superficial knowledge of the context of a specific dispute will necessarily 
result in an equally superficial response. If this response fails to address the most divisive 
conflicts, its impact in terms of building peace will be a limited one. Illustrative of this is the 
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fact that between 1996 and 1999, the international community in BiH spent approximately four 
times as much on rebuilding houses than it did on social support of displaced persons,1263 a 
strategy that was most likely based on the (faulty) assumption that people would return, if only 
they had somewhere to stay. This shows little appreciation of the more layered reasons for the 
displaced persons’ reluctance to move, such as their socio-economic insecurity and the fact 
that they might not have felt welcome by their old neighbours, and goes to explain why 
ultimately, relatively few people chose to go back to their old homes.  
 
While international actors with exclusively thematic expertise generally find it harder to make 
meaningful changes to people’s lives, the sole involvement of local peacebuilders should also 
be avoided. Locals have vested personal interests in the post-violence society, which can 
encourage them to act as spoilers or make them more interested in increasing their personal or 
political power, rather than contributing to peace.1264 Consequently, the best strategy forward 
is to shift power from international to local peacebuilders, only to certain extent. The two 
should participate in the same working groups and the expertise of each – thematic or 
contextual – should be valued equally. Such a step is not only essential for the design and 
implementation of effective peacebuilding strategies, but also in line with the UN’s pronounced 
commitment to self-determination1265 and necessary for avoiding allegations that exclusively 
international teams are operating as neo-colonialists.1266 Furthermore, hybrid staff operations 
are crucial because international peacebuilders report, and are accountable, to a different 
audience than local ones.1267 While the latter are concerned with the responses of people within 
the post-violence society – their friends, families or political supporters – for the former, their 
bosses in different capitals around the world and journalists from The New York Times or The 
Washington Post are potentially more influential in setting the mission’s agenda.1268 Thus, it is 
only by combining the strengths of the two sets of professionals that peacebuilding strategies 
will start making real, and not only legal, changes to the society in which they are operating. 
While however, for the moment, the UN has acknowledged the importance of such an 
integrated approach on paper,1269 in practice, initiatives to empower the grassroots have tended 
to only be adopted in an ad hoc and haphazard manner.1270  
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If one of the reasons that some peacebuilding strategies have failed to address the real concerns 
of people in post-violence societies is the international peacebuilders’ more superficial 
knowledge of the context, another is the significant attention that has been paid to protecting 
human rights by reforming the law, as opposed to inducing social change through other 
mediums.1271 While support is gradually being built in favour of more multidisciplinary teams, 
this trend should not be exaggerated as peacebuilding ‘still remains legalistic in orientation and 
rooted in a civil and political rights-based framework at a policy level.’1272 This is, at least 
partly, because many of the peacebuilders are themselves lawyers.1273 Arguably, lawyers have 
been favoured over other professionals within peacebuilding operations because among the key 
challenges in post-violence societies, is the absence of the rule of law. In such contexts, law is 
a useful tool, since its association with values like justice, objectivity, uniformity, universality 
and rationality, lends legitimacy to the new state of affairs and helps make the post-violence 
society a member of the international community.1274 A second reason for the emphasis on the 
‘legal’ components of a peacebuilding operation is that (especially international) decision-
makers tend to favour short-term, technical projects that are easy to measure and justify to their 
funders, rather than taking action to address soft issues, such as building community relations 
and responding to subjective feelings of insecurity or mistrust of the locals.1275 Focusing on 
legal outcomes, with their emphasis on the volume of cases that have been litigated, amount of 
properties that have been returned or sum of bodies that have been retrieved, is convenient 
because their effects are quantifiable and easy to put on a chart.1276  
 
They say that to the hammer the world looks like a nail. Similarly, there is a risk that to a 
lawyer, a complex conflict – with political, social, economic, cultural, psychological and some 
legal dimensions – looks like a legal puzzle. As a result, when a peacebuilding operation is 
mainly staffed by lawyers, it is almost natural for them to emphasise the protection of (legal) 
human rights because their training and background fuels existing tendencies to search for the 
resolution of a conflict in law.1277 It is therefore unsurprising, in light of their composition, that, 
by and large, peacebuilding teams have ‘prioritised justice issues and [are] financing and 
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supporting the implementation of a plethora of legal initiatives.’1278 While however, lawyers 
are well-suited in drafting complex pieces of legislation, they are generally not trained in 
identifying and developing the conditions that must be in place for a peacebuilding strategy, 
including the implementation of a human rights law, to function effectively. Thus, although 
focusing on these conditions is crucial for the promotion of subjective peace, they have tended 
to receive relatively limited attention.  
 
In light of this problem, if we want to achieve ‘embedded’, rather than just ‘distant justice’,1279 
we should use legal tools, yet also be wary of the ‘seduction of legalism’.1280 Achieving this 
balance requires that peacebuilding operations are staffed by a range of professionals in 
addition to lawyers, such as psychologists, economists, social workers, educators, people 
working within the media, representatives of victim groups, politicians and political analysts. 
If ‘change is driven by multiple factors’, then the composition of peacebuilding teams should 
give the opportunity to different thematic and country experts to identify these and promote 
them.1281 Of course, involving such a wide range of professionals in the planning and 
implementation stages of a peacebuilding strategy may be difficult, both in terms of cost and 
the time it would take for them to reach a decision. One way of addressing the cost problem is 
to engage with local experts, whose services are almost always cheaper than those of 
international peacebuilders. This might not be an option in all post-violence societies due to 
the possible lack of sufficient expertise among the locals, but it can work well in some contexts, 
such as Cyprus, which boasts of high educational levels1282 and an engaged civil society within 
both communities.1283 The coordination problem on the other hand, can be addressed by 
making a conscious effort to build a multi-disciplinary core team of peacebuilders, who are 
then regularly consulted by a range of other professionals. Admittedly, this is likely to result 
in much more complex, expensive and long-term peace operations. These are indeed significant 
hurdles, but if they are used as excuses to prevent much-needed changes in the composition of 
peacebuilding teams, we run the risk that ‘symbolic victories may be mistaken for substantive 
ones, covering a reality that is distasteful.’1284 Empowering different types of peacebuilders – 
both in terms of their nationality and professional qualifications – might make peacebuilding 
more challenging, but it will also make its effects more real.  
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B. Adopting a Two-way Communication Strategy  
Peacebuilders often expect that human rights initiatives might be opposed by those actively 
trying to undermine the peace process, but there is little appreciation that they may also be 
unpopular with the general population at large.1285 They sometimes fail to realise, in other 
words, that while the public might in principle support efforts to promote peace, what this 
means in each context and for different individuals may vary. Especially in post-violence 
societies, where people have shaped their lives and identities around community-tailored 
perceptions of what is just, ‘what might be obvious conclusions to human rights groups and 
advocates, as well as victim organizations, is not necessarily so for other sectors of society.’1286 
It is for this reason that oftentimes one or more of the conditions discussed in Section IV may 
be absent and why human rights, while adequately protected in a technical sense, will be unable 
to induce subjective feelings of peace. One way of addressing this problem is by developing 
effective channels of communication between peacebuilders and their target audience.  
 
Notably, what is meant by ‘target audience’ must be carefully defined, as local leaders and the 
general population of a post-violence society, are not always one and the same. If the two are 
not distinguished, there is a danger that peacebuilders will solely communicate with one and 
assume – often wrongly – that their messages will be accurately communicated to the other as 
well. The outcome of the GC referendum on the Annan Plan in Cyprus, which was a complete 
surprise to the international community, illustrates this danger. While GC political leaders had 
been negotiating a peace agreement under the auspices of the UN for decades, and reassuring 
the international community that the basis of this agreement was understood and accepted by 
the GC public, they had made no effort to prepare their constituents for the compromises that 
would be required of them. To the contrary, the polemic language that was used within – but 
never outside of – Cyprus1287 and the nationalist focus of the educational system1288 were 
completely at odds with what GC politicians were declaring in international fora. As a result, 
when the Plan was presented to the GC public and rejected by a staggering 75,8 per cent of the 
population,1289 both the international community and most GC felt cheated: the former because 
GC swiftly dismissed Kofi Annan’s brainchild – the outcome of years of negotiations – as 
unacceptable, and the latter because the international community had dared propose such a 
peace agreement in the first place. It seems that what was needed, and lacking, in Cyprus in 
2004 was the adoption of a communication strategy that directly linked peacebuilders and their 
real target audience, the public, without having to depend on potentially unreliable political 
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messengers. The importance of this strategy was appreciated early on by the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, which noted in a case concerned with investigations into enforced 
disappearances that ‘society has the right to know the truth regarding such crimes, so as to be 
capable of preventing them in the future.’1290 As a result, it created a duty on the state to 
investigate the forced disappearances and ‘publicly divulge the results of said 
investigation’,1291 both in the Official Gazette and also a daily newspaper with ‘national 
circulation’.1292  
 
Oftentimes, especially in the 21st century, a communication strategy has been understood as 
engagement with the media and essentially outsourcing to journalists the responsibility of 
filtering for, explaining to, and convincing the public that they should change their war-held 
perceptions.1293 This is, arguably, what Lynch and Galtung had in mind when they coined the 
term ‘peace journalism’.1294 The ‘communication strategy’ proposed here however, requires 
more than that, for two reasons. First, individuals are ‘neither passive subjects nor non-
reflexive in their interactions’ with the state, which makes it necessary, to convey messages to 
them – such as explaining the objectives of a given peacebuilding strategy – but also receive 
feedback from them – like whether they find this strategy necessary, legitimate or effective. 
1295 While the media, and especially local and national news outlets, are particularly effective 
in talking to the people,1296 just relying on this strategy results in a one-way traffic, which 
leaves the public with no way of communicating their views and concerns back to the 
peacebuilders. Second, the media might make positive contributions to peace, but it is also 
possible that, by disseminating nationalist messages, they can have the opposite effect.1297 
Thus, what is needed is a two-way communication strategy that is comprehensive in that it 
actively considers both the types of messages it is sending to the general population and the 
best way of disseminating these.  
 
Perhaps it is the SA TRC, among all peacebuilding institutions covered by this study, that has 
adopted the most effective and multifaceted communication strategy and was therefore, able 
to assist SA to ‘come to terms with their past on a morally accepted basis and to advance the 
cause of reconciliation’.1298 One of the reasons the Commission’s communication strategy was 
so effective was that it satisfied all three requirements – paying attention to the content, 
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listening to victims and ensuring the effective dissemination of its message – that are essential 
for maximising the reach and impact of a peacebuilding institution’s work. The content of the 
TRC’s message was a five- (subsequently seven-) volume account of the human rights 
violations that had taken place between 1960 and 1994 in the country.1299 This took care to 
describe atrocities in the country’s history in an accurate, comprehensive and sensitive manner, 
while at the same time, communicating a message that was both nuanced and simple. On the 
one hand, by allowing individual victim stories to become integrated in the broader national 
narrative, the TRC emphasised the human consequences of apartheid. In turn, this made its 
message universal in its reach and easy to comprehend and accept, even by those who kept 
track of the Commission’s proceedings only intermittently.1300 On the other, it was careful to 
nuance its conclusions, such as that there are different categories of perpetrators, with varying 
degrees of culpability.1301 Furthermore, while the TRC could have chosen to document only 
human rights violations that had taken place against blacks – which, after all, constituted the 
overwhelming majority of violations during this period1302 – it also referred to those that had 
been committed by blacks themselves.1303 This strategy, coupled with the Commission’s 
acknowledgement that someone could be both a victim and a perpetrator, showed that it did 
not try to sell an obvious message1304 and pre-empted the sort of defensive alarms that often 
stop new information from inducing social and psychological change.1305  
 
In many instances, like for example, during judicial proceedings, listening to the experience of 
the victims is an integral and unchanging part of the process, thus leaving relatively little 
flexibility to peacebuilding actors to improve this part of their communication strategy. In other 
cases however, it is possible to rely on different methods that will allow the institution in 
question to listen to the victims, such as by relying on consultation procedures,1306 satisfaction 
surveys,1307 or talking to the victims directly.1308 Over the years, the TRC used several of these 
methods, thus allowing itself to fine-tune its communication with the victims in a way that 
balanced its different objectives and achieved them to the greatest possible extent. Its 
procedures originally involved detailed interviews of the victims with statement-takers that had 
been trained by psychologists to function as supportive counsellors and respond to the 
participants’ psychological needs.1309 While this arguably had positive effects in inducing 
psychological changes among the victims, it was such a slow and expensive process that the 
Commission could only have continued with it, if it radically reduced the number of 
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testimonies that it was willing to hear. As a result, this was replaced by a questionnaire 
consisting of close-ended questions that was faster to go through, but resulted in a drop in the 
quality of the interviews and evidence received.1310 Compromising between the two processes, 
the Commission settled on the use of semi-structured interviews that tried to combine the 
strengths, while avoiding the weaknesses, of the two previous approaches.1311 While this has 
been criticised as detracting from the victims’ testimonial experience and therefore 
undermining the possibility that it would result in psychological change,1312 it allowed the 
Commission to obtain information from a wider range of witnesses.1313 In turn, this had the 
advantage of compensating more victims – since only those who had given testimony to the 
TRC were eligible for an individual remedy1314 – and produced better supported conclusions 
than the Commission would have arrived at, had it limited the number of testimonies it heard. 
It is through processes such as these that the TRC ensured, not only that it was heard, but also 
that it heard what the public had to say. 
 
Equally well thought-out was the dissemination strategy of the TRC, which was based on a 
realisation from early on that if a society-wide change was to be made, it had to also address 
the bystanders – the average SA – rather than solely focus on the victims. This resulted in a 
decision that all of the Commission’s proceedings would be broadcasted live on radio, while 
their launch and some high-profile hearings would also be televised.1315 Moreover, the hearings 
took place in town halls, civic centres and churches around the country, thus giving the 
opportunity to members of the public to watch the Commission’s proceedings in person.1316 It 
is a matter of contention whether what the TRC had to say was inducive to reconciliation in 
the country.1317 What is undisputed however, is that its methods of communicating with the SA 
population worked; the Commission’s message might not always have been agreeable, but it 
was always heard.1318 This approach of the TRC is in sharp contrast to the workings of the (SA) 
CRLR, which although had a similar mandate of providing ‘support to the process of 
reconciliation and development’, perceived its role in a much more technical way and did not 
attempt to communicate with its target audience beyond the minimum of providing the 
displaced victims with the necessary remedy.1319 This contrast in approaches resulted in very 
                                                 
1310 Chapman and Ball, ‘The Truth of Truth Commissions’, 26.  
1311 Ibid. 
1312 Saunders, ‘Lost in Translation’.  
1313 Chapman and Ball, ‘The Truth of Truth Commissions’, 27.  
1314 TRC, Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Volume 6, Section 2, ch 1, [11]. 
1315 Ibid, Volume 1, ch 1, [78]. 
1316 Ibid, Volume 1, ch 12 (‘Regional Office Reports: Durban Office’), [41]; ibid, Volume 1, ch 12 (‘Regional 
Office Reports: Johannesburg Office’), [43]. 
1317 Mahmood Mamdani, ‘Amnesty or Impunity? A Preliminary Critique of the Report of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of South Africa (TRC)’ (2002) 32 Diacritics 32; Rosemary Nagy, ‘Reconciliation in 
Post-Commission South Africa: Thick and Thin Accounts of Solidarity’ (2002) 35 Canadian Journal of Political 
Science 323. 
1318 One example of the TRC’s least popular conclusions was its finding that ‘the ANC and its organs […] 
committed gross violations of human rights in the course of their political activities and armed struggles, for which 
they are morally and politically accountable.’ (TRC, Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Volume 
5, ch 6, [132].) 
1319 Department of Land Affairs, White Paper on South African Land Policy, 14. 
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different levels of impact from each institution, thus confirming the importance of taking 
communication with the target audience seriously.1320 
 
VI. Conclusion 
One limitation of liberal peacebuilding is that it assumes that the protection of human rights 
can induce socio-economic and psychological changes that are necessary for subjective peace, 
but it does not explain how or why these will take place. At the same time, critiques of liberal 
peacebuilding have identified this limitation, but have made only general recommendations, if 
any, on how it can be addressed.1321 This chapter has navigated a course between the two 
positions by arguing that the protection of human rights can contribute to subjective feelings 
of peace in three distinct, but compounded, ways: by empowering victims to articulate their 
grievance, pushing the state to formally acknowledge this, and resulting in the provision of a 
remedy. However, for these steps to achieve the successful resolution of conflicts as 
psychological states of affairs, at least two conditions must be in place. On the one hand, it is 
necessary that peacebuilding strategies induce social and economic improvements and 
therefore, make a real impact in the lives of the people within the post-violence society. On the 
other, they must be perceived by the target audience as having this effect, which will in turn, 
result in psychological changes conductive to peace. 
 
While these conditions might appear to be fairly abstract, two concrete peacebuilding strategies 
have been suggested in order to contribute to their materialisation. The first, involves the 
shifting of power within peacebuilding teams from international to local, and from legal to non-
legal, actors. This will encourage the team to devise and implement strategies that will 
complement the protection of human rights, thus addressing the real needs of the public in the 
post-violence society in a more holistic manner. The second, calls for the adoption of a two-
way strategy that will allow the local population to communicate its needs and concerns, and 
peacebuilders to respond to them, in a way that resembles a dialogue between the two. This 
strategy should be comprehensive in that it is concerned, not only with the content of the 
message that is being communicated, but also the most effective ways of reaching the intended 
recipients of the message in each instance.  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
1320 Theunis Roux, ‘Land Restitution and Reconciliation in South Africa’ in Francois Du Bois and Antje Du Bois-
Pedain (eds), Justice and Reconciliation in Post-Apartheid South Africa (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2008) 
1321 Mac Ginty, ‘Indigenous Peace-Making’, 159.  
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Chapter 7 – Conclusion 
 
I. Introduction 
Critiques of liberal peacebuilding can generally be divided into two camps: those that involve 
a fundamental appraisal of the concept, and the rest, that adopt a practical problem-solving 
approach.1322 The first, take issue with the theoretical foundations that shape peacebuilding 
operations by questioning the power of democratic institutions to build peace,1323 or the ability 
of market liberalisation policies to promote socio-economically equitable relations within the 
post-violence society.1324 The second, are concerned with identifying ways of making existing 
peacebuilding structures more effective by, for example, strengthening local actors,1325 raising 
concerns about the lack of legitimacy of different institutions,1326 or making recommendations 
about what powers that should be afforded to different peacebuilding bodies within the 
society.1327 This dichotomy between the two camps has created a lacuna in terms of producing 
research that is both theoretically informed and results in proposals about how peacebuilding 
operations can become more effective. It is this gap that the book sought to fill in relation to 
one peacebuilding strategy, namely the protection of human rights. To this end, the book was 
broadly divided between the first part that devised the theoretical framework and the second, 
that developed and applied it in relation to specific case studies. This chapter brings the two 
analytical strands together, explaining how the conclusions of both inform the fundamental 
critique on the one hand, and result in practical recommendations, on the other. 
 
II. Informing the Liberal Peacebuilding Critique 
Theoretical appraisals of liberal peacebuilding over the last two decades have generally been 
scathing of the model currently applied in post-violence societies. Thus, Ignatieff has argued 
that liberal peace operations are essentially types of ‘empire[s] lite’,1328 which, according to 
Richmond, can only build ‘virtual peace’.1329 Thiessen has lamented the fact that even when 
properly implemented, such strategies result in ‘a shell of a state’1330 and Autessere has 
                                                 
1322 Michael Pugh, ‘The Problem-Solving and Critical Paradigms’ in Roger Mac Ginty (ed), Routledge Handbook 
of Peacebuilding (New York, Routledge, 2013). 
1323 Luc Reychler, Democratic Peace-Building and Conflict Prevention: The Devil Is in the Transition (Leuven, 
Leuven University Press, 1999). 
1324 Jan Selby, ‘The Political Economy of Peace Processes’ in Michael Pugh, Neil Cooper and Mandy Turner 
(eds), Whose Peace? Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding (Basingstoke, Palgrave, 
2011). 
1325 Oliver Richmond and Audra Mitchell (eds), Hybrid Forms of Peace: From Everyday Agency to Post-
Liberalism (Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). 
1326 Rebecca Everly, ‘Assessing the Accountability of the High Representative’ in Dina Francesca Haynes (ed), 
Deconstructing the Reconstruction: Human Rights and Rule of Law in Postwar Bosnia and Herzegovina (Surrey, 
Ashgate, 2008). 
1327 Richard H. Pildes, ‘Ethnic Identity and Democratic Institutions: A Dynamic Perspective’ in Sujit Choudhry 
(ed), Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: Integration or Accommodation? (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2008). 
1328 Michael Ignatieff, Empire Lite: Nation-Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan (London, Vintage, 2003). 
1329 Oliver Richmond, ‘UN Peacebuilding Operations and the Dilemma of the Peacebuilding Consensus’ (2004) 
11 International Peacekeeping 83, 96. 
1330 Charles Thiessen, ‘Emancipatory Peacebuilding: Critical Responses to (Neo)Liberal Trends’ in Thomas 
Matyok, Jessica Senehi and Sean Byrne (eds), Critical Issues in Peace and Conflict Studies: Theory, Practice and 
Pedagogy (Lanham, Lexington Books, 2011), 118. 
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explained the relatively disappointing record of peacebuilding operations by pointing to the 
‘practice of number worship’ when measuring social change.1331 Related, are Mac Ginty’s 
criticisms that the international community’s inability or unwillingness to shape its practices 
by taking into account the unique context of each society, have resulted in ‘off the shelf peace 
interventions’ and a ‘peace from IKEA’.1332  
 
Rather paradoxically considering the vigour with which such criticisms are made, they rarely 
result in specific recommendations about what needs to change in order to avoid the pitfalls 
they identify. Most theoretical critiques either result in no practical recommendations at all,1333 
or give rise to broad, vaguely articulated suggestions that are a far cry from being 
implementable on the ground. For instance, despite Mac Ginty stressing the need to move 
beyond a solely negative critique,1334 his recommendations for improving the liberal peace 
model are unduly open-ended. His first suggestion, that we work towards an ‘everyday peace’, 
is ‘highly context-, location- and time-specific and relies on well-honed interpersonal skills’, 
characteristics that make it difficult to understand what this would look like in a post-violence 
society.1335 Alternatively, his proposal to adopt ‘indigenous peace-making’ over liberal 
peacebuilding strategies lacks content, beyond the obvious observation that local actors should 
be empowered.1336 Similarly, Richmond’s proposal to work towards ‘eirinism’ – a revision of 
liberal peace that makes social, rather than institutional change, a priority – is intuitively 
persuasive, but even clarificatory statements, such as that this depends on ‘acceptance of 
peacebuilding as an empathetic, emancipatory process, focused on everyday care, human 
security and a social contract that provides care as well as security’, remain excessively 
vague.1337 Finally, Paris’ suggestion to address the limitations of the existing peacebuilding 
model through ‘institutionalization before liberalization’ is sufficiently specific, but its 
increased emphasis on institutions and processes, to the almost total disregard of social change, 
is at odds with the needs of subjective peace.1338  
 
This study is rather unique in adopting exactly the opposite approach to the existing literature: 
it delivers a mixed, instead of wholly negative, review of human rights as one instrument in 
the liberal peace toolbox, and makes practical recommendations for their continuing 
improvement, rather than merely focusing on their theoretical limitations. On the one hand, an 
                                                 
1331 Severine Autesserre, Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014) 241.  
1332 Roger Mac Ginty, ‘Indigenous Peace-Making Versus the Liberal Peace’ (2008) 43 Cooperation and Conflict 
139, 145. 
1333 See, eg, Chandra Lekha Sriram, ‘Justice as Peace? Liberal Peacebuilding and Strategies of Transnational 
Justice’ (2007) 21 Global Society 579. 
1334 Mac Ginty, ‘Indigenous Peace-Making’, 159, arguing that ‘[t]he radical research agenda now needs to move 
beyond merely criticizing the failings of the liberal peace to scoping the extent to which alternatives […] are 
possible.’ 
1335 Roger Mac Ginty, ‘Everyday Peace: Bottom-up and Local Agency in Conflict Affected Societies’ (2014) 45 
Security Dialogue 548, 555. 
1336 Mac Ginty, ‘Indigenous Peace-Making’. 
1337 Oliver Richmond, ‘A Post-Liberal Peace: Eirinism and the Everyday’ (2009) 35 Review of International 
Studies 557, 578. 
1338 Roland Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2004). 
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assessment of their peacebuilding potential in the four case studies suggests that human rights 
can almost always have positive effects, whether these are symbolic, result in institutional and 
legal amendments, or, most ambitiously, induce social and psychological changes among the 
population. All of these changes are essential in post-violence societies: if institutional and 
legal amendments are adopted in the absence of broader social initiatives, then only a 
superficial type of peace is likely to be built. Alternatively, if attempts are made to induce 
social, but not legal change, then the results of peacebuilding efforts are likely to be ephemeral. 
In practice, human rights language has made symbolic inroads even in relation to fundamental 
conflicts, such as those concerning missing persons in Cyprus; resulted in legal amendments, 
for example in relation to the right to life in NI; and contributed to social and psychological 
changes when being used by the TRC in SA. At the same time, the picture is not all rosy: 
despite some positive developments in Cyprus, the most divisive fundamental conflicts, such 
as those relating to remedying the displaced, have largely remained unresolved. Similarly, 
institutional and legal amendments in NI, and even more so in BiH, have not been transformed 
to social and psychological changes among the population, while in SA, this has only happened 
to a limited extent and is mostly due to the efforts of a single institution.  
 
This mixed review suggests that more can, and needs to, be done in order to enhance the 
peacebuilding potential of human rights. On the most abstract level, peacebuilders must be 
clear from the outset on what they are working towards, rather than merely have a vague idea 
of what peace looks like. Taking into account the specific needs of each society, they must 
strike a balance between security, justice and reconciliation considerations and explicitly rely 
on these in order to shape peacebuilding policies on the ground. More practically, when using 
human rights to adjudicate disputes, peacebuilders should acknowledge the strengths of the 
judiciary in resolving minor conflicts and its limitations in addressing their fundamental 
counterparts. With these in mind, they must seek to resolve as many zero-sum conflicts as 
possible during the negotiation of the comprehensive peace agreement and take advantage of 
the peace momentum, rather than push differences under the carpet by opting for constructive 
ambiguity. At the same time, since minor disagreements are often successfully resolved in the 
courtroom, the judiciary should be strengthened through the training of legal actors, the 
creation of specialised courts, the simplification of legal procedures and the better cooperation 
between domestic and international institutions. Finally, peacebuilders should decide whether, 
and when, to rely on human rights adjudication by considering the effect that the passage of 
time can have on a court’s reasoning, ability and willingness to resolve the conflict.  
 
When using human rights with the expectation that they will result in the adoption and 
implementation of peacebuilding policies, the political willingness of the decision makers to 
induce change must be a primary consideration. Even when this is present however, challenges 
might arise in relation to the drafting of the relevant legislation, or when it is being implemented 
by a body that lacks the capacity, expertise, institutional independence or resources to 
undertake the task successfully. These hurdles can be overcome by involving, where needed, 
international actors and civil society organisations. Such involvement can give rise to political 
pressure to build peace, or to the provision of technical expertise that will address the other two 
challenges. Further, the analysis suggests that the composition of the peacebuilding team 
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should be reconsidered and shifted along two axes: from international to also domestic actors, 
and from legal to non-legal experts as well. This will provide the team with the local knowledge 
and multidisciplinary perspectives needed to induce socio-economic and psychological 
changes within the post-violence society. Finally, since peace must not only be built, but also 
be seen to be built, it is important that any initiatives are accompanied by a comprehensive 
communication strategy that not only speaks to, but also receives information from the local 
population about its needs and concerns.  
 
These recommendations do not form an exhaustive list of steps that necessarily lead to the 
building of peace. They should also not be endorsed by detracting attention from additional 
challenges of peacebuilding operations that have been identified by the UN, such as insufficient 
funding or lack of coordination among different actors.1339 Rather, their adoption, alongside 
other proposals for improvement, can be one way of enhancing the effectiveness of 
peacebuilding operations. Thus, the aforementioned recommendations seek to achieve this, not 
by overhauling the liberal peace agenda, but by merely making tweaks to it. For example, they 
take for granted that the international community will have an interest, and continue being 
involved, in peacebuilding initiatives within post-violence societies, but urge that such 
involvement does not overshadow the importance of local ownership of the process. Similarly, 
the study accepts that there is an international trend, both in post-violence societies and 
elsewhere, of the judiciary being asked to adjudicate and resolve political disagreements.1340 
Taking this as a given, the recommendations focus on ensuring that increased judicial 
involvement in the resolution of conflicts will be such, that it produces positive results.  
 
Nevertheless, the difficulty of adopting and internalising (even small) changes to the liberal 
peace agenda should not be underestimated. In an ideal scenario, these will not only shape local 
practices, but also have an impact on those who fund peace operations, such as international 
organisations, governments and large non-governmental bodies. In such a case, the 
recommendations could reshape from within how peacebuilders present, justify and assess their 
work. As a result, if they are taken seriously, they can lead to a shift in the balance of power 
among existing actors, and as such, are likely to be resisted by some, while endorsed by others. 
At the same time, hurdles in the adoption of such proposals are not insurmountable. For 
instance, the emphasis on subjective security, justice and reconciliation is indeed likely to make 
any peacebuilding operation longer, as socio-economic and psychological changes need 
several years before they can take root. While this risks making the operation unaffordable, the 
empowerment of local peacebuilders and the strengthening of civil society organisations can 
reduce costs and give a different kind of momentum to the process, thus ensuring its longevity. 
 
                                                 
1339 For a discussion of these challenges, see Roland Paris, ‘Understanding the “Coordination Problem” in Postwar 
Statebuilding’ in Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk (eds), The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the 
Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations (London, Routledge, 2009). 
1340 There is extensive literature discussing this phenomenon. See, eg, Tom Gerard Daly, The Alchemists: 
Questioning Our Faith in Courts as Democracy-Builders (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2017); Ran 
Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism (Cambridge, 
Harvard University Press, 2004); Samuel Issacharoff and Richard H. Pildes, ‘Politics as Markets: Partisan 
Lockups of the Democratic Process’ (1998) 50 Stanford Law Review 643. 
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III. Getting from Peace in the Books to Peace on the Ground 
In three out of the four case studies – BiH, NI and SA – the peacebuilding operation has been 
in place for more than 20 years, and as a result, it is too late to implement all of the 
recommendations that have been made here. In all of them however, it is still possible to make 
at least some changes that draw inspiration from the preceding analysis. For instance, an 
assessment of the provisions of the (SA) Employment Equality Act [55 of 1998] that seeks to 
address the problem of discrimination in the workplace, suggests that these should be amended. 
While the Act creates specialised bodies that applicants can theoretically resort to, procedural 
hurdles make both the Commission of Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration, and the Labour 
Courts, on which the Act relies, inaccessible. As a result, relatively minor conflicts that could 
have been successfully addressed in these forums, remain unresolved and perpetuate a sense 
of injustice in the country. Taking into account the continuing inequalities and discrimination 
in SA, such amendments could, even today, have a positive peacebuilding effect.  
 
Similarly, the proposals point to overdue changes that must take place to the BiH peace 
architecture and in particular, the need to shift power from international to local actors. 
Significant improvements on this front have already been made, as evidenced by a comparison 
between the existing situation and the days when the High Representative was responsible for 
every single major legislative change in the country.1341 Even so, it is arguably high time that 
the international community starts considering how best to dissolve the Office of the High 
Representative and create the space for local politicians to come to the fore. This is not to 
suggest that the transition will be seamless or that all local actors will resist the temptation to 
continue acting as spoilers. However, it is a necessary step, not only because the High 
Representative’s lack of accountability has festered and allegedly resulted in shady backroom 
politics over the years,1342 but because at some point, BiH must start being run like a truly 
democratic state. In this endeavour, the strengthening of civil society organisations to 
counterbalance the gradual withdrawal of the international community will also be helpful, but 
insights which warn against a simplistic and overly positive depiction of such actors should be 
taken into account as well.  
 
Finally, lessons can be learned about the improvement of the peacebuilding process in NI. This 
has aptly been characterised as ‘piecemeal’, since it lacks a central commitment among the 
parties to address fundamental questions as to who is a victim and perpetrator, and what are 
appropriate responses for each type of actor.1343 Limitations of this fragmented process 
notwithstanding, the many initiatives within it, give peacebuilders a greater opportunity to 
strike a balance between the different elements of peace that each promotes. This makes it even 
more important for them to have a clear understanding of what peace means and, considering 
this together with the needs of the NI society, make decisions about what should be prioritised 
                                                 
1341 Gergana Dimitrova, ‘Democracy and International Intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (2005) 6 Central 
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1342 Roland Kostić, ‘Shadow Peacebuilders and Diplomatic Counterinsurgencies: Informal Networks, Knowledge 
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and when. A more practical observation is that the replacement of the Historical Enquiries 
Team, which investigated conflict-related deaths, by the Legacy Investigation Branch, provides 
authorities with the opportunity to change policies and adopt a much more effective 
communication strategy with the public. This will ensure that its investigations do not merely 
comply with the UK’s human rights obligations, but are also perceived by the parties as a 
genuine effort to promote reconciliation among the victims’ families.  
 
However, it is Cyprus that has the most to gain from a careful consideration of this study’s 
recommendations. Although some peacebuilding initiatives on the island are already 
underway, the lack of a comprehensive peace agreement gives Cypriots the opportunity to take 
such proposals into account (almost) from the outset. For example, peacebuilders should 
consider during the negotiations, what is meant by ‘justice’ in the context of Cyprus and how 
this is best promoted in the eyes of both communities. At the same time, they should determine 
the powers of a newly formed constitutional court and other specialised bodies, by bearing in 
mind the preceding analysis of the judiciary’s mixed ability to resolve different types of 
conflicts. Perhaps most importantly in light of the island’s history and their past mistakes, 
negotiators should take meaningful steps to establish a communication strategy between them 
and the general population. If they do not, they leave the public uninformed about what is being 
discussed on its behalf, with the risk that when the peace settlement is put to a referendum, it 
will (again) be rejected. The way the idea of the ‘communication strategy’ is understood here, 
as one that talks to, but also receives feedback from the public, acquires increased importance 
because it is only by engaging in this two-way process that negotiators can become both 
effective and legitimate peacebuilders. In this respect, the empowerment of local actors and 
strengthening of civil society organisations, who should act, not as assistants to the 
international community, but as equal partners, are also important considerations to take into 
account. The international community should learn from past experiences in Cyprus and 
acknowledge that peacebuilding policies that are devised and implemented by those actually 
experiencing the challenges such policies seek to address, are much more likely to speak to the 
local population and be effective in achieving their objectives. 
 
Finally, the lessons drawn from the four case studies can be usefully applied to other societies 
that have recently emerged from, or are in the process of ending, violent conflict. With various 
levels of violence ranging in Syria, Yemen, Mozambique and Haiti; growing instability in 
Tunisia, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sri Lanka; and frozen conflicts being 
maintained or becoming hotter in Kashmir, Nagorno-Karabakh and Ukraine, to name but a 
few, the stakes for the success of peacebuilding operations could not be higher. Especially in 
societies where the security situation on the ground makes academic research difficult, a 
theoretical framework and practical recommendations derived from a comparison of other 
post-violence contexts, could offer a useful starting point for action. 
 
IV. The Need for Further Research 
The theoretical analysis undertaken in relation to the potential of human rights to resolve 
conflicts and the practical recommendations that have been drawn from this, concern only one 
component of the peacebuilding agenda. A similar exercise, where existing assumptions are 
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unpacked and examined, must take place in relation to its other components, such as the rule 
of law and the rapid push towards democratisation and market liberalisation.1344 More directly 
connected to the subject matter of this study is also the need to conduct further research on the 
peacebuilding effects of socio-economic1345 and group rights.1346 Additionally, oftentimes 
emerging from the literature is the assumption that human rights, this time understood more 
broadly as social values and not only as legal tools, have an untapped educative potential.1347 
Whether this is indeed the case, the conditions under, and ways in which, they can educate the 
public should also be explored. Finally, an application of the theoretical framework that has 
been proposed here to different post-violence societies could shed light on other conditions, 
the presence of which, can further enhance the peacebuilding potential of human rights.  
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